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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the development of national justice processes in Uganda in the wake of 
war in order to address key theoretical dilemmas that have recently emerged in the field of 
transitional justice. I focus on closely connected debates over the exclusion of socioeconomic 
justice, the relationship between international, national and local actors, the role of 
transitional justice discourse, and ultimately, the future of the field itself. Based on fieldwork 
undertaken in Kampala, the Acholi district and the temporary international arena created in 
Kampala for the 2010 ICC Review Conference, this thesis traces the role of local, national 
and international actors in the war itself, the search for peace, and the current „post-conflict‟ 
period. I examine the ways in which actors at all „levels‟ narrate the northern conflict and 
accordingly negotiate and contest the nature, scope and course of post conflict justice. I argue 
that the struggle for a meaningful approach to transitional justice is global in dimension. The 
power to define and perform postwar „justice‟ is concentrated in the hands of the state. A high 
risk persists that Uganda‟s transitional justice policy will prove an empty performance of 
„victor‟s justice.‟ International and domestic actors alike have shaped and justified the 
Ugandan Government‟s self-interested approach and facilitated the dominance of 
international criminal justice. Conversely, civil society actors at all levels in Uganda draw on 
transitional justice as a radical language of resistance to fight for meaningful change. As long 
as it fails to address socioeconomic issues and structural violence however, transitional 
justice discourse will ultimately fall short of giving political voice to local priorities, and 
activating long-term social transformation. I argue that the field of transitional justice must be 
re-envisioned to embrace socioeconomic justice, in order to impel the endless pursuit of a just 
society. This task will require the collective efforts of a global constellation of actors.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Contrasting Meetings: Community Dialogue versus International Dialogue 
 
In a bare clearing in a small village, a diverse group of people gathered under an 
ominous cloudy sky. Along with many other villages in Northern Uganda, the people of 
Lukodi have experienced decades of insecurity, social and economic devastation, 
displacement in crowded, squalid camps and attacks by both the Lord‟s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and Government forces. Just six years ago, the LRA raided Lukodi, massacring 
over sixty people.
1
 In July 2010, a local Gulu-based Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO), the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP), hosted a special promotional 
„community dialogue‟ for Lukodi villagers to express their views about the complex issues 
of justice, reconciliation and accountability that are heavily debated in the wake of the 
northern war.
2
 On one side of the clearing sat several rows of people in plastics chairs, 
including many members of the host NGO JRP sporting bright logo-printed T-shirts, 
representatives of the JRP‟s international donors, and Government staff involved in 
national transitional justice policy. Gathered opposite were around sixty Lukodi villagers: 
some sat cross-legged on woven mats while others stood. Between the two groups, 
technical crew from the popular local radio channel Mega FM recorded the interactions 
on camera. One by one villagers, NGO staff and transitional justice „experts‟ from Gulu 
town put forward their views on justice after the war before heavy rain rapidly dispersed 
the crowds. 
 
Clearly, this particular community dialogue event was in part a contrived performance 
for visiting donors and Government officials who had traveled from Kampala and beyond 
Uganda to attend the official NGO launch of JRP, which took place later that day. Despite 
this and the awkwardly distant seating arrangement, it was clear that the present members 
of the Lukodi community had an open platform to express their views. One villager 
                                                 
1
 See, Justice and Reconciliation Project, The Lukodi Massacre: 19th May 2004, JRP Field Note XIII (Gulu, The 
Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2011) http://justiceandreconciliation.com/#/publications/4540226079 
[Accessed 10 August 2011] 
2
 Community Dialogue held by Justice and Reconciliation Project, Lukodi Village, Gulu District, 23 July 2010 
Description of this event is based on the author‟s participant observation and discussion with several involved 
actors after the dialogue. Comments made by villagers in Luo were translated  by attending Gulu NGO actors.  
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passionately declared that Lukodi people perceive both the Government and the LRA as 
perpetrators, and demanded to know why the International Criminal Court (ICC) had 
failed to address the crimes of Museveni‟s regime. He received enthusiastic applause. The 
guest speaker struggled to explain the ICC‟s legal justification for the limited nature of the 
ICC‟s intervention in Uganda in the local language (Luo), and eventually broke into 
English. Amongst a community deeply affected by the war, his attempts to explain why the 
ICC indicted only the LRA fell flat. Another villager asked who would compensate those 
who were tortured, lost property or were injured? Would the Government assist the 
economic recovery of Lukodi and the wider Acholi region? At one point, the MEGA FM 
facilitator put the Government actor on the spot, demanding, „what is the national 
program concerning traditional justice, truth telling and reparations?‟ With visible 
reluctance, she stood and explained that two years after the war ended, nothing had yet 
been developed. Later that night the Lukodi dialogue and JRP launch was broadcast on 
national television.
3
 Over the picture, JRP staff urgently emphasized that the plight of 
Northern Uganda must be heard, and that the Government must respond.   
 
A month earlier in the most opulent hotel-conference complex in Kampala, another 
diverse range of actors met for the ICC‟s first Review Conference. ICC officials, 
representatives of ICC member states, a host of international and domestic NGOs, donors, 
scholars, students and even a few conflict „victims‟ met to review the impact of the ICC on 
various „situation countries,‟ including Uganda. A widely held expectation prevailed 
throughout the conference that all actors present must support the development of the ICC 
to advance the global “fight against impunity.”4 In his address during the opening of the 
conference, the ICC‟s prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo emphasized the grand vision that 
international criminal justice will “deter the crimes” and “protect the victims.”5 The new 
international Court, he affirmed boldly, will “force political actors to adjust to new legal 
limits.” 6 
 
A contradiction quickly became apparent between different NGO‟s portrayals of the 
impact of the international Court in Uganda. In the DVD „The Reckoning,‟ widely 
                                                 
3
 Personal observation, 23 July 2010 
4
 Participant observation at the Review Conference of the ICC, Kampala, June 2010 
5
 Moreno-Ocampo, Luis, Opening remarks at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court, 31
st
 
May 2010, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC-RC-statements-
LuisMorenoOcampo-ENG.pdf [Accessed 12 August 2011]  
6
 Ibid 
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circulated and screened at the conference by civil society groups, Ugandans are pictured 
as grateful, passive recipients of international criminal justice.
7
  In contrast, at a side 
event held in the „people‟s space‟ tent, another international NGO gave activists from 
Northern Uganda a platform to speak.
8
 Standing out amongst a sea of dark suits, a woman 
in vibrant patterned dress raised her voice. With passion, she recognized that the ICC 
might have something to offer, but demanded that both parties in the war face 
accountability. She declared that the ICC had failed to address Government crimes, and 
expressed doubt that the new domestic International Criminal Division (ICD) in Ugandan 
would prove any better.
9
 Most of all, she reflected, Northern Ugandans need economic 
opportunities, reparations and truth. “Many international people,” she contended, “see 
the ICC as the key justice body, but on the ground we see that it is ineffective.”10  
 
Thesis conception:  
Research Agenda  
 
This thesis analyzes the development of national justice processes in Uganda in the wake of 
war in order to address key theoretical dilemmas that have recently emerged in the field of 
transitional justice. As commonly conceived, transitional justice comprises of a range of 
mechanisms and processes that aim to bring accountability, justice, and reconciliation as 
societies emerge from a period of violent civil conflict or authoritarian rule.
11
 From an initial 
focus on criminal retributive justice, the field has expanded to also recognize a wider range of 
mechanisms, such as truth commissions, reparations, building the rule of law, and 
reconciliation processes.
12
 While the concept of transitional justice is relatively new, it has 
rapidly taken root in the conceptual landscape and structures of international law, national 
governance and civil society worldwide. It has been institutionalized in ad hoc international 
                                                 
7
 Yates, Pamela, Dir. The Reckoning: The Battle for the International Criminal Court (Skylight Pictures, 2009) 
8
 „Women‟s Initiative for Gender Justice.‟ Note that the Ugandan activists were also representatives of local 
based Non-Governmental Organizations or Community based groups.  
9
 Note that until mid 2011 the International Crimes Division (ICD) was referred to as the War Crimes Court. 
Throughout this thesis however, I refer to the ICD.   
10
 Author‟s notes of the side event „Women‟s Court,‟ held by the Women‟s Initiative for Gender Justice at the 
Review Conference of the ICC, Kampala, June 2010 
11
 See United Nations Security Council, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict 
Societies, Report of the Secretary General, S/2004/616 (United Nations Security Council, August 2004) 
http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed 13 
August 2011], p.4  
12
 Ibid 
12 
 
criminal tribunals, a flurry of national truth commissions, and in the permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Transitional justice has furthermore become embedded in the post-
conflict development agenda of the United Nations (UN), and in the raison d'être of numerous 
international and local NGOs.  
 
Recently however, criticism has emerged that rigorously contests the theoretical 
underpinnings, conceptual reach, and practical implementation of transitional justice. While 
many authors defend the traditional scope and aspirations of the field, a new wave of 
scholarship has cast doubt upon the liberal and legal underpinnings of transitional justice, and 
its narrow conception of „justice.‟ Scholars critique the way in which transitional justice is 
often internationally or nationally imposed on local communities, and implemented in a 
manner that disguises the workings of political power. While some theorists accordingly 
argue that „transitional justice‟ must be expanded and re-envisioned, others suggest that the 
concept is so tainted by its imperialist, legalistic origins that those seeking meaningful justice 
in the wake of war should forsake it entirely.
13
  
 
This thesis explores the debate by drawing on an in depth case study of Uganda. Based on 
fieldwork undertaken in Kampala, the Acholi district and the temporary „international arena‟ 
created in Kampala for the 2010 ICC Review Conference, I examine the „political ecology‟ of 
transitional justice development in Uganda, tracing the role of a myriad of local, national and 
international actors in the war itself, the search for peace, and the current „post-conflict‟ 
period in which the struggle for justice continues. I examine the ways in which actors at all 
„levels‟ narrate the northern conflict, influence one another, and accordingly negotiate and 
contest the nature, scope and course of post conflict justice. Throughout, I pay particular 
attention to how involved actors draw on the concept of „transitional justice.‟ 
 
 It should be noted that I use the terms „international, national and local‟ simply to indicate 
the primary identity and „level‟ of operation of individuals or groups. International, for 
instance, refers to actors foreign to Uganda, such as the inter-Governmental organization the 
ICC, foreign donors, and international NGOs, while „national‟ refers to Government actors, 
or to domestic civil society groups with a nation-wide reach. „Local‟ broadly denotes actors 
                                                 
13
 Bell, Christine, 'Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the Field or Non-field', International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, 3.1 (2009), 5   
 
13 
 
that identify and operate primarily within a local area (in this case, the Acholi region, 
Northern Uganda), such as civil society groups, communities, and religious and traditional 
leaders. Certainly, these categories are far from discrete. As I explore throughout this thesis, it 
can be difficult and even arbitrary to distinguish between these levels, as international, 
national and local actors often work in close collaboration, while some actors identify across 
different categories.  
 
Thesis Argument 
 
In this thesis, I demonstrate that there is a high risk that the Ugandan Government‟s 
transitional justice program will amount to nothing more than an empty performance of 
„victors‟ justice‟ that fails to address the underlying structural and economic dynamics of the 
conflict, or engage with the priorities of war-affected communities.     
While the Ugandan Government presents a war narrative that focuses exclusively on the 
atrocities of the LRA, both the Ugandan regime and international actors bear responsibility 
for the 20-year conflict. I argue that in their ardent pursuit of international criminal justice, 
many international and domestic actors have facilitated and justified the Government‟s 
portrayal of the conflict and its narrow, partial approach to justice. I examine the work of 
groups who have contested the Government‟s narrative of the war, and strategically drawn on 
transitional justice discourse to confront the State‟s self-interested justice. This challenge has 
stemmed not only from local groups representing local interests, but also from national and 
international players. The capacity of such actors to represent local justice priorities, 
however, is often severely limited by their failure to unequivocally encompass the idea of 
„socioeconomic justice‟ in their advocacy.  
 
Throughout this thesis I argue that in many ways, the struggle for a meaningful approach to 
transitional justice is global in dimension, transcending the categories of international, 
national and local. There is a strong tendency for the concept of justice to be monopolized by 
international criminal law, and manipulated by elite political interests. However, civil society 
actors at all levels can transitional justice as a radical language of resistance to fight for 
meaningful change in the wake of war.  
14 
 
The Ugandan case illustrates that the field of transitional justice must be re-envisioned to 
embrace socioeconomic justice in order to impel the endless pursuit of a just society. This can 
only be achieved through the collective efforts of actors at all levels. 
 
Literary Contribution  
 
This thesis contributes to three key, overlapping areas of debate that have recently emerged in 
the field of transitional justice. The first is the debate over whether structural socio-economic 
justice and development issues should be included within the scope of transitional justice. 
The second area concerns the role of international, national, and local actors in the 
conception, development and implementation of transitional justice processes. The final area 
addresses how involved actors use the language of transitional justice. This debate pivots 
around the extent to which transitional justice has come to represent an inherently hegemonic 
enterprise, and whether the discourse of „transition‟ can be reworked and redeemed.  
 
Theoretical debates in the field of transitional justice are reflected in rich, regionally specific 
discussions over the nature of justice, peace, and reconciliation in Uganda. Particularly since 
the Ugandan Government‟s controversial referral of the „situation concerning the LRA‟ to the 
ICC in 2003, a rapidly expanding literature has emerged that contests the impact and 
appropriateness of different justice „modes‟ at the international, national and local level. 
Frequently, scholars that contribute to such debates are personally involved in the landscape 
of post conflict justice in Uganda. Many have worked for local or national NGOs, 
international NGOs, the Ugandan Government or the ICC. In the field of transitional justice, 
scholarship, practice and advocacy are closely intertwined.  
  
The various scholarly positions that I will expound upon are often strongly divergent. 
Summarized in broad strokes, some authors defend the legitimacy of the ICC intervention, 
arguing that it acted within the confines of the Rome Statute. Others emphasize that war-
affected communities welcome international criminal accountability. Conversely, other 
scholars criticize perceived outcomes of international intervention, arguing that the ICC 
quashed hopes for a peace settlement, undermined local „traditional‟ processes, or validated 
the Government‟s one-sided focus on the crimes of the LRA. The notion of local, „traditional‟ 
justice has also come under considerable scrutiny. While many commentators note that 
15 
 
traditional mechanisms need to be adjusted to conform to human rights standards, others 
argue that traditional mechanisms commonly highlighted are simply not widely supported 
and could prove counterproductive. Within the debate, local and international justice, and 
traditional and retributive justice are often cast in opposition to one another. Scholars also 
rarely specifically include socioeconomic and development issues in the scope of justice. As 
yet, little research has examined the ongoing influence of the ICC and other international and 
domestic civil society actors upon the development of transitional justice mechanisms in 
Uganda. This thesis contributes towards this research gap.  
 
Before I outline my research methodology and provide a structural „road map‟ of this thesis, I 
explore the scholarly field of transitional justice. After providing a critical overview of the 
conceptual development of transitional justice and current trajectory of the field, I focus on 
the three areas of debate identified above. 
 
Critical Debates in the Field of Transitional Justice: Literature Review  
Unraveling the Liberal, Legalist roots of Transitional Justice  
 
To understand the current debates in the rapidly developing field of transitional justice, it is 
vital to explore the origins of the concept. The founding scholars of transitional justice 
portray the concept as grounded in historical practice. While John Elster traces back the 
practice transitional justice thousands of years, Teitel locates its origins in the Nazi War 
Criminal trials at Nuremburg.
14
 She identifies three key phases in the history of its 
development.
15
 The first phase, according to Teitel‟s „genealogy,‟ emerged in response to 
World War II, and focused almost exclusively on criminal punitive justice. Following the end 
of the Cold War and the wave of „nation building,‟ Teitel‟s „second phase‟ was characterized 
by the expansion of transitional justice practices to include non-criminal judicial alternatives, 
such as truth commissions. Teitel argues that in the third, current „contemporary‟ phase, 
criminal justice mechanisms, non-criminal judicial tools and international and national 
approaches are increasingly recognized as complementary, while transitional justice has 
become „normalized‟ through the expansion of international humanitarian law. While Teitel‟s 
                                                 
14
 Elster, Jon, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004): Teitel, Ruti Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): Teitel, Ruti, 
'Transitional Justice Genealogy', Harvard Human Rights Journal, 16 (2003), 69   
15
 Teitel, Genealogy 
16 
 
genealogy of transitional justice neatly highlights major trends in dominant post conflict 
justice practices, the history she constructs tells a restricted story, and justifies a particular 
way of framing „justice‟ following conflict and regime change.  Like other prominent 
founding transitional justice scholars she offers little reflection on the contextual origin and 
deeper theoretical underpinnings of the term itself.
16
  
 
Closer inspection reveals that the notion of transitional justice as it was originally conceived 
was grounded in an unquestioning faith in the primacy of civil and political human rights, 
liberal democracy, and a particular understanding of „transition.‟17 Arthur‟s analysis suggests 
that the field of transitional justice was born out of an „identity crisis‟ of the human rights 
movement in the 1980s that took place as a series of oppressive dictatorships underwent 
regime change. Human rights activists and scholars identified that their work solely dealt with 
current abuses, rather than the question of how past violations of rights should be dealt with 
and future abuse prevented. A new focus on political transitions accordingly emerged, 
catalyzed by the 1988 Aspen Institute Conference “State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon,” 
which aimed to explore the “issues that arise when a Government that has engaged in gross 
human rights abuses is succeeded by a regime more inclined to respect those rights.”18 
„Transition‟ was widely assumed to refer simply to a transition to democracy and the rule of 
law. „Transition‟ was not conceived as a long, open-ended process to develop the conditions 
necessary for a flourishing public sphere, but rather as a matter of implementing appropriate 
legal and constitutional reforms.
19
 This conception reflected a clear rejection of the 
previously dominant Marxist notion of transition, which envisioned a radical process of social 
and economic transformation at a structural level.
20
 This reconfiguring of the notion of 
„transition,‟ Arthur reveals, reflected a broader „ideological shift‟ towards civil and political 
human rights, and the widespread decline of radical social movements.
21
 Transition became 
understood as a technocratic approach to implementing democracy and reform focused on the 
legal-institutional level.  
 
                                                 
16
 Arthur, Paige, 'How "Transitions" Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice', 
Human Rights Quarterly, 31.2 (2009), 321-67   
17
 Ibid  
18
 Arthur, p.351 
19
 Ibid, p.339 
20
 Ibid, p.337  
21
 Ibid 
17 
 
Early advocates and founders of transitional justice quickly identified with the project, 
solidifying and advancing universal standards of justice. Internationally recognized principles 
for dealing with perpetrators of large-scale human rights abuse and restructuring states‟ 
political and legal apparatus came to be considered crucial to establishing democracy in states 
undergoing transition.
22
 Recalling the discussion at the field-defining 1988 Aspen 
Conference, Diane Orenlicher notes that “even for those who favored some local 
determination” there was general consensus that  “Governments must comply with 
international legal obligations” to ensure accountability.23 Conference scholars agreed on a 
minimal obligation to “acknowledge the truth,” and that whenever possible, Governments 
should prosecute perpetrators of large-scale atrocities to deter future abuses.
24
 A deep-seated 
wariness of amnesties prevailed.
25
 Orenlicher reflects that at the time she was convinced that 
international law could assist “the aims of fragile democracies.”26 Some scholars such as 
Teitel recognize that the period of upheaval following a conflict or regime change is 
particularly „open to politics,‟ raising the possibility of political abuse of transitional justice 
mechanisms by those in power. However, reflecting the unwavering faith of early transitional 
justice advocates international law, Teitel appeared convinced that international systems of 
justice and accountability could overcome potential abuse by state powers. 
27
  
 
„Transitional justice,‟ was therefore originally an internationally defined and driven project, 
centered on the goal of ensuring accountability and truth in order to facilitate transition to a 
new liberal political order founded upon the rule of law. As initially conceived and promoted, 
transitional justice was defined in opposition to the previously prevalent Marxist-derived idea 
of economic and social structural transformation of society. 
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The Expansion of Critical Debate  
 
The transitional justice paradigm as conceived by prominent scholars such as Teitel, Kritz 
and Elster, and embedded in international legal practice has been increasingly subject to 
rigorous critique. A scholarly struggle has emerged over the scope of the field and the very 
“nature, direction, and goals and ownership of transition itself.”28 In recent years, transitional 
justice has increasingly been constructed as „interdisciplinary field.‟ As Bell identifies for 
instance, the establishment of an interdisciplinary journal dedicated to transitional justice in 
2007 was not a neutral act. Rather, it was part of a wider movement to prize loose the project 
of post-conflict justice from the dominant hold of legal discipline, and to expand the 
conceptual scope of „justice‟ included in the field.29  
 
 A major concern that runs through emerging critiques is that transitional justice has become 
construed as a “tool box” of legal and constitutional mechanisms that can be applied 
uniformly across all cases.
30
 This conception of transitional justice can misleadingly 
depoliticize the application of justice mechanisms, disguise the workings of power, and 
moreover lead to narrow, legally focused reading of abuse and its remedy.
31
 Wilson‟s critical 
work on South Africa‟s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), for instance, 
demonstrates that the Commission served the core purpose of consolidating an “uncontested 
administrative authority” for the new ruling regime.32 Essentially, the mantra of 
„reconciliation,‟ Wilson argues, enabled the post apartheid Government to pursue a project of 
political centralization. The near-excusive reliance of the TRC on „factual-forensic‟ evidence 
and focus on individual acts of violence moreover, failed to capture the breadth and depth of 
South African‟s experiences.33 As Wilson puts it, “the TRC‟s account of the past was 
constrained by its excessive legalism and positivist methodology, which obstructed the 
writing of a coherent socio-political history of apartheid.”34  
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The wave of critiques of the concept of transitional justice has given rise to a number of key, 
interconnected debates in the field. Below, I explore the three ongoing strands of critical 
discussion that I engage with in this thesis. 
 
Should Economic Justice be included in the scope of Transitional Justice?  
 
As Miller contended in 2008, “issues of development and inequality may become the next 
frontier of scholarly and institutional debates on transitional justice.”35 A clear consensus has 
emerged that transitional justice must encompass processes of reconciliation and social 
healing. The question of whether structural violence, socio-economic justice and development 
issues should be included within the scope of transitional justice, however, is still deeply 
controversial.
36
 As yet, issues of economic development and inequality are largely absent 
from the scholarship, institutions, and „international enterprise‟ of transitional justice.37 As 
Mani puts it, socioeconomic issues “seem to lie just beyond the traditional frontiers of 
transitional justice.”38 The widely held view that transitional justice and economic 
development are strictly distinct spheres is evident, for instance, in a recent conference on 
donor strategies regarding transitional justice. Some participants made the recommendation 
that donors must weigh the “possible tradeoffs between supporting transitional justice and 
development priorities.”39 
 
While most scholars continue to take the exclusion of socio-economic issues from the scope 
of transitional justice for granted, a few authors have directly argued the point. A common 
case made is that widening the scope of transitional justice amounts to dangerous „conceptual 
stretching‟ that could broaden the notion so far that it looses its “fundamental meaning and 
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purpose.”40 Duthie further develops this line of reasoning in an article that argues that while it 
is vital to pursue a „development sensitive approach‟ to transitional justice, it remains unclear 
that the two spheres should directly engage.
41
 He contends that transitional justice measures 
such as truth commissions may lack the capacity, investigative skills or methodologies to 
directly address economic injustices, which are typically broader in scope than other crimes.
42
 
Such an expansion in mandate could inundate and overwhelm a truth commission.
43
 
Moreover, he suggests, encompassing development issues could hinder the ability of 
transitional justice mechanisms to achieve accountability for mass human rights violations by 
distracting the public‟s attention from atrocities focused on a smaller subset of „marginalized‟ 
victims. 
44
 As Rama Mani suggests, the reluctance of most transitional justice scholars and 
practitioners to engage in social-economic issues is likely to reflect the fact that the scope of 
such injustices is “so wide, their victims so many,” while the agents are so nameless and 
faceless.
45
 Certainly, socio-economic justice does not fit neatly into dominant models of 
transitional justice that focus on individual accountability, and reparation of individual 
victims.  
 
A small handful of scholars however, contend that to exclude such issues can act to 
perpetuate injustice and fail to address key dynamics of a conflict.
46
 Recently, Miller has 
strongly critiqued the international project of transitional justice for narrating both conflicts 
and transition exclusively in terms of physical violence and political change, obscuring the 
economic origins and consequences of war. Miller contends that the issue of whether to 
include socio-economic issues in transitional justice is not simply a pragmatic question of 
which institution or field is best equipped to implement development.
47
 Rather, including or 
excluding socio-economic issues in transitional justice establishes whether or not they are 
issues of „justice,‟ that require political change.  Miller emphasizes that transitional justice 
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institutions have a „definitional power‟ that can demarcate the scope and nature of violations 
addressed in the aftermath of conflict.  
 
The critical work of several scholars on South Africa‟s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) underlines this point.
48
 The TRC focused narrowly on acts of physical violence and 
abuses of civil and political rights, failing to address ongoing racially aligned social and 
economic disparity and exclusion.49Ross demonstrates the way in which the Commission 
emphasized overt sexual abuse against women, but ignored more subtle forms of violence 
experienced by women as a result of apartheid.
50
 Wilson‟s work reveals moreover that the 
reliance of the Commission on the abstract, moral notion of the “overriding evil of the 
apartheid system” replaced “historical analysis of concrete social conditions.”51 The „story‟ of 
apartheid was painted as chiefly about racism and individual violations, rather than a system 
of abuses and economic inequities.
52
 Other scholars contend that failure to recognize and 
address the economic dimensions of a conflict or period of widespread human rights abuse 
may lead to renewed outbreaks of violence.
53
 Ultimately, critics such as Mani argue that if 
people‟s basic human needs and impoverishment is not addressed, victims may perceive that 
transitional justice measures enacted after a conflict are distant and „hollow.‟54 
 
In this thesis I contribute to the debate through analysis of the role of socioeconomic issues in 
the underlying causes and dynamics of the Ugandan conflict, local perspectives on justice and 
postwar priorities, and factors influencing the current development of transitional justice 
processes in Uganda. I examine the reasons why different actors have included or excluded 
such issues within the scope of „transitional justice,‟ and explore the implications of these 
decisions.  
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The Disputed Role of International, National and Local Actors  
 
As critical scholars increasingly contest the traditional frontiers of transitional justice, intense 
debate persists over the role of international, national, and local actors in the conception, 
development and implementation of transitional justice processes. As Bell puts it, this 
discussion reflects a wider global struggle over the “appropriate parameters of international 
intervention” within the internal workings of the state.55 Unsurprisingly, this debate reflects 
parallel discussions that emerged in the closely related scholarship on humanitarianism.
56
 
Debate is frequently centered on the question of which „level‟ is the most appropriate to 
define and enact transitional justice measures. While some scholars defend the role of the 
international community in stipulating the boundaries and goals of post conflict justice, others 
heavily critique such intervention and draw attention to the emergence of „bottom up‟ 
approaches to transitional justice. After outlining this debate, I examine the subtler question 
of how diverse international, national and local levels interact and influence one another.   
 
Many scholars and practitioners continue to advance the position that international actors can 
and should play a vital role in ensuring that transitional measures adhere to international laws 
and standards.
57
 Such authors often maintain that transitional justice mechanisms 
implemented at the international level can provide greater legitimacy than nationally directed 
processes. Kaminski et al, for example contends that “international tribunals offer better 
prospects of due process and impartiality.”58 The greater underlying conviction of many 
scholars however, is that the advancement of international law and institutions can generate 
the normative power to positively influence the values and practices of states.
59
 Reflecting on 
the passing of the Rome Statute of the ICC, for instance, prominent legal scholar Schabas 
contends that the statute‟s influence “will extend deep into domestic criminal law, enriching 
the jurisprudence of national courts and challenging prosecutors and judges to greater zeal in 
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the repression of serious violations of human rights.”60 A recent report from a conference on 
donor strategies for transitional justice similarly calls for donors to promote the application of 
international law in state policy.
61
 Faith in the spread of international values is also evident in 
the recent work of Juan Mendez, who like many other scholars applauds the development of a 
strong international norm against the implementation of broad amnesties in post conflict 
solutions.
62
 According to Mendez, this norm impels states to strive towards reconciliation 
while ensuring that the „inherent dignity‟ of victims of human rights abuses is maintained, 
presumably through the trial of their perpetrators.
63
 Mendez acknowledges recent critiques, 
and concedes that “we occasionally come dangerously close” to imposing solutions from afar 
without considering local views. She goes on to conclude, however, that international 
intervention does not “replace the judgment of domestic actors” but rather plays a critical role 
in prompting “war torn societies to live up to their international obligations.”64  
 
A comprehensive literature has emerged that critiques the international and nationally 
imposed approaches to transitional justice. Numerous authors have argued that despite the 
ideals of international legal scholars, all too often, transitional justice strategies simply reflect 
the self-interest of the international community or national elites.
 65 
Through this lens, 
international law is certainly not immune to power politics. Hazan draws on several case 
studies to argue that the implementation of balanced international criminal justice is 
dependant on the existence of political will at both the national and international level. 66 In 
the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Hazan argues that the 
international community lacked the geo-strategic interest and the political will to exert 
significant pressure on the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan regime to cooperate in the execution of 
„balanced‟ trials.67 The trials of the ICTR accordingly amounted to „victors‟ justice.‟68 In 
contrast, the international community led by the United States exerted significant pressure 
upon Serbia to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
which Hazan contends was primarily an act directed at an international audience to publicly 
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criminalize Milosevic, justify the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention 
and to “appease the guilty conscience of western opinion.”69 Serbians and Croatians reacted 
with hostility to the mechanism, perceiving it as a “western instrument.”70 Such international 
„justice‟ interventions are shaped by the political interests of powerful states, and focused 
almost exclusively upon legal measures.  
 
Critical scholars have further emphasized that international or nationally driven projects can 
hinder local-level approaches to justice, or simply lack meaning to those most affected by 
conflict.
71
 Wilson‟s study of the TRC, for instance, reveals the extent to which national 
process failed to connect with local communities. At one level, as Wilson notes, there were 
simply very few initiatives taken by the “TRC to engage with the bodies that actually exercise 
political authority in the townships.”72 His fieldwork among the townships of the Vaal region 
exposed that many local actors held “disdain” for the TRC, some viewing strongly that 
reconciliation should be undertaken by legitimate community institutions. Moreover, many 
local community members in the Vaal region preferred vengeance and punishment, 
perceiving the strictly „reconciliatory‟ approach of the TRC as weak and ineffective. 
Accordingly, the outcome of local court proceedings was not infrequently public flogging. 
National level justice, such work implies, is often discontinuous with local approaches.     
 
Paul Gready makes the useful distinction between „embedded justice‟ and „distanced 
justice.‟73 Distanced justice, Gready characterizes, includes mechanisms that are 
geographically remote from local populations, lack grassroots participation, and undermine 
local-level systems. Embedded justice, in contrast, has „high local visibility,‟ and is at least 
partly locally defined and owned.  Gready points towards the locally implemented „Gaccaca‟ 
courts in Rwanda as an indigenous and participatory mechanism that marked a „revolution in 
transitional justice,‟ although he notes that they, like other „embedded‟ measures are not 
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immune from local power dynamics.
74
 He contrasts the Gaccaca courts to the distant, 
expensive ICTR trials that were largely unknown to Rwandans at the local level.
75
  
 
Other critics however highlight that even measures implemented at the local level can still 
reflect a „top down‟ approach that appears alien to communities. Barbara Oomen, for 
example, contends that the supposedly „home grown‟ and locally sensitive local Gaccaca 
courts in Rwanda actually reflected a donor-driven experiment to deal with a vast number of 
perpetrators.
76
 Despite being implemented at the local level, the courts lacked the authenticity 
and popular participation to be effective.
77
 Bett‟s analysis of the international, national and 
local court systems instituted in Rwanda reaches similar conclusions. The role played by the 
international community and national Government, Bett contends, was “politicized by elite 
interests,” which pervaded “every level of Rwanda‟s transitional justice.”78   
 
In response to such critiques, a wave of actors and critics contend that transitional justice 
must be re-envisioned and recreated as a truly bottom-up, locally driven and owned process.
79
 
Interestingly, theoretical advances in the field of transitional justice correspond with 
empirical developments. A shift away from „top down‟ models of transitional justice has even 
been acknowledged rhetorically at the international level. A much-cited report by the UN 
Secretary General on transitional justice emphasizes the need to “eschew one-size fits all 
formulas and the importation of foreign models,” and rather base support on domestic 
assessments, needs and participation.
80
 Several scholars have focused on locally derived 
practices and measures that operate completely independently of the national and 
international level. Lundy and McGovern emphasize the need for „home grown‟ projects that 
are designed, conducted, and implemented within communities, allowing locals to exercise 
agency.
81
 Drawing on the example of a community truth-telling initiative in Northern Ireland, 
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they contend that such approaches can be sensitive to local dynamics and create genuine 
dialogue between participants.
82
 Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza similarly explore the alternative 
ways that local Community-based organizations and NGOs effectively incorporate elements 
of „traditional‟ Mayan practices into conflict-resolution and psychosocial healing 
techniques.
83
 While noting that national level planners must learn from local dynamics and 
practices in order to inform their design of national programs, they conclude that 
Governments and international agencies must “at least aim to „do no harm.‟”84 This 
perspective on the role of the international, national and local actors in transitional justice 
focuses primarily upon local initiatives, placing little emphasis on the responsibilities of 
national and international processes other than to avoid obstructing local systems.  
 
A few scholars have however also highlighted local or civil society efforts to influence 
national policy. In a rare assessment of the roles played by civil society in transitional justice, 
David Backer highlights that CBOs and NGOs have entered the realm of policy debates, 
playing an advocacy role regarding transitional justice mechanisms.
85
 In the introductory 
chapter of the watershed publication „Transitional Justice from Below,‟ McEvoy and 
McGregor emphasize that in contexts in which national systems are corrupt or incompetent, it 
is often community organizations, NGOs, or religious bodies that act as “the engines of 
change.”86 Like a growing number of authors, they point towards the ability of such groups to 
mobilize in opposition to “powerful political or social… forces” from below.87 Drawing on 
the case of Colombia, Diaz shows how „bottom up‟ NGOs and civil society actors have 
challenged the Colombian state‟s approach to transitional justice. Such work highlights the 
potential for various local actors to make demands in the development of national transitional 
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justice processes.
88
 Numerous scholars have called for national and international measures to 
engage with, and respond to voices from „the bottom up.‟89  
 
The critical responses of numerous authors to the top heavy, international legalist approach to 
transitional justice has blossomed into a thriving literature that explores the roles of local, 
national and international actors. The field of critique, however, has much room for 
expansion. Firstly, there is tendency for scholars to simply focus on assessing the direct 
advantages or disadvantages of mechanisms imposed upon, or implemented at various levels, 
such as the irrelevance of distant international courts for local people, or the success of ad hoc 
community led mechanisms in dispute resolution.
90
 On the whole, less critical attention has 
been given to the ways in which different actors across levels interact and influence one 
another and struggle over competing ideas. As Miller puts it, rather than “offering a critical 
exploration of the influence of one area [level of actor] on another” the literature tends to 
focus on the “lessons learned‟ in a particular area.”91 While it is increasingly recognized that 
transitional justice as a “multi tiered system” or a “global project,” Millar‟s work suggests 
that more attention needs be given to the role of various actors at all levels in the spreading of 
ideas and ideals and the production of different narratives.
92
 When scholars do address such 
questions, they tend to focus on the influence of one particular level on another (such as local 
actors on national process), rather than exploring the wider web of interrelationships at play.
 
Secondly, as evident from the review of critical literature above, scholars also tend to portray 
the role of various levels as homogenous. With a few notable exceptions, little attention is 
given to the diversity and tension between roles played by international, national and local 
actors.
93
  
 
This thesis accordingly contributes towards the critical literature by focusing on the varied 
impacts and interrelationships of international, national, and local actors engaged in the 
development of transitional justice processes in Uganda. I pay particular attention to the way 
                                                 
88
 Diaz, Catalina, 'Challenging Impunity from Below: The Contested Ownership of Transitional Justice in 
Colombia', in Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change, ed. by Kieran 
McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 
89
 See McEvoy and McGregor eds. Transitional Justice From Below 
90
 Recent exceptions include Diaz, and McGregor, Lorna, 'International Law as a 'Tiered Process': Transitional 
Justice at the Local, National and International Level', in Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism 
and the Struggle for Change ed. by Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Oxford Hart Publishing 2008)   
91
 Miller, p.290  
92
Ibid  
93
 Diaz is a recent exception.   
28 
 
in which actors across all levels construct, legitimize or challenge narratives about the war 
and transition, and how much attention they pay to the perspectives and interests of those 
most affected by the conflict. I critically examine, for instance, the ways in which the ICC, as 
well as a myriad of other international actors influence the construction of war narratives, and 
the development of transitional justice policy. Conversely, I also explore the diverse 
approaches of different national and local actors towards Governmental and international 
actors and institutions. I draw attention to the way in which complex webs of actors are 
drawn into a struggle focused at the national level. I argue that both international actors and 
civil society actors (both national and local) have significant capacity to cultivate or restrict 
the opening of critical political space where dominant discourses and power imbalances of 
transition can be challenged.  
 
Transitional Justice: A Language of Resistance to Hegemony?  
 
The final, closely related area of discussion that I engage with throughout this thesis concerns 
the ways in which involved actors draw upon the language of transitional justice. While 
transitional justice has been increasingly recognized as a “discursive project” that is used to 
narrate and shape transition rather than a “neutral instrument” to bring about justice and 
reconciliation,
94
 only a few scholars have critically examined the use of transitional justice 
discourse in particular contexts.
95
 Study of the use of transitional justice discourse has wide 
implications. With the expansion of a deeply critical literature, a distinct sense of 
disillusionment with the concept of transitional justice has emerged. Bell describes a 
“growing unease among practitioners and in scholarship over the future direction of the 
field.”96 Many scholars simply ignore such questions, and persevere with their critiques of the 
transitional justice framework. For scholars such as Bell however, the question appears to be 
whether transitional justice can be applied constructively as a useful concept, or whether the 
language is so deeply tainted by its imperialist, legalistic origins that it should be abandoned 
entirely by those seeking true transformation in post conflict societies.
97
 In her review of 
„Transitional Justice from Below,” Nagy furthermore queries:  
 If transitional justice reaches out more fully to rectify social inequality and structural 
violence, what makes it “transitional” rather than simply “justice? The question is not 
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simply semantic. Governments deploy the current toolkit and language of transitional 
justice even as they “other” victims, minimize their own involvement, and consolidate 
unequal power relations.
98
 
 
The question lingers, has transitional justice come to represent an inherently hegemonic 
enterprise, or can a discourse of „transition‟ also be effectively used by actors seeking 
meaningful change?  
 
Many scholars are pessimistic. Hazan argues that transitional justice discourse is often used 
as a façade for ongoing injustice.
99
 In the case of Iraq, Hazan demonstrates how the language 
of transitional justice was used to frame „justice‟ as a transition from the rule of Saddam 
Hussein to liberal democracy, and to detract attention from the question of the ongoing 
occupation and war crimes of the United States.
100
 Nagy, who argues that transitional justice 
has become a “global project” that typically “involves a delimiting narration of violence and 
remedy,” appears similarly pessimistic about application of transitional justice discourse.101 
Arthur‟s critical work in tracing the conceptual history of transitional justice as explored 
above, leads her to seriously question whether it is better to “simply reject the transitional 
justice framework altogether.”102 She queries, “Should transitional justice be folded into the 
anti impunity movement centered on the development of international norms and law?” She 
cynically notes that this would represent “an unsurprising historical outcome given the 
expansion of…„international justice.‟”103 Perhaps most intriguingly, Bell cautions that 
attempts to re-envision transitional justice and decolonize “law‟s hold over the field” comes 
with certain dangers.
104
 She warns that efforts to deeply displace the field‟s heavy focus on 
accountability “risks undoing what in practice is still a fragile consensus,” and stripping the 
concept of its normative power for local justice struggles.
105
 Without reaching a conclusion, 
Bell raises the concern that the notion of transitional justice is so deeply enmeshed in the 
global acceptance of international law and standards of accountability that to radically 
critique or widen its focus could weaken the entire concept.  
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A number of authors however have highlighted that transitional justice discourse can also be 
used as a language of resistance. Scholars who draw attention to the role that civil society can 
play in challenging central Government policy have also contended that such actors have 
resourcefully drawn on transitional justice discourse to frame their position. Most notable are 
key studies of the Columbian case by Uprimny and Saffon, and also Diaz.
106
 Uprimny and 
Saffon demonstrate that the language of transitional justice was adopted by both the 
Columbian Government and various civil society movements, but applied in different ways, 
for divergent purposes.
107
 The Government adopted transitional justice in a “manipulative” 
manner, as a “rhetorical instrument” that was not followed by any practical transformation. 
Effectively, the Government‟s use of the discourse served to disguise ongoing impunity. In 
contrast, Colombian civil society groups used the language of transitional justice 
“democratically” to contest the Government‟s discourse and demand guarantees of non-
recurrence. While the authors conclude that manipulative uses of transitional justice 
prevailed, they emphasize that it is important to recognize the value of democratic uses of the 
discourse that bring victims into the “center of discussion.”108 Diaz‟s analysis similarly 
highlights that “at the very least” transitional justice gave the NGO and civil society sector “a 
framework within which to critique the understanding being propagated by the state.”109 
Interestingly however, from the author‟s description it appears that Colombian civil society 
group‟s conception of „transitional justice‟ did not extend to include socio-economic issues. 
Rather, they focused on demanding that the Government combat impunity.  
 
In this thesis I contribute to the emerging debate through exploration of how transitional 
justice discourses are conceptualized, articulated and strategically utilized by different actors 
in Uganda. I pay particular attention to the way the concept of „transition‟ is conceived in the 
Ugandan context in which no regime change has taken place, and what is included in the 
understandings of „justice‟ projected by different actors. Drawing on original fieldwork, I 
address a number of unanswered questions raised by different scholars. Firstly, I explore the 
central question of the extent to which „transitional justice‟ can be effectively reworked as 
radical language of emancipation. Secondly, I address Bell‟s concern that a radically 
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expanded conception of transitional justice (for example to include socio-economic justice) 
could reduce the „normative power‟ of the framework, which is ultimately derived from the 
concept‟s strong, expanding foothold in the international arena. Finally, I take up the question 
posed by Nagy of what, if anything is distinctive about the undertaking of transitional justice 
as opposed to „justice.‟ 
 
Methodology: Multilayered Fieldwork in Uganda  
In addition to the wealth of available scholarly literature and fieldwork notes on the war and 
postwar justice issues in Uganda, this thesis is based upon original fieldwork undertaken in 
Uganda over the course of three months from 31st May till the 31
st
 August in 2010. My 
fieldwork took place in four different „spheres‟ in Uganda. The first was the temporary 
„international arena‟ that descended upon Kampala for the first ever „Review Conference‟ of 
the ICC that took place over two weeks in early June. The second was the „national‟ level in 
Kampala, in the realm of policy makers and NGO advocates. The third was the „local‟ NGO 
scene of Gulu town. The fourth „sphere‟ of my fieldwork took place in several villages in the 
Acholi region.  
 
Throughout this fieldwork experience, my goal was to gain insight into the experiences, 
perspectives, and struggles of a broad spectrum of actors involved at different levels in the 
field of transitional justice development in Uganda. My research agenda changed, unfolded 
and ultimately expanded throughout my time in the field, and was repeatedly shaped and 
reshaped by my encounters. As well as conducting interviews and engaging in participant 
observation (specified below), wherever possible I also collected relevant reports, 
Government financial data, and DVD‟s, which are included in the Bibliography. This 
included key reports produced by Uganda‟s Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS), such as the 
report of the 3
rd
 Forum on Transitional Justice. Data collected from the Ministry of Finance 
related primarily to the Government‟s budgetary allocations to the Northern Uganda Peace 
Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP).  
 
My interviews were largely unstructured; my initial questions were shaped to the particular 
role or position of the interviewee, while further prompts flowed from our conversation. 
Overall, I conducted seventy-two interviews that ranged between twenty minutes and an hour 
and a half in length. Interviews were either recorded in note form, or via digital voice 
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recorder according to the preference of the participant. All interviews were undertaken with 
full informed consent, and wherever possible I provided participants the opportunity to check 
and adjust their interview transcript.  
With the exception of individuals who specified otherwise, throughout this thesis I ensure that 
my respondents cannot be individually identified. As explored further below, I adopted an 
especially careful approach when interviewing rural community members affected by the 
war, particularly former abductees of the LRA.  
 
The ICC Review Conference in Kampala drew together the „professional family‟ of the 
international justice scene, as well as many actors involved in post conflict justice in Uganda. 
Throughout the two-week event, I engaged in participant observation, attending a wide range 
of official plenary sessions and side events, as well as the daily morning „strategy‟ meetings 
of the umbrella NGO, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), and various 
social gatherings. In particular, I focused on different actors‟ portrayals of the impact of the 
ICC upon Uganda, the development of formal criminal justice in Uganda, and representations 
of the perspectives of war-affected communities. I observed the spaces in which critical 
voices emerged and local voices were given a platform to speak, and the spaces in which such 
voices were excluded. As well as making extensive „field notes,‟ I engaged in many informal 
conversations and several formal interviews with a variety of actors: international and 
national Ugandan NGOs, international scholars of the Ugandan case, state delegates and local 
Ugandan civil society representatives.   
 
My fieldwork at the national level in Kampala was largely facilitated through the contacts I 
made at the ICC Review Conference. In total, I spent three weeks undertaking this aspect of 
my fieldwork. My key goal in this „sphere‟ was to explore the historical and current 
development of national transitional justice policy, and understand the way in which 
international, local and other national actors and institutions influenced this process. I also 
aimed to analyze the relationship and tensions between different actors, and the different 
modes of interaction of such actors with local war affected communities. My research was 
conducted primarily through in-depth interviews with political Government officials, 
international donors of transitional justice, and public servants in the Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs, JLOS, the International Crimes Division, the Department of Public 
Prosecutions, and the Amnesty Commission. I also had the opportunity to observe several 
informal meetings between JLOS policy makers. Aside from Government workers, I also 
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interviewed the directors of a variety of national level NGOs, including the Ugandan 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (UCICC), and the Refugee Law Project (RLP), 
which is heavily involved in policy advocacy in the area of transitional justice.   
 
I spent five weeks in Northern Uganda working with a locally run NGO, the „Northern 
Ugandan Transitional Justice Working Group‟ (NUTJWG). Part way through my process of 
exploring the „Gulu town‟ justice scene and interviewing various key players (a range of local 
Government, judicial, and civil society actors), I was adopted by NUTJWG as a co-planner, 
research assistant, and errands runner. They were tremendously short staffed and overworked, 
while I was eager to try and see the field of postwar justice through the eyes of local NGO 
workers who had also suffered through the war, and considered themselves  „transitional 
justice activists.‟ Through NUTJWG, I was initiated into the local northern „NGO world‟ of 
project proposals, donor grants and project reports, community engagement and advocacy 
work. During my time with this group, we organized and ran several community consultation 
exercises across the Northern region, held a strategic breakfast meeting for key NGO leaders 
in Gulu town, worked with the key Gulu NGO addressing transitional justice (the Justice and 
Reconciliation Project), and participated in a day-long celebration of „International Day of 
Justice‟ in Lira. We also conducted research on Government compensation processes. 
Throughout this experience, I paid close attention to the way NUTJWG and other civil 
society actors perceived the concept and utilized the language of transitional justice, and 
engaged with grassroots communities and national actors.  
 
My interactions with villagers in the Acholi region were facilitated by the community 
workers of the locally run faith-based NGO, Caritas Gulu. Over the course of three weeks, I 
spent time „moving in the field,‟ largely in the sub counties of Unyama, Patiko and Paicho, 
where I observed their work and was given the opportunity undertake a number of interviews. 
I was particularly cautious with my approach, as the communities I engaged with had 
undergone a long period of extensive suffering, while many individuals had witnessed or 
experienced violence and atrocity. A trained, experienced Caritas local community worker 
accompanied me who knew the village members we interacted with. He approached 
individuals, explained the precise nature of my project, what the information would be used 
for, and asked if they would be comfortable to participate in an interview. He emphasized 
participation was voluntary, and that they were free to terminate the interview at any point if 
desired. In addition to „regular‟ community members, I interviewed a range of local 
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councilors, traditional leaders, elders, and formerly abducted persons. In these interviews, I 
asked participants open questions about their experiences, priorities and expectations after the 
war, as well as more specific questions about their views on accountability, reconciliation and 
forgiveness regarding perpetrators, and their perspectives on local traditional practices. While 
I did not elicit information about their experiences during the war, sometimes participants 
offered their stories without prompting.  
 
Besides deliberate research engagement, my perspectives on „justice‟ issues and various 
narratives about the northern war was also inevitably flavored by the daily observations, 
encounters and experiences of everyday life in Kampala and Gulu. In Gulu town, I was 
privileged to live with the Anglican Bishop of Gulu (also chairman of the Acholi Religious 
Leaders Peace Initiative) and his family on site at the Anglican diocese compound. While in 
Kampala, I lived at an Anglican Parish at which large numbers of urban internally-displace 
persons (IDPs) from the North come to worship. Conversations about the war, the role of 
NGOs in Gulu, and issues of justice and forgiveness with my extended host-families as well 
as guests and neighbors shaped my thinking.
110
  
 
I make no pretense that my engagement in the field of transitional justice in Uganda was 
adequately „embedded‟ or comprehensive. In the space of three months available to a 
master‟s student there are obvious limitations to the depth of fieldwork that can be achieved. 
Furthermore, my fieldwork was stretched over four different „spheres,‟ as described above. 
This was the inevitable cost of endeavoring to gain a sense of the interface between 
international, national and local actors involved in transitional justice, rather than focusing 
upon one level.  In particular, I felt that my engagement at the „grassroots‟ village level was 
lacking, although I learned a great deal from my interactions with local villagers. My trips to 
Acholi villages with Caritas were unfortunately forestalled due to a temporary lack of funding 
that prevented the community workers from making regular outings „to the field.‟ Besides 
this constraint, I was hampered by my inability to speak Luo, and incapacity to live with my 
„participants‟ in the village and become familiar with them, their perspectives and 
experiences over time; in short, to do „proper‟ ethnographic fieldwork.  
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Road Map: Thesis Structure  
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The second chapter explores the war in Uganda. I 
identify and critically deconstruct the dominant narrative of the conflict presented by the 
western media and the Ugandan Government, which has become contested in the subsequent 
struggle for transition. I highlight the socio-economic roots and consequences of the war, and 
the complicit role of both the Ugandan Government and foreign aid donors in inadvertently 
perpetuating the structural violence and marginalization of the north. I show that the 
international community has never been absent from the situation in Northern Uganda: 
international actors participated in, and helped to shape dominant representations of the 
conflict.  
 
The third chapter analyzes Uganda‟s emergence from war, dealing with the critical formative 
period of 2003 (the year of Uganda‟s referral to the ICC) until 2008 (the final collapse of the 
Juba Peace process). I argue that in various ways international actors have had profound, yet 
contradictory influences on national processes in Uganda. I show how various international 
actors, as well as diverse domestic actors, have the power to cultivate or restrict the opening 
of critical political space in which dominant narrative about the war is justified or challenged. 
While the ICC acted to legitimize the Government‟s politicized discourse and narrow the 
trajectory of post conflict justice, other international, national and local actors acted to 
momentarily broaden the scope of „justice‟ to address the deeper socio-economic roots and 
repercussions of the war, and compel the Government to submit to processes of 
accountability and national transformation. The language and concepts of transitional justice 
facilitated the efforts of such actors.  
 
The fourth chapter explores the views of northern Acholi communities affected by the war, in 
order to ground my discussion of struggles over the development of transitional justice in an 
awareness of local post war priorities and perspectives on justice. I argue that the commonly 
drawn distinctions between local, traditional justice and international justice are not 
particularly helpful.  A better distinction can be made between „embedded‟ and „indirect‟ 
justice. I found that people are generally more concerned with „embedded justice:‟ they are 
more worried with tangible outcomes such as socio-economic rehabilitation, reparations, land 
access, and restoration of relationships with those around them, than far away symbolic acts 
that have little direct impact on their lives. I focus on two forms of embedded justice: 
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socioeconomic justice, and local-driven approaches to social reconciliation. These concepts 
transcend the categories of international, national and local. Socioeconomic justice 
necessarily involves the transformation of state policy. I argue that while the struggle for an 
inclusive, effective approach to social reconciliation must be centered at the local level, 
national and international actors must cultivate this process by challenging self-interested 
power.  
 
In the fifth chapter I map the „political ecology‟ of the current struggles over the development 
of national transitional justice that emerged after the failure of the peace talks in 2008. This 
chapter is based primarily upon original fieldwork. I show that while actors at all levels 
participate in this struggle, power is concentrated in the hands of the sovereign state. The 
trajectory of transitional justice in Uganda risks instituting an empty performance of justice 
that lacks meaning to those affected by the war, and is largely devoid of socio-economic 
justice. Throughout my analysis, I show that struggle for transition in Uganda is „global‟ in 
dimension: international, national, and local actors play varying, often contradictory roles. 
Different Government actors, civil society groups and international players either critically 
challenge or justify and facilitate the Government‟s dominant narrative of the war and 
convenience-driven approach to postwar justice. The discourse of transitional justice is used 
as a language of resistance, pressing the Government to engage in „transition‟ in the absence 
of meaningful change. Unless transitional justice discourse is expanded to encompass 
socioeconomic justice however, its capacity to give political expression to local communities‟ 
justice priorities will remain limited.  
 
Chapter six draws on my experience of the 2010 ICC Review Conference to frame the 
conclusion of this thesis. I build on the arguments developed in previous chapters through a 
critical analysis of the Conference, which drew together the myriad of local, national, and 
international actors involved in transitional justice in Uganda. I highlight that the struggle for 
a meaningful approach to transitional justice in Uganda takes place in the wider context of the 
hegemony of international criminal law as the dominant mode of global „justice.‟ Drawing on 
the Review Conference, I examine the role played by civil society actors worldwide in 
constructing and perpetuating this hegemony, and contrast the dominant portrayals of 
international justice at the Review Conference with the realities of the Ugandan situation. 
Finally, I explore the implications of my Ugandan field research for the three debates in the 
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field of transitional justice outlined above, reflects on the possibilities of future research 
agendas
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Chapter Two: War in Northern Uganda 
  
Introduction 
While Uganda has often been heralded as a „champion of progress‟ in international 
development circles, for over twenty years the people of Northern Uganda were 
enmeshed in a conflict of violence, displacement and social and economic 
deprivation. Until recently, the Ugandan Government successfully portrayed the 
northern situation as a localized war perpetrated by a northern rebel group, the LRA. 
The western media and various international NGOs have widely disseminated this 
view, caricaturing the LRA as an apolitical, incomprehensible terrorist group, solely 
responsible for the suffering of northern communities.
111
 To understand the 
development of transitional justice processes in Uganda, it is vital to build a critical 
understanding of northern conflict. The struggle that has emerged over the best path 
to „justice‟ and „transition‟ in the wake of conflict reflects disputes about the nature of 
the war itself.  
 
This chapter critically analyzes the key dynamics of the conflict in Uganda that 
transpired in 1986, providing a platform for discussion of the transitional justice 
development in following chapters. Drawing on the in-depth ethnographic fieldwork 
of scholars such as Dolan, Finnstrom, and Branch, this chapter challenges dominant 
narratives of the war, demonstrating that the northern conflict resulted from a 
complex interplay of local, national and international factors. For decades, Northern 
Ugandans were caught between the strategic violence of the LRA and the structural 
violence of the Ugandan Government, both of which were facilitated and perpetuated 
by various international actors and systems. I demonstrate that both the underlying 
roots and consequences of the conflict were characterized by the socio-economic 
marginalization of the north. I highlight that any approach to transitional justice that 
fails to embrace socioeconomic justice is accordingly inadequate.  
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This chapter is divided into five sections. First, I briefly trace the background and 
roots of the conflict through Uganda‟s colonial and postcolonial history. I pay 
particular attention to the ways in which economic divisions, geographic regions, and 
political interests became strategically fused by governing elites. This fusion 
eventually resulted in the north-south rift that underlies the LRA conflict. Secondly, I 
reconsider the LRA, demonstrating that contrary to common depictions, their actions 
followed a particular societal-based logic that emerged in response to patterns of 
regional economic and political exclusion. 
 
 The third and fourth sections address the intertwined roles of the Ugandan 
Government and international actors in enmeshing the north in a conflict of structural 
violence.  In the third section, I consider the failures of the Government‟s military and 
diplomatic strategies to end the war. I argue that the Government‟s approach to the 
north was characterized by political expedience, interlaced by its financial and 
strategic relationships with international donors and allies. In the fourth section, I 
assess the Government‟s policy of displacing northern communities into „protected 
villages.‟ This policy, which led to the increased insecurity and social and economic 
dehabilitation of northern populations, was facilitated by the uncritical provision of 
aid by international agencies, and the failure of the wider international community to 
challenge the Government‟s approach.  
 
Colonial and Independence History: the Emergence of Regional Inequality 
Since colonial times, governing elites in Uganda have constructed and strategically 
manipulated ethnic and regional identities in order to create a support-base for their 
political power.
112
 Below, I trace the colonial and post-independence history of 
Uganda, focusing on the emergence of regional and identity based political and 
economic disparities that underlie the northern LRA conflict.  
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In 1894, the area now known as Uganda was declared a British protectorate. The 
colonial rulers identified different ethnic groups, and prescribed them particular 
economic and administrative roles. As narrated by a local activist in Gulu Town in 
Northern Uganda: 
       When the British came the foundation of their rule was divide and conquer. We        
       are a strong people and they preferred us to protect the territory. We were given   
       the gun. But to the soft-spoken people in the South and West, the British gave   
       education and business. For agriculture, we were given cotton, but in the south        
       they were given coffee which proved much more lucrative. That was the    
       foundation, but instead of breaking loose, we stuck to that. We kept that  
       mentality.
113
 
 
Northern ethnic groups (including the Acholi) were also often used as a pool of cheap 
labor employed in the south, while southern regions benefited from the introduction 
of cash crops and industry.
114
 Southern groups also gained greater influence in civil 
service.
115
 The early roots of economic disparity between northern and southern 
regions of Uganda can accordingly be traced to this period, as can the militarization of 
northern ethnic groups.
116
  
 
While such divisions originated as colonial constructs, as the above quote suggests, 
political and socio-economic dynamics were generated that extended beyond the 
colonial era. Many Acholi, for example, adopted the idea that they were a „naturally‟ 
militaristic tribe.
117
 More broadly, as Branch contends, British governance embedded 
“ethnicity as mode of rule, and a mode of… identification” in Uganda‟s political 
landscape.
118
 The extent to which ethnic identity had become entangled with political 
privilege was reflected in the independence constitution of 1962. The constitution 
granted vastly disparate political positions to the ethnic groups of different regions. 
The Buganda kingdom received federal status, the Kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and 
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Toro semi-federal, while district status was given to Acholi, Bugisu, Bukeida, 
Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso and West Nile.
119
 
 
The political maneuvers of post-colonial regimes generated further regional 
cleavages.
120
 The rule of Obote I (1962-1971) inadvertently ingrained a divide 
between a „nilotic‟ North and a Bantu „South‟ in national politics, despite his initial 
attempts to abolish the British legacy of ethnic political disparity. Obote I, himself a 
northerner from Langi, abolished the federal status of the kingdoms converting all of 
Uganda into districts under greater central control. While many northerners welcomed 
this shift, southern ethnic groups interpreted the change as an “attack on their 
constitutionally-guaranteed rights.”121 In order to gain support for the centralization of 
state power, Obote increasingly provided political patronage to northern ethnic groups 
and filled the army ranks with Langi and Acholi. In 1971, Amin, a northerner from 
West Nile, overthrew Obote in a military coup, violently expelling Langi and Acholi 
from the army, and later also from the ranks of the political elite.
122
 Under the second 
period of rule of Obote II (1980-1986) following the overthrow of Amin, Acholi once 
again dominated the army in the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), 
although they only regained limited political power.
123
  By 1986, the pattern of 
manipulating ethnic identities to consolidate political power had become entrenched.  
 
When Yoweri Museveni‟s National Resistance Army (NRA) took power through the 
civil war of 1986, Museveni framed his struggle as a southern revolution against 25 
years of political and economic oppression by northern leaders.
124
 As Branch argues, 
from the northern perspective this claim was implausible: northern leaders such as 
Amin economically marginalized and brutalized the northern Acholi and Langi, while 
Obote II severely restricted their role in the political arena.
125
 For Museveni, however, 
initially framing his revolution in North-South terms enabled him to garner united 
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support for himself as a southwestern president from a still ethnically splintered 
south.
126
 The fresh memory of UNLA slaughter of NRA and civilians in the Luwero 
Triangle, perceived to be carried out by northerners in the army ranks, and the brief 
seizure of power by the Tito Okello‟s Acholi soldiers in 1985 lent compelling support 
to Museveni‟s north-south narrative.127 Just as rulers before him, Museveni carved 
regional divisions and enacted political and economic exclusion in order to cement his 
own power. In 1986 following the capture of Kampala, soldiers from both Okello and 
Obotes‟ armies began to return to the north. As Dolan describes it, for people in 
Northern Uganda this was a time of “holding one‟s breath and waiting for the 
worst.”128  
 
The roots of the northern conflict can therefore be traced to the colonially wrought 
economic and political marginalization of the North, and the regional divides carved 
by successive postcolonial regimes. The following section examines the nature of the 
Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) movement that eventually emerged in Northern 
Uganda following Museveni‟s coup in 1986. After critically questioning dominant 
media portrayals of the rebel movement, I provide an alternative analysis. First, I 
identify a societal-based „spiritual‟ logic in the LRA‟s goals and structure, influenced 
by previous northern movements. Next, I argue that the LRA initially emerged as a 
localized, politically charged struggle against Museveni‟s NRA.  Finally, I explore the 
complex and fraught relationship between the LRA and the Acholi people, and the 
extent to which the rebels championed a genuine political message.    
 
The Lord’s Resistance Army 
The nature and agenda of the LRA rebel movement is highly contested. The LRA, led 
by Joseph Kony, has inflicted untold suffering upon the Acholi people and other 
regions of Northern Uganda since its rise in 1988, and since 2008 against civilians in 
Congo and the Central Republic of Africa. While the LRA‟s motivations are disputed, 
their means of operation are widely documented: looting, rape, civilian massacres, 
burning of homes and land, mutilation, and the forceful abduction of civilians, 
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(disproportionately children) to serve as soldiers and rebels‟ „wives.‟ Abductees are 
often forced to commit atrocities against people in their own villages, including 
family members.  
 
Many commentators dismiss the LRA as irrational madmen or terrorists. Such 
observers note that Kony abducted and massacred the people of his own Acholi tribe, 
made strange declarations about instating rule based on the ten commandments, yet 
showed no sign of launching direct assault on Museveni‟s regime.129 The most 
common depiction by the media is that the LRA is simply an incomprehensible rebel 
group with “no clear political agenda” and odd, pseudo-spiritual beliefs and 
practices.
130
 Alternatively, the LRA have also been portrayed purely as proxy warriors 
of the Sudanese Government in tit for tat retaliation against Museveni‟s support of the 
Sudanese rebel group the Sudanese People‟s Liberation Army (SPLA).131  
 
As recent scholarly works by Finnstrom, Branch and Dolan clearly and compellingly 
assert however, the „official discourse‟ on the LRA is driven by the Ugandan 
Government in order to support their own meta-narrative of the conflict. In order to 
represent the northern conflict as an apolitical „Acholi problem‟ to the rest of the 
country and international donors, Museveni‟s Government encouraged and fuelled the 
representation of the LRA as an irrational terrorist group. Demonizing the LRA 
served to disguise the role of the Government in inadvertently prolonging the northern 
conflict, and acting as perpetrators of violence. Those that questioned this 
interpretation could be branded as „collaborators.‟ This dominant narrative of the war 
focuses exclusively on the crimes of the LRA, and ignores the complicity of the 
Ugandan Government. As explored in the following chapter, the ICC and its 
supporters have also adopted and disseminated this war narrative in order to defend 
the Court‟s narrow intervention. Struggles over the meaning of „justice‟ in Uganda 
reflect disputes about the nature of the conflict itself.  
The emergence of Kony‟s LRA cannot be separated from previous political 
movements that drew on local notions of a spiritual realm.
132
 Kony‟s movement bears 
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significant similarities to the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSM) led by Alice Lakwena 
that rose to fight Museveni‟s regime in 1986.133 Elements of Alice‟s movement 
reflected widely held local spiritual beliefs, such as the notion that „good‟ spirits 
could „possess‟ a spirit medium, guiding their actions.134 It is clear from the 
experiences of returning LRA-abductees that similar spiritual notions deeply 
influenced the LRA‟s agenda and control structure. Analyses of the LRA provided by 
Dolan and Finnstrom reveal a highly organized group, ordered by a religious 
framework merged with military models of administration.
135
 Kony claimed that his 
orders and strategic instructions derived from the spirits that possessed him, 
reinforcing the notion of his unquestionable authority.
136
 Like Alice, Kony ultimately 
appeared to seek the creation of a cleansed, pure society of „new Acholi.‟ As 
expressed by a former LRA abductee, “All the tribes who joined the LRA were to be 
the new Acholi community, „Acholi Manyen.”137 This central vision cannot be 
separated from the political context in which the LRA emerged and the political goals 
of Kony‟s movement. 
Kony‟s movement emerged as a locally orientated struggle against Museveni‟s 
NRA.
138
 The emergence of the LRA in 1988 as the lone remaining northern rebel 
movement coincided with the NRA‟s bolstering of local governance and security 
structures. Local governance was consolidated through the establishment of local 
defense units and the strengthening of the Resistance Council (RC) system.
139
 As 
Branch argues, Museveni‟s RC system amounted to a “decentralized, direct rule 
regime” administered by local agents that served the needs of Museveni‟s “ethnically 
exclusive central state.”140 The NRA excluded northerners not only from national 
politics, but also local governance: RC appointees were generally marginal locals who 
would prop up the regime, rather than prominent Acholi elders or politicians who 
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could represent the community.
141
 In contrast to Alice‟s HSM that targeted the central 
Government, Kony‟s fight was against an internal enemy. To the LRA, the north-
south divide had infiltrated Acholiland; the NRA had broken into the workings of 
Acholi society.
 142
 Kony‟s goal of creating the „New Acholi‟ emerged from his 
perceived need to purge the enemy from within. The emergence of the LRA can thus 
only be understood in the context of the societal logic of contemporary local spiritual 
and religious ideas as well as historical patterns of violent political repression and 
economic exclusion.  
Understanding the political-religious framework of the LRA also helps to make sense 
of their activity pattern. While the LRA‟s targeting of suspected Government officials 
at the local level follows clear logic, violence against the broader civilian population 
is more complex. Elements of the LRA‟s communication with civilians through 
pamphlet dropping and the sending of messages through released abductees indicate 
that the rebels did seek popular support amongst Acholi communities. At times they 
called for „all capable boys and girls to join the LRA so that they remove Museveni 
from the chair of Uganda.‟143 People were instructed to return from the Government‟s 
„protected‟ camps to their homes so that they would not be killed in LRA attacks on 
the camps.
144
 Other instructions appeared bent on disconnecting the Acholi population 
from the NRA regime. For example, edicts were circulated forbidding people to take 
information to the Government by bike, and not to obey Government troops.
145
 
 To the extent that the LRA perceived that the population was against them and their 
goals, civilians became a target of extreme violence. The practice of looting and 
abducting recruits quickly alienated much of the population from supporting Kony‟s 
movement, which in turn fuelled further attack on the wider population. This pattern 
is perhaps particularly evident in the waves of LRA atrocities following the NRA‟s 
organization of local militias called “Arrow Groups” to fight the rebels after the failed 
peace talks of 1994.
146
 The extent to which participation was voluntary or enforced is 
unclear. Shortly after their formation, the NRA deserted the Arrow Groups, leaving 
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them to face the rebels alone. The Government Minister of the North, Betty Bigombe, 
declared that the task of defeating the LRA was primarily “the people‟s duty.”147 In 
response, the LRA sent Bigombe a letter declaring that she had “brought death to the 
Acholi” by „inciting‟ the people to mobilize against their movement.148 As Branch 
describes it, the LRA embarked on a “campaign of collective punishment,” of killing 
and maiming.
149
 In 1995 in Atiak, after defeating the home guards of the so-called 
protected camp, the LRA declared: “You Acholi have refused to support us. We shall 
now teach you a lesson,” before massacring 200 civilians.150 
Throughout its insurgency, the LRA articulated their goals in political terms, and 
acted to undermine the role of the NRM in the north. Their messages to the people 
included promises to remove the NRM from power (e.g. in 1988), and political 
criticism of Museveni‟s regime.151 In 1999 when they managed to broadcast on radio 
for a number of days, spokespersons accused Museveni of economic corruption, 
overstaying in power, and encouraging mob justice.
152
 To the extent that the LRA 
gave some expression of the political and economic injustices of Museveni‟s regime 
experienced by the Acholi, some people may have initially supported them, or felt a 
degree of sympathy.
153
 For the general population however, the LRA was most 
clearly a perpetrator, and a source of suffering and insecurity. The LRA did not 
politically represent the people of Acholiland or the wider north, but their actions did 
serve a political purpose according to the internal logic of Kony‟s movement. In 
pursuit of the vision of a New Acholi community, Kony sought to undermine and 
purge Museveni‟s regime from all connection with the northern people. In addition to 
attacking Government actors, this involved widespread assault on the population, not 
only to punish and eliminate those perceived as Acholi traitors, but also to 
demonstrate that the Government had no power or will to protect or sustain them.
154
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To question the media‟s portrayal of the LRA as simply mad and incomprehensible is 
not to deny that the actions of the LRA are atrocious and politically and socially 
destructive. What is known of Kony even suggests that he has psychopathic 
tendencies; he is clearly highly charismatic, egotistical, cruel, strategic and apparently 
unremorseful. While Kony was crucial to the emergence of the LRA, it is also 
arguable that the movement was a product of long-embedded patterns of political 
violence, ethnic-based rule, and economic exclusion. A response to immediate ethnic-
political grievances was given shape and expression through a locally derived (but 
arguably distorted) spiritual and religious worldview. Far from ad hoc and 
inexplicable, the LRA appears highly structured, organized and with a political 
component to their agenda.  
While several commentators have suggested that the LRA is simply a pawn in the 
proxy war between Uganda and Sudan, it is clear then that the LRA was also 
consistently driven by its own goals.
155
 Certainly, for some time, the LRA‟s 
relationship with the Sudanese Government vastly advanced its military strength and 
capacity. It is clear from numerous sources that particularly after 1994, the Khartoum 
Government provided the LRA with food, significant weaponry assistance, a safe 
haven and training facilities in Sudan.
156
 The Sudanese regime supported the LRA in 
retaliation against the Ugandan Government‟s backing of the anti-Khartoum rebel 
group, the SPLA, and encouraged the LRA to directly attack SPLA forces.
157
 
Certainly, the LRA fulfilled a “political role on the chessboard” at a regional level.158 
However, as Dolan puts it, the LRA itself certainly did not perceive itself as “a 
collection of „proxy warriors‟ dependent exclusively on the Government of Sudan.” 
This is particularly evident from 2000, when the relationship between the LRA and 
Sudan began to break down as relations normalized between Uganda and Sudan. 
Dolan describes, for instance, that when the Sudanese Government proposed to shift 
the LRA‟s camp in Sudan 1000km northwards, Kony declined food and arms, and 
began to search for alternative alliances.
159
 The LRA were not simply puppets of the 
Khartoum regime.  
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Contrary to dominant Government-driven narratives then, the LRA movement 
emerged as a societal-grounded response to the Ugandan Government‟s political and 
economic repression of the North. As the northern situation developed, the 
Government used the portrayal of the LRA as apolitical and incomprehensible to 
deflect attention from its own complicity in the war. By demonizing the LRA, the 
Government suppressed the question of equal inclusion of the north in the economic 
and political life of Uganda. As I explore throughout this thesis, depictions of the 
LRA as apolitical are furthermore used to defend approaches to postwar justice that 
focus exclusively on LRA crimes. The following section examines the complicit roles 
of the Ugandan Government and wider circle of external actors in inadvertently 
allowing the war to continue for so long.  
The Structural Complicity of the Ugandan Government and International 
Actors  
Failure to End the War 
In his thesis, Dolan raises the critical question: why did a war supposedly waged by a 
rebel group of 1-5,000 against a Government with 50-60,000 troops at its disposal and 
support from the US drag on for over twenty years?
160
 This question has profound 
implications for the development of approaches to postwar justice. It is commonly 
argued that the Ugandan Government has been simply unable to achieve a peace 
agreement or military „solution‟ to end the LRA‟s violence in the north. The Ugandan 
People‟s Defense Force‟s (UPDF‟s) military incapacity, Sudanese support of the 
LRA, and LRA‟s unpredictability are often cited as reasons that the Government 
failed to defeat the LRA militarily or negotiate a solution.
161
 In contrast, Dolan argues 
that the Government consistently lacked the political will to end the war, and 
furthermore deliberately perpetuated the situation for political gain.
162
 Dolan contends 
that it seems unlikely that “the LRA could survive for so long had the UPDF really 
wished to deal with them.”163 Dolan‟s argument is certainly attractive, and draws 
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greatly needed attention to the responsibility of the Government for the suffering of 
northerners. However, I argue that within the context of a wider web of international 
alliances and donor relationships, the Ugandan Government‟s changing approach to 
the north is better described as shaped by political and economic expedience, rather 
than deliberate policy. As Branch contends, as “intentionality is extremely difficult to 
prove…the war is best thought of as a system.”164 Before I explore the deeper reasons 
for the continuation of the war, I first recount the failures of the Government‟s efforts 
to end the conflict.  
In the years immediately following Museveni‟s 1986 coup, the Government‟s 
approach to dealing with „the northern problem‟ was the marginalized, tortured 
inclusion of northern populations. While the Government refused to engage politically 
with northern rebel movements, northerners were also denied a political voice through 
meaningful participation in the new local political structures of the NRA.
165
 As long 
as the rebels did not manage to build a support base, the NRA allowed the rebels to 
roam free, perpetrating violence against locals. A contemporary newspaper in 1987 
declared that the NRA “seems only to be defending themselves” and doing “nothing 
to contain the situation.”166 The Acholi were described as “millet between two 
grinding stones,” represented by the rebels and the NRA.167 The NRA also allowed 
widespread cattle rustling. Following the emergence of the LRA as the sole rebel 
group in 1988, the regime increasingly perpetrated direct violence against civilians. 
As the war continued, however, the Government‟s role in the conflict became 
somewhat less clear.  
Over the years, the Government intermittently engaged in various efforts to end the 
war, including a number of peace negotiations, military operations, and eventually the 
creation of an amnesty law in 2000. However, until international pressure on the 
regime increased after 2003, these attempts often appeared contradictory and lacked 
conviction. Until the radical commitment of the Ugandan Government and the LRA 
to the Juba Peace talks in 2006, the Ugandan Government‟s suspicious and 
antagonistic approach to negotiations regularly undermined the possibility of a 
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peaceful settlement.
168
 The „peace talks‟ of 1994 illustrate this pattern. Dolan‟s 
analysis of the transcript of the talks clearly reveals that despite the courageous and 
well-intentioned efforts of Bigombe, the Minister of the North, the negotiations 
amounted to „war talks.‟ Government representatives goaded and humiliated the 
LRA, preying on their insecurities.
169
 When Kony demanded UN oversight of the 
talks and that the final negotiation be delayed by three to six months, Museveni 
publicly declared an ultimatum for Kony to surrender within a week or face military 
annihilation.
170
 As Vlassenroot puts it, “this deadline destroyed the whole process of 
negotiations.”171 
The Government continued to appear reluctant to reach a negotiated settlement with 
the LRA, or to allow their unconditional, peaceful return. Following increasing calls 
from local actors for peace in 1997 and 1998 Museveni is reported to have declared, 
“There is no compromise with these terrorists and criminals.”172 When the local civil 
society group Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) developed a 
dialogue with the LRA in 1998, their talks were disturbed by UPDF attacks.
173
 As I 
will later explore in more detail, the Amnesty Act of 2000 was also undermined by 
the Government‟s non-committal approach, and ultimately failed to achieve peace. 
The Act is generally agreed to have originated from popular pressure from civil 
society to bring home the rebels and forced abductees and end the war. As Dolan 
points out, however, given the President‟s clear reluctance to enact the amnesty, and 
openly stated desire for the top commanders of the LRA to be excluded, it was 
unlikely to fully succeed.
174
  
While probably Museveni‟s preferred „solution‟, military attempts repeatedly failed to 
eradicate the LRA. As already noted, during „Operation North‟, undertaken in 1991, 
the NRA removed significant national military support after establishing the locally 
recruited “Arrow Groups.” The northern population faced the onslaught of the LRA 
without sufficient assistance, while the Government failed to supply the Arrow 
                                                 
168
 Dolan, Understanding War and Its Continuation, pp.149  
169
 Ibid 
170
 Doom and Vlassenroot, p.24 
171
 Ibid 
172
 „Museveni Rejects Rebel Compromise,‟ New Vision, 25 June 1998, cited in Dolan, Understanding 
War and its Continuation, p.149 
173
 Dolan, Understanding War and its Continuation p.151 
174
 Ibid. See also Allen, War and Justice in Northern Uganda, p.34 
51 
 
Groups adequate arms.
175
 The Government‟s attacks on the LRA in the wake of the 
fruitless 1994 peace talks also failed to contain the LRA‟s increasing violence against 
civilian populations. While LRA and UPDF forces clashed intermittently, the next 
major Government military campaign against the LRA was not until 2002. While 
Operation Iron Fist involved approximately 10, 000 troops, US logistical support and 
attack of LRA bases in Sudan, Kony and the LRA key commanders escaped and 
immediately continued to refill their ranks with new abductees.
176
 In response to the 
attack, the LRA retaliated, moving unchecked through Northern Uganda and 
perpetrating massacres in new regions. The second offensive in 2004, while 
significantly better organized, also failed to capture the key commanders.
177
 
Repeatedly, the Ugandan Government failed to end the LRA war through military 
means.  
An Internationally Supported War of Convenience 
The question of the complicity of the Ugandan Government in the Northern Conflict 
has profound implications for the pursuit of postwar justice. As explored throughout 
this thesis, actors that support different approaches to justice offer very different 
accounts of the war. Actors that focus their postwar efforts on securing the criminal 
trial of the LRA (such as the ICC) naturally downplay or ignore the role of the 
Ugandan Government in the war. Critical groups that highlight the Government‟s 
complicity advocate for justice mechanisms that hold the state accountable, and seek 
broader transformation of the northern situation. Below, I demonstrate that in contrast 
to dominant war narratives, the Government bears significant responsibility for the 
perpetuation of the northern conflict.  
While it is problematic to contend that the Government of Uganda deliberately 
perpetuated the northern war, it can certainly be demonstrated that the Government 
prioritized various strategic decisions that made it predictably difficult to conclusively 
defeat the LRA militarily. These decisions, as I explore below, were either directly 
prompted or facilitated by Uganda‟s profitable international donor relationships and 
strategic alliances. Furthermore, for a long time, failure to defeat the LRA or reach a 
peace agreement did not disadvantage the Ugandan Government. Rather, given the 
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nature of Uganda‟s relations with the international community, the existence of the 
northern conflict often proved highly convenient. 
Uganda‟s lucrative relationship with the US as an ally against terrorism undermined 
both the Government‟s ability and motivation to conclusively defeat the LRA.  
Firstly, US support underpinned Uganda‟s engagement in a „proxy war‟ with Sudan, 
which led to the greatly enhanced military capacity of the LRA. As Branch notes, 
when Sudanese support to the LRA expanded from 1994, the LRA “suddenly had 
better uniforms than the NRA” and became very well armed.178 Increasingly, the 
Ugandan Government explained the seeming inability of the UPDF to defeat the LRA 
with reference to „the Sudan factor.‟179 However, it is clear that Sudan‟s support of 
the LRA was a direct response to Uganda‟s own backing of the SPLA.180 It is 
reasonable to question why, for so long, Museveni did not seek a deal with the 
Sudanese Government to cease the reciprocal supporting of rebel groups.
181
 Uganda‟s 
key driving motivation, however, was to maintain its strong relationship with the US. 
In August 1993, Sudan had been placed on the US list of state sponsors of 
terrorism.
182
 Uganda‟s highly profitable relations with the US were largely grounded 
in the role Uganda played in “containing the Sudanese danger.”183 As Vlassenroot 
further explains, at the time, “Museveni [was] hardly in a position to displease 
Washington at the risk of losing material support.”184 Secondly, the prospect of 
further US support also weakened the incentive of Uganda to conclusively defeat the 
LRA. Uganda was able to solidify their relationship with the US by representing the 
LRA as an international terrorist group that must be contained by Government 
forces.
185
 Particularly after 9/11, Museveni was able to position Uganda as a vital ally 
of the „war on terror‟ and receive further significant financial, technological and 
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logistical assistance.
186
 Ironically, Uganda stood to benefit from US assistance by 
paying lip service to its continued combat against the LRA, while also engaging in a 
proxy war that fueled the LRA‟s military strength.  
It is also critical to recognize that for a long time, the relationship between the 
international donor community and Uganda was shaped by Uganda‟s image as an 
exemplary model of neoliberal reform. As I will explore in the following paragraphs, 
this dynamic profoundly shaped Uganda‟s approach towards the northern conflict. In 
1987 Uganda accepted conditional loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank (WB),
187
 and from 1992 increasingly adopted neoliberal reforms. 
With an impressive GDP growth rate of 6%, Uganda became championed as a shining 
example of third world development and attracted increasing support from 
international donors.
188
 As Branch argues, donors were reluctant for a long time to 
acknowledge the magnitude of the northern crisis because Uganda had become a 
„success story‟ of national recovery and neoliberal reform. This trend is particularly 
evident for example, in the series of World Bank reports (1998, 2000 and 2004) that 
pay minimal attention to the northern crisis, instead hailing Uganda as an example of 
economic “post conflict reconstruction” since the time of Amin.189 Such reports 
ignored the rapidly widening poverty gap between northern regions and the rest of the 
country and the growing security and livelihood crisis in the north.
190
  
Uganda‟s prized position amongst international donors allowed Museveni to use the 
northern war to justify a high military budget.
 191
 The regime appeared to accrue 
several benefits from this. Improving the military was desirable in order to secure the 
regime‟s power base and allow economically exploitative military ventures into the 
neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo.
192
 Also, Museveni appeared to divert 
security and defense funds to patronage in order to sustain support. 
193
 Compared to 
donor contributions to the national budget, „classified‟ security and defense funds 
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were less tightly monitored. Military spending became a vast area of Government 
corruption.
194
 A 2004 Commission of Inquiry, for instance, revealed numerous 
instances of the purchase of „junk‟ military equipment and also noted that president 
Museveni often granted military tenders personally.
195
 Many „ghost‟ (deceased) 
soldiers remained on the UPDF payroll, most likely allowing higher-ranking officers 
to receive bounteous rewards.
196
  These „benefits‟ again simultaneously undermined 
Uganda‟s ability to combat the LRA and its motivation to conclusively end the war. 
Increased opportunity for profitable cross-border military ventures and corruption of 
military funds directly advantaged Museveni‟s regime, yet also helps to explain why 
despite significant military spending, the UPDF failed to eradicate the LRA from 
Northern Uganda. High-ranking military officers may also have perceived the 
continuation of the northern war as convenient, given their lucrative gains from 
presidential patronage.  
The donor community propped up Museveni‟s gross misuse of funding, and 
inadvertently allowed the regime to benefit from the guise of fighting the northern 
war. As Branch puts it, Uganda managed to strategically turn “its international 
reputation as a model of African leadership and its position as an ally in the war on 
terror into a capacity to use donor funding at its own discretion.”197Whenever donors 
challenged the extent of the Government‟s military spending, Museveni simply 
appealed to the need to combat the extreme violence of the LRA. Donors complied, 
seemingly unwilling to deny the Government funds to deal with a rebel group causing 
many civilian deaths. International donors simply questioned the extent of the 
Government‟s military budget, rather than the true use of „military‟ funds, the failures 
of the Government‟s efforts to fight the LRA, and further still, the broader 
appropriateness of focusing on a military „solution‟ to the northern problem.198 
The northern war proved convenient for the Uganda Government in more ways then 
these. While the international community seemed willing to turn a blind eye, the 
Government exploited the opportunity to derive political benefit from the northern 
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war by portraying the situation alternatively as an intra-ethnic struggle, or a fight 
against terrorism. By painting the situation as an intra-ethnic war, Museveni‟s regime 
fed preconceptions held by people in other regions that northerners are innately 
violent and militarized. As one Acholi elder commented, “the war has greatly 
degraded the Acholi in the eyes of other Ugandans, who view them as murderers, 
stupid and senseless.”199 At times, Museveni has perpetuated and drawn upon such 
characterizations to bolster his southern-central support base. The election campaign 
of 1996 provided a particularly clear example.
200
 Museveni‟s election team broadcast 
a radio advertisement featuring the voice of a man with a northern accent who hijacks 
civilians at a roadblock, robbing and killing them.
201
 The broadcaster‟s voice-over 
warned listeners that if they elect opposition candidates, the northerners could regain 
power to the detriment of their security. The language of „terrorism‟ also gave 
Museveni a guise under which to purge dissenting political voices within Uganda. 
Many political opponents including Acholi Members of Parliament have been 
accused of collaborating with the LRA, and have often faced persecution or political 
exclusion.
202
 
The continuation of the northern conflict therefore resulted from the interplay of local, 
national and international dynamics. The international goals of the advancement of 
neoliberal reform and the war on terror contributed to a situation in which Uganda 
was able to profitably exploit funding opportunities in a manner that simultaneously 
undermined the Government‟s prospects of ending the war, and significantly 
diminished their incentive to do so. Below, I turn to an assessment of the 
Government‟s policy of displacing northern communities into „protected‟ camps, and 
the role of international agencies in facilitating this process. As I demonstrate, it is in 
the encampment of northern populations that state actors can most clearly be 
identified as active perpetrators of structural (and physical) violence in the northern 
conflict. This analysis again has significant implications for the pursuit of justice in 
the wake of war. As I argue throughout this thesis, the narrow focus of many actors 
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on the prosecution of the top LRA is accordingly a grossly insufficient approach to 
postwar justice. Rather, a comprehensive understanding of the war suggests that 
„justice‟ must address the complicity of the state in the socioeconomic devastation of 
northern communities throughout the war.    
Displacement in ‘Protected’ Camps: National and International Complicity in 
Dehabilitation and Dependency  
In 1996, the Government embarked on a policy of shifting civilians (frequently 
forcibly) from their homesteads into camps called „protected villages.‟ The numbers 
of displaced grew rapidly. Originally, the World Food Program (WFP) estimated they 
would need to provide for 110 000 people in the camps. By 2002, the WFP‟s figure 
was 522 000.
203
 Following LRA violent reprisals in the aftermath of Operation Iron 
Fist, the number of displaced people had risen to 800 000.
204
 As recalled by a camp 
leader interviewed by Dolan, the objectives of establishing the camps were 
purportedly to “avoid abduction…save the lives of people …[and] to cut 
communication between the masses and the rebels.”205 The curiously contrasting 
objectives of providing security and curbing rebel collaboration hints at the 
Government‟s fraught relationship with those they were supposedly protecting.206 The 
following paragraphs outline the impact of the camps upon the civilian population.  
The conditions of life in the camps led to widespread impoverishment and denial of 
basic human rights in northern war-affected communities. An Acholi woman 
explains: 
The problems I faced in village are nothing compared to the problems in the 
camp. In my home, I farm my late husbands land and yield much food. In the 
camp, I have to wait for World Food Programme food. Only then can my 
children eat.
207
 
While some economic and agricultural activity took place during the years of camp 
life, most people simply could not access arable land. From November 1998, civilians 
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were ordered not to move more than 1km from the camp area.
208
 By 2000, 
approximately 10% of previously farmed land was still cultivated.
209
 The food rations 
provided by WFP and other food agencies were distributed unreliably and often in 
inadequate proportions, while access to clean water and sanitation was often lacking. 
Odek camp in 1998 for example, had only three pit latrines for 8000 people.
210
 
Crowded, unsanitary conditions combined with severely inadequate access to 
healthcare led to greatly inflated rates of mortality and morbidity.
211
 The severe 
erosion of access to adequate education will undoubtedly have long-term impacts for 
Acholi and other affected northern communities. One 2001 study showed for instance 
that only 17.86 % of men, and 16.14% of women completed primary school, while 
access to secondary schooling was even lower.
212
 
Significant evidence suggests that the Government‟s policy of displacement 
exacerbated the vulnerability of the population to the violence of the LRA. The UPDF 
largely failed to protect civilians. According to the records of the Acholi Religious 
Leaders Peace Initiative for example, Government forces placed in Kitgum and Pader 
districts intervened in only 33 of over 456 attacks on camps between June and 
December of 2002.
213
 Rather than guarding the perimeters, UPDF quarters were 
usually positioned at the center of the camps, surrounded by civilian huts.
214
 From his 
fieldwork, Dolan observed that UPDF responses to attack were frequently late, to the 
point that they usually arrived after the LRA had left.
215
 Many civilians accordingly 
chose to leave the camps at night, seeking greater safety from attack and abduction by 
commuting to town centers, or sleeping in temporary hideouts (Alups) in the bush 
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outside the camps.
216
 In 2004, a survey showed that on one night, 20 000 children had 
commuted to eleven different commuter sites.
217
  
In many instances UPDF soldiers became the direct perpetrators of violence and 
crime against civilians. Reports of UPDF killing civilians accused of collaborating 
with the LRA were not uncommon.
218
 A man now living in Patiko sub county 
recalled: 
A UPDF solider killed my father. They killed nine other people on the same 
day. They shot them; perhaps hoping that maybe they were some of the 
collaborators with the LRA, the rebels. This place [pointing to where the camp 
was] was a battlefield. The same thing happened in other villages.
219
 
Soldiers were reported to have exploited the encamped population, looted goods, 
demanded arbitrary manual labor from civilians, and perpetrated rape. Civilians 
increasingly felt caught between the two forces. Furthermore, to the encamped 
populations it was often unclear who the perpetrators were, particularly as the two 
armies often wore the same uniforms.
220
 It certainly appears that incidents of looting, 
destruction of property and attacks were undertaken by UPDF under the guise of the 
LRA.
221
  
Extreme insecurity, squalid, cramped conditions and forced reliance on food aid took 
a heavy social toll upon the encamped populations. Dolan‟s deeply involved 
fieldwork explores the ways in which people became dehabilitated, adopting self-
destructive individual and collective behavior patterns in response to their 
surroundings.
222
 Why did most people stay in the camps during the periods of relative 
peace instead of tending to their land? Dolan points to fear of Government reprisal, 
but also deep psychological and cultural dehabilitation that prevented people from 
resisting the situation. During my fieldwork in Gulu, many northerners also reflected 
upon the culture of dependency and idleness that developed during the period of 
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encampment.
223
 To a great extent, people came to rely on the services provided at the 
camps, despite their inadequacy.
224
 Destructive patterns of alternative economic and 
social activity also emerged. While men increasingly engaged in heavy drinking, 
numerous women took up alcohol brewing to earn enough to feed their children.
225
 
Widespread breakdown of local authority structures and social conflict resolution 
mechanisms also occurred.  
The structural violence and devastation wrought by the Government‟s policy of 
encampment stemmed from a number of factors of convenience. As Vlassenroot 
contends, the policy of encampment is likely to have reflected the military goal of 
containing the situation by cutting off rebels‟ easy access to food, and segregating 
„potential collaborators‟ from the rebels.226 The camps also served to demonstrate to 
outside observers that the Government was taking measures to shield civilians from 
LRA attack. As indicated in the above discussion however, the Government perceived 
little incentive to invest heavily in military protection or service provision for 
northern populations. In the absence of international scrutiny, it was more convenient 
for the Government to continue to divert military funds elsewhere. 
While the acts of violence and neglect committed by UPDF soldiers were certainly a 
matter of individual choice, they also reflected the wider context of inadequate 
funding of the UPDF and an abusive military culture. Government troops were 
usually inadequately fed and paid, and often had to resort to stealing from civilians in 
camps.
227
 As Vlassenroot notes, poorly paid non-northern soldiers who perceived the 
conflict as an „Acholi affair,‟ were unsurprisingly reluctant to risk their lives in a 
“foreign war.”228 Retributive action against UPDF violence and abuse of civilians 
appeared to be rare before 2004.
229
 As I explore below, the Government was also able 
to render itself conveniently exempt from the responsibility of ensuring critical 
services for northern populations due to the extensive presence of international aid 
agencies.   
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During the period of 1996-2003, the net impact of humanitarian organizations 
operating in Northern Uganda was to facilitate the Government‟s policy of 
displacement. Aid agencies undertook a range of approaches in response to the 
northern situation, including the establishment of reception centers for abducted 
children, and support of local peace initiatives and income generating activities.
230
 A 
significant proportion of aid, however, was dedicated to the provision of food and 
basic services in the „protected camps,‟ as requested by the Ugandan Government in 
1996.
231
 By 2003 over half of the total aid money (US$123.6 million) was spent on 
purchasing and distributing food packages.
232
 Certainly the aid often provided much 
needed relief to large numbers of people.
233
 As Branch argues, however, the aid 
provided by organizations such as WFP facilitated the Government‟s program of 
encampment but failed to avert “a humanitarian disaster of vast proportions.”234 The 
WFP provided food without questioning the wider political context, largely ignoring 
UPDF violence and Government structural complicity in the northern situation.
235
 In 
November 1996 the WFP‟s account simply read:  
Escalation in insurgency since July 1996 by the LRA in the north of Uganda has 
continued to pose a threat to the lives and property of people…WFP has 
responded to the situation by arranging limited short term ad hoc distributions of 
food to the worst affected areas.
236
 
International organizations acted to perpetuate the status quo and facilitate a culture of 
reliance on foreign aid amongst the encamped populations.
237
 Increasingly, 
populations were “taught”, as Branch puts it, to “orientate their attention away from 
the state” as service providers, towards transnational agencies that ultimately lack any 
political accountability to the communities they serve.
238
  The national policy of 
creating the IDP camps was designed to transfer responsibility to the wide range of 
UN agencies, NGOs and donors that participated in planning and providing services 
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in the camps. Little or no pressure was exerted on the Government to adequately 
protect civilians, provide basic social services for encamped civilians, or bring the 
situation to an end.
239
 While there were local NGOs that drew critical attention to 
abuses by state actors, until 2004, international NGOs that were in a strong position to 
leverage the Government were overwhelmingly quiet.
240
 Another humanitarian 
worker interviewed by Dolan commented that humanitarian actors the UN are “…just 
diluting the essence of the issue. They think they are doing protection, yet the 
Government is getting off scot-free.”241 NGOs may have preferred to stay „apolitical‟ 
due to fear of expulsion or reprisal. Overwhelmingly however, the actions and 
inactions of most organizations reflected a „disaster model‟ of humanitarian aid.242 
Politics was viewed as irrelevant: the people of Northern Uganda were perceived 
rather as „passive victims‟ without agency.243 As Dolan argues, while state actors and 
the LRA both acted as the perpetrators of violence as well as economic and 
psychological dehabilitation, international humanitarian organizations acted as 
complicit bystanders.
244
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has critically examined the historic emergence and key dynamics of the 
northern conflict, challenging the dominant narratives of the war commonly presented 
by the Ugandan Government, western media and International NGOs. I have argued 
that it is misleading and inaccurate to simply narrate the northern situation as a war 
between the LRA and Museveni‟s regime. For over twenty years, northern civilians 
became enmeshed between the structural violence of the Ugandan Government and 
the atrocities of the LRA, which was facilitated by the actions and inactions of various 
international actors and institutions. 
From the colonial roots of economic disparity, the emergence and expansion of the 
LRA rebellion, to the dynamics that drove the continuation of the conflict, socio-
economic issues and national-international dynamics have factored strongly 
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throughout the northern war. Contrary to dominant narratives, the LRA did not act 
simply as irrational terrorists or religious fanatics. Rather, the LRA movement 
reflected a particular societal-based logic that emerged in response to historical 
patterns of political and economic exclusion and the immediate context of the NRA‟s 
coup. A complex interplay between the strategic interests of national and international 
actors served to perpetuate the war. The complicit role of international economic 
agencies and donors in the continuation of the war was underpinned by their vested 
interest in preserving the image of post-1986 Uganda as a shining example of 
neoliberal economic reform. The uncritical provision of funds by international actors 
eager to fight a „war on terror‟ and promote this neoliberal agenda led to a situation in 
which Uganda was able to profitably exploit funding opportunities in a way that 
simultaneously diminished the Government‟s prospects of ending the war, and 
furthermore undermined their incentive to do so. Uganda‟s strategically beneficial 
siphoning of military funds to political patronage, provision of support to the SPLA, 
and engagement in exploitative military ventures in the DRC weakened the ability of 
the Ugandan Government to end the war or adequately protect encamped northern 
populations. In addition to the procurement of significant international funds with few 
strings attached, Uganda could exploit the northern situation for various political 
gains.  
Finally, the socioeconomic roots of the conflict were reproduced and magnified in its 
consequences. Twenty years of deep insecurity and displacement in squalid camps 
brought about deep social and economic devastation amongst northern communities, 
and widening disparity between the north and the rest of the country. The 
international community actively participated in the policy of encampment through 
the uncritical provision of food aid, facilitating a culture of reliance on foreign 
agencies, and ultimately failing to challenge the Government‟s approach to the north.  
As I explore throughout this thesis, the struggles over different approaches to post 
conflict justice are underpinned by very different accounts of the war itself. This 
chapter has established that a narrow focus upon the criminal trial of LRA 
commanders is inadequate. Actors that defend this approach downplay or ignore the 
complicity of the state actors in the war. Rather, „justice‟ must also hold the state 
accountable for its role in the war. Furthermore, if „justice‟ is to be meaningful it must 
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strive towards the transformation of the dynamics that drove the conflict itself: the 
socioeconomic marginalization of Northern Uganda. As I argue at greater length in 
subsequent chapters, transitional justice must unequivocally encompass the concept of 
socioeconomic justice.  
In the following chapter, I examine Uganda‟s emergence from war, analyzing the 
critical period of 2003-2008. I focus on two significant developments in this period: 
Uganda‟s referral of the northern situation to the ICC, and the pivotal Juba Peace 
Process. Throughout my analysis, I explore the ways in which various local, national, 
and international actors can either cultivate or restrict the opening of critical political 
space in which dominant narratives of the war are justified or challenged. I identify 
the roots of transitional justice discourse in the radical space created at Juba, in which 
a range of actors at all levels critically confronted dominant narratives of the war. 
Actors in Juba demanded that post-war processes address the socio-economic roots of 
the conflict, its ongoing consequences, and the Government‟s accountability.   
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Chapter 3: Uganda’s Emergence From War  
 
Introduction 
Even while the war persisted, from early 2004 a dynamic debate ignited over how 
peace could be brought to Northern Uganda, the nature of „justice‟ that should be 
sought in the wake of conflict, and the relationship between the two. In late 2003, 
Uganda referred the „situation of the Lord‟s Resistance Army‟ to the ICC. Early the 
following year, the ICC Prosecutor announced that the conflict would be the first case 
addressed by the new international justice institution, and the ICC commenced 
investigations. The ICC intervention created a storm of controversy in Uganda. Local 
civil society actors feared that the release of arrest warrants for LRA commanders 
would prevent a peaceful solution. Northern cultural and religious leaders contended 
that the ICC could undermine the possibility of applying „traditional‟ justice processes 
that focus on forgiveness and reconciliation. The arrest warrants for Kony and four 
other LRA commanders released in 2005 also directly contradicted the blanket 
amnesty established in 2000. Furthermore, many perceived that the ICC was biased 
towards the Ugandan Government, as it indicted only the LRA and appeared to rely 
closely upon state security forces to conduct its operations.  
On the other hand, key changes in the international environment paved the way to 
unprecedented engagement between the LRA and the Ugandan Government during 
the Juba peace talks from 2006-2008. The agreements reached at Juba presented a 
window of hope for definitive disarmament of the LRA and a fundamental shift in the 
Ugandan Government‟s approach to the North. The ICC indictments, however, 
proved to be a major stumbling block to the talks. The indictments shaped the course 
and content of the negotiations and underpinned their final demise. While hopes that a 
conclusive peace deal would be forged between the Ugandan Government and the 
LRA collapsed in November 2008, agreements signed during the negotiations have 
been officially adopted as the framework for the development of national transitional 
justice mechanisms in Uganda.  
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This chapter explores the path of Uganda‟s emergence from war. I argue that the 
international community had a profound yet contradictory influence on national 
processes in Uganda. I demonstrate how various international actors, as well as 
diverse domestic actors, have the power to cultivate or restrict the opening of critical 
political space in which dominant narrative about the war is justified or challenged. 
On one hand, the ICC acted to legitimize the Government‟s politicized discourse and 
narrow the trajectory of post conflict justice towards a focus on criminal trials of the 
LRA. Meanwhile, other international and local actors broadened the scope of „justice‟ 
during the Juba Peace Process to address deeper socio-economic roots and 
repercussions of the war, and compelled the Government to submit to processes of 
accountability and national transformation. I demonstrate how the language and 
concepts of transitional justice helped facilitate the efforts of such actors. This chapter 
contributes to the regionally focused literature on the ICC intervention in Uganda 
through original analysis of the ICC‟s impact on the development of early transitional 
justice processes.  
I divide this chapter into four sections. First, I explore the politics of Uganda‟s 
referral of the LRA conflict to the ICC. After analyzing the self-interested motivations 
of both the Ugandan Government and the ICC, I discuss the broad implications of 
ICC‟s narrow intervention in shaping discourse of violation and justice in Uganda. In 
the second section I examine the development of the Juba Peace talks. Firstly, I 
explore the drive from local civil society for a peaceful end to the war, and their 
hostile reaction to the ICC intervention. Secondly, I examine the conflicting roles of 
different international actors in the struggle to engage the LRA and the Ugandan 
Government in the Juba peace process.  
In the third section, I analyze the Juba agreements, demonstrating that the peace talks 
provided a political space where dominant narratives of the war could be challenged. I 
argue that to a degree, the language of transitional justice facilitated the radical 
political gains made in Juba. In the fourth part, I examine the impact of the ICC on the 
Juba talks. I contend that the ICC inadvertently propelled the development of formal 
criminal justice ahead of other reconciliation measures provided for in the Juba 
agreements. Finally, I posit that the ICC ultimately derailed the peace process, 
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significantly weakening the Ugandan Government‟s obligation to implement the Juba 
agreements.  
 
The Convenient Alliance of Uganda ands the ICC: Narrowing the Scope of 
Justice   
Motivations of Uganda‟s referral to the ICC 
 
The international pressure upon the Ugandan regime that developed from 2003 
transformed the Northern conflict in numerous ways. After years of apathetic silence, 
increasing critical international attention was cast upon the northern conflict and the 
role of the Ugandan regime. The visit of Jan Egeland (UN Under-Secretary for 
Humanitarian Affairs to Northern Uganda) in November 2003 marked a critical 
turning point in the approach of the international community. Egeland stated: “We 
must agree as an international community, the UN and donors, that this is totally 
unacceptable. Northern Uganda is the most forgotten crisis in the world.”245 Egeland‟s 
call reflected a wider rise in awareness by top-level members of the UN and 
diplomatic circles. The immediate backdrop to the surge of critical voices was the 
dismal failure of the Government‟s military campaign Operation Iron Fist, which 
resulted in tragic retaliation of LRA violence against civilians. The UK Deputy High 
Commissioner (the representative of another key donor) declared in response that the 
“war effort has failed,” while other donors questioned the Government‟s military 
approach towards ending the war.
246
 Donor misgivings also became evident as their 
contributions diminished. In the financial year of 2003-2004, donor support of the 
total Government budget slipped to 47% compared to 54% between 2000 and 2003.
247
  
 
The Ugandan Government‟s referral of the „situation regarding the LRA‟ to the newly 
established ICC appeared to be a strategic response to this mounting international 
pressure. The emergence of donor scrutiny upon the northern conflict and prospects of 
losing donor funds drove the Government to seek new avenues to gain the approval of 
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the international community. By referring the LRA to the ICC, Museveni‟s advisors 
perceived he could swing international favor back towards the regime by casting 
Uganda as a champion of the international justice movement and the fight against 
impunity.”248 The legal advisor to the Government on the ICC himself explained 
Uganda‟s referral as an “attempt to engage an otherwise aloof international 
community by transforming the prosecution of the LRA leaders into a litmus test for 
the much celebrated promise of global justice.”249 In casting itself as the new 
champion of international justice, Uganda could also counter international criticism 
levied at the regime for offering a blanket amnesty to the LRA.
250
 
 
Referral to the ICC also reflected Museveni‟s desire to regain international support 
for UPDF military operations. As discussed in the previous chapter, Museveni‟s 
determination to keep the military option alive probably reflected his need to maintain 
the flow of donor funding to Uganda‟s military budget, which propped up his political 
patronage system.
251
 Furthermore, in 2003 it is likely that Museveni feared defense 
budget cuts as donors increasingly doubted Uganda‟s military approach to the north. 
Referring the northern conflict to the ICC was likely to boost support for military 
action against the LRA, as the court required the capture of the top LRA commanders 
in order to put them on trial.
252
 Statements issued by the ICC indeed lent support to a 
military approach. Soon after referral to the ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
stated that the arrest of the LRA must be a key priority.
253
 It appears Uganda also 
anticipated international assistance in military efforts to capture the LRA.
254
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It is clear that Museveni‟s regime felt secure that state actors would not be subjected 
to the ICC‟s jurisdiction when it made the referral. The referral itself tellingly 
requested the ICC to investigate “the situation concerning the LRA.”255 In January 
2004, the ICC‟s decision to commence investigations was announced in an amiable 
joint press conference between Museveni and the ICC‟s prosecutor, Moreno 
Ocampo.
256
 While ICC representatives have since insisted that in 2003 the ICC 
prosecutor interpreted Uganda‟s referral to include all crimes committed during the 
northern conflict after 2002,
 
Ugandan officials appear convinced that the ICC would 
only target the LRA.
 257
 After investigations were opened into five LRA commanders, 
for instance, the defense minister assured Parliament that “the number of people to be 
handled by the ICC does not exceed five.”258 
The Self-interested Approach of the ICC  
 
For the ICC, Uganda‟s self-referral offered a promising first case with which it could 
establish its credibility as an international institution.
259
 As Nouwen describes, in the 
wake of the Rome Statute‟s entry into force in 2003, the new staff of the ICC felt a 
sense of urgency to demonstrate to supporting states and NGOs that the Court was 
worthy of confidence.
260
 Ideally, a first case needed to assure dubious states that the 
ICC would not act with disregard for state sovereignty, and also avoid invoking the 
condemnation of the U.S, which openly sought to undermine the fledgling Court.
261
 
As many commentators have since recognized, the Ugandan case uniquely fitted such 
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criteria.
262
 Because Uganda referred the case itself, the ICC could feel simultaneously 
assured that Uganda would cooperate with its procedures, and that it would not come 
under the scrutiny of other member states for overriding state sovereignty. The U.S 
was unlikely to obstruct the intervention, as the LRA, an ally of Sudan‟s regime in 
Khartoum already featured on its list of international terrorists.
263
 Given the vested 
interest in achieving a successful first case to prove the functionality of the Court, the 
Court acted pragmatically to maintain the cooperation of the Ugandan Government. 
As indicated above, this involved refraining from subjecting state actors to the ICC‟s 
jurisdiction.  
 
For its part, the ICC has staunchly justified its exclusive indictment of LRA in legal 
terms. Its initial indictments were explained in terms of the „the gravity‟ criterion, 
which prescribes that only those individuals most responsible for the gravest crimes 
should be investigated and brought before the Court.
264
 In 2005, Moreno Ocampo 
accordingly explained: 
 
…crimes committed by the LRA were much more numerous and of much higher 
gravity than alleged crimes committed by the UPDF. We therefore started with an 
investigation of the LRA...we will continue to collect information on allegations 
concerning all other groups, to determine whether the Statute thresholds are met 
and the policy of focusing on the persons most responsible is satisfied.
265
 
 
Legal analysts such as Nouwen and Schabas have described this application of the 
gravity criteria as “dubious,” noting that regardless of “numerical differences” 
between the crimes of the Government and the LRA, the involvement of the state in 
crimes against civilians is arguably a “sufficient indication of gravity,” given “the 
high risk of impunity for such crimes.”266 The ICC‟s adviser Brubacher has also 
defended the ICC‟s impartiality on the grounds that the ICC is bound by non-
retroactivity and can only investigate crimes that occurred after the 1
st
 July 2002 when 
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the Rome Statute of the ICC came into force.
267
 Much of the worst physical violence 
that took place during the war, including that perpetrated by UPDF forces, took place 
before 2002, and is therefore automatically excluded from investigation by the 
Court.
268
  
 
The Impact of the ICC Intervention on discourses of Justice 
 
The ICC‟s intervention has continued to lend legitimacy to the Government‟s 
narrative of the war. The focus has remained on the crimes of the LRA, while the 
Ugandan Government has escaped the Court‟s scrutiny. Officially, the ICC has been 
careful to emphasize the OTP‟s impartial stance. However, the Ugandan 
Government‟s confidence that state actors will escape the jurisprudence of the Court 
appears warranted. Since 2008, annual ICC reports have carefully stated that the OTP 
“continues” to analyze “information in relation to alleged crimes committed by the 
UPDF and related national proceedings.”269 Seven years after Uganda‟s referral 
however, no official proceedings have actually been opened into the alleged crimes of 
UPDF soldiers or other state actors, although ICC representatives formally state that 
the OTP is yet to reach a decision.
270
 Unofficially, the belief that the ICC will not 
investigate state actors is widespread. In 2006, the registrar of the ICC is even 
reported to have told Uganda‟s New Vision that “according to the chief prosecutor” no 
names will be added to the list of indicted individuals unless “any new crimes are 
committed.”271 News reports in Uganda have gone so far as to broadcast that the ICC 
has cleared the UPDF, emphasizing that the international Court “has not found 
evidence.”272  
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The ICC‟s intervention has therefore acted to constrict the „discourse of violation‟ in 
Uganda, limiting the scope of applicable justice.
 273
 In part, the failure of the ICC to 
address the Government‟s role in the war reflects its narrow legal focus of justice 
upon extreme, physical violence rather than structural violence.
274
 The ICC‟s central 
mandate under the Rome Statute to prosecute the individuals „most responsible‟ for 
„gravest crimes‟ is ill equipped to recognize and address systemic, socio-economic 
injustices. While it is hypothetically feasible, for instance that the ICC could 
prosecute UPDF commanders for attacks on civilians, it is not conceivable that the 
ICC could hold Government actors responsible for their negligence and complicity in 
allowing social and economic devastation of northerners to persist. The ICC has 
therefore narrowly limited the conception of „violations‟ committed in the Ugandan 
conflict to the physical atrocities of the LRA. The Court effectively lends 
international legitimacy to the narrative of “tolerable structural violence and 
intolerable physical atrocity.” 275  
 
The intervention of the ICC accordingly served to refocus international attention 
exclusively on the LRA. While the Government had previously capitalized on the 
media‟s portrayal of the LRA as irrational terrorists to justify increased military 
budgets, the ICC indictments could be invoked to further demonize the LRA as 
internationally wanted criminals.
276
 The discourse advanced by the ICC itself 
bolstered this image of the LRA. Infamously, when an academic persistently asked, 
why the ICC had failed to prosecute state actors, Ocampo accusingly retorted, “If you 
want to support the LRA, fine! But you should know they are a criminal 
organization.” 277 Ugandan state officials have often invoked the ICC‟s intervention to 
recast attention on LRA crimes or defend the regime from critical accusations.
278
 
 
On balance, referral to the ICC‟ has indeed rebuilt support amongst some 
international actors for the Ugandan Government and its military approach, and to 
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subdue critique of the UPDF.
279
 Support for a second Iron Fist attack on the LRA in 
2004 following the dismal failure of the first attack is likely to have been bolstered by 
the ICC process.
 
As I discuss in the following section, from late 2005, a new alliance 
of donors increasingly advocated that the Government pursue a peaceful settlement. 
However, the competing imperative of executing the ICC arrest warrants led other 
external actors and donors to continue to support military options throughout the Juba 
negotiations. 
280
 Accordingly, when the Juba process finally collapsed, the joint forces 
of Uganda, DRC and Southern Sudan launched „Operation Lightning Thunder‟ 
against the LRA in the DRC. This joint military offensive was declared “welcome” by 
the Security Council as an effort to “address the security threat posed by the LRA.”281 
 
Contrary to the contentions of ICC advocates therefore, the Court did not provide a 
“depoliticized venue for justice.”282 Rather, the ICC‟s intervention was both triggered 
and shaped by the self-interested goals of both the Ugandan Government and the 
International Court. The Ugandan Government sought to regain its international 
reputation amongst donors and boost support for military funding and ventures. For 
the ICC, the Ugandan case was a chance to establish its credibility. The ICC‟s 
exclusive indictment of LRA leaders reflects a focus on physical violence rather than 
structural and socio-economic injustice, and also its reliance on the Ugandan 
Government‟s cooperation. As I discuss further in chapter five, the ICC‟s intervention 
inevitably has ongoing implications for the development of transitional justice 
processes in Uganda. Effectively, the decisions and discourse of the ICC has lent 
international legal credibility to the prevailing narrative that the suffering of Northern 
Ugandans is exclusively due to the LRA, and that little or no responsibility lies with 
the Ugandan Government. Post conflict „justice‟ is cast primarily in terms of 
prosecuting leaders of the violent rebel group, rather than the ongoing transformation 
of the Government‟s socio-economic and political engagement with Northern 
Uganda.  
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I now shift my focus to peace processes in Uganda, and the impact of the ICC. Before 
examining the development and implications of the Juba Peace process, I survey early 
efforts of northern civil society actors to push the Government towards peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. 
 
The Road to Juba: the Role of International and Local Actors  
Civil Societies Push for Amnesty and Peace Negotiations in Uganda  
 
For many years, local Ugandan civil society organizations and activists built 
momentum for peaceful resolution of the northern conflict.
283
 A range of groups, 
notably the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and Human Rights 
Focus (HURIFO) called on the Government to engage in dialogue with the LRA, and 
to establish a blanket amnesty to draw combatants out of the bush.
284
 As Barney 
Afako puts it, many local advocates of the amnesty felt that “any threats of 
prosecution, even of a minority of combatants, would pose an obstacle to peaceful 
resolution.”285 After the Government undertook consultations that revealed 
widespread support, the Amnesty Act was enacted in January 2000.
286
 The Act 
established a blanket amnesty, offering immunity for all insurgency related offenses 
to those who denounce rebellion. While the popular support generated for the 
Amnesty around 2000 reflected many factors, in the context of prolonged suffering 
many northerners gave priority to ending violence and enabling the return of abducted 
children above retributive justice.
287
 
 
Even before Uganda‟s referral to the ICC, the Amnesty suffered from various 
problems that limited its success. As discussed in the previous chapter Museveni 
appeared to be ambivalent towards the Amnesty Act. Museveni‟s lack of commitment 
was clearly demonstrated by his instigation of contradictory policies. The military 
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offensive unleashed in 2002, Operation Iron Fist no doubt communicated to LRA 
leadership that the Government offer of reconciliation was far from secure and 
genuine. In the same year the Anti-terrorism Act was passed, which seemed to legally 
contradict the Amnesty Act.
288
 Secondly, for some LRA commanders, accepting 
amnesty implied the need for them to receive forgiveness for wrongdoing. Some LRA 
fighters clearly wanted a negotiated resolution, involving concession from the 
Government, rather than submissive surrender.
289
 Kony himself reportedly denounced 
the amnesty and promised violent retaliation for any of his soldiers that attempted to 
leave.
290
 
 
While the Amnesty failed to lure the LRA leadership to abandon the rebellion, it 
certainly facilitated the return of many fighters and abductees. While in the first few 
years the bulk of returnees (called „reporters‟) were from other rebel groups, in 2003 
the number of LRA reporters that surrendered under amnesty had grown to 5000.
291
 
By January 2009, this number reached 12,503.
292
 The growth in numbers from 2003 
largely reflected improved communication of the Amnesty to the LRA.
293
 
Interestingly, the numbers of reporters rose most suddenly in the wake of the 
Government‟s renewed military offensive in early 2004. It is likely that while some 
LRA were simply given the opportunity to escape in the confusion, others were 
driven to accept amnesty due to the intensity of the UPDF‟s onslaught and lack of 
food.
294
 Ironically then, while such military offensives acted as a deterrent for the 
LRA leadership to seek paths of reconciliation, in the particular case of the 2004 
attacks it inadvertently facilitated the return of many rank and file LRA. Civil society 
group‟s concerted efforts to secure an Amnesty process therefore enjoyed some 
success in disarmament and return of many LRA fighters.  
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In addition to lobbying the Government to instate Amnesty, a few key Ugandan civil 
society groups and NGOs passionately pushed for peace negotiations. The ARLPI in 
particular sought to keep lines of communication open with the LRA in the hope of 
rekindling a reconciliation process. At times, groups promoting peace faced vehement 
opposition from the Government. As the director of HURIFO in Gulu recalls, “they 
started calling us rebel apologists, others called us collaborators.” 295 Until 2004, the 
efforts of such groups only produced scattered negotiations. In May, however, a team 
including Betty Bigombe initiated fresh talks with the LRA with funding from several 
interested aid donors.
296
 
 
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the ICC‟s decision to commence 
investigations in Uganda, officially announced in July 2004, was met with dismay and 
fiery animosity by many civil society groups and local NGOs based in Northern 
Uganda.
 297
 They feared that ICC involvement would ruin long sought after peace 
talks. Certainly, the prospect of indictments of the LRA starkly contradicted the 
blanket amnesty, further illustrating the Government‟s lack of commitment to the Act. 
In 2004, Father Carlos Rodriguez of the ARLPI declared publicly that future ICC 
arrest warrants would:  
…practically close once and for all the path to peaceful negotiation as a means 
to end this long war, crushing whatever little progress has been made during 
these years… Obviously, nobody can convince the leaders of a rebel movement 
to come to the negotiating table and that the same time tell them they will 
appear in courts to be prosecuted.
298
  
 
The ICC process certainly hindered the peace talks underway during 2004. 
Nevertheless, the team managed to achieve a geographically limited ceasefire in 
November, which lasted into 2005. When the ICC arrest warrants were released that 
year however, Bigombe appeared to give up hope, declaring: “There is now no hope 
of getting them [the LRA] to surrender.”299 
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Perhaps most controversially, many religious and traditional leaders in Northern 
Uganda also portrayed the ICC intervention as threatening to local cultural forms of 
justice.
300
 At the time, such leaders argued that the ICC threatened to enforce a 
western, retribution-focused justice upon Northern Uganda, undermining the 
possibility of applying „traditional‟ justice mechanisms that focus on forgiveness, 
reconciliation and compensation of victims‟ families.301 Particular emphasis has been 
given to Mato Oput, an extensive process of reconciliation between a perpetrator 
(usually of murder) and their family, and the victim‟s family that culminates in a 
ceremony involving compensation and drinking of a „bitter root‟ mixed with the 
blood of a goat or sheep.
302
 In 2004, the Acholi Paramount Chief, Rwot Onen David 
II for instance stated:  
We have the traditional culture. When someone kills, we have a system to stop 
the killing. That is why we did not have death as a punishment. Nor did we have 
jail sentences. Rather we had reconciliation- Mato Oput… Does the ICC not 
value community values of people? Does the ICC override all other systems?
303
  
The retired Anglican Bishop of Gulu, interviewed by Allen in 2004 explained that: 
“God [has] revealed Mato Oput to our society…Acholi know that it is only through 
forgiveness that the problems can be solved…reconciliation is the only way.”  
Numerous actors accordingly suggested that in the immediate interests of peace and 
reconciliation, even the LRA leaders should undergo traditional justice processes 
rather than formal criminal trials.
304
  
 
As I explore further in the following chapter however, the issue of „traditional‟ justice 
and its potential application is significantly more complex than portrayed by such 
leaders. The contemporary focus on the local mechanism, Mato Oput, largely arose 
from the attempts of international actors to facilitate the reinvigoration of „traditional‟ 
leadership and reconciliation processes in Northern Uganda.
305
Claims of traditional 
and religious leaders about Mato Oput and need to replace ICC trials with traditional 
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processes are best viewed in the wider context of the local-driven search for a 
peaceful solution to the war. Rather than accurately representing the widespread 
views of Acholi communities, their advocacy reflected a concerted effort to make a 
peace settlement possible, underpinned by their own personal convictions. A wide 
range of people supported and disseminated such claims regarding Mato Oput 
precisely because it was considered a possible road to peace. As I explore in the 
following chapter, while many Acholi people adhere to a spiritual worldview that 
could be described as „traditional,‟ they have diverse opinions about questions of 
„justice‟, trials, forgiveness and reconciliation.   
 
I turn next to the Juba Peace process, which brought the contradiction between 
peaceful settlement and the ICC process to a head. The engagement of the Ugandan 
Government in the Juba talks was unprecedented. The seriousness of both parties at 
Juba is evident in several remarkable agreements signed between 2006 and 2008. 
Before exploring the radical nature of the agreements and the impact of the ICC upon 
the Juba negotiations, I analyze the radical changes wrought by international actors 
that brought together the parties at Juba.  
 
The Fraught Road to Juba: the Conflicting Roles of International Actors  
 
International actors played a vital role in bringing about the unprecedented 
engagements between the Ugandan Government and the LRA in the Juba Peace talks. 
The first critical changes that triggered the talks were political developments in South 
Sudan in 2005, and the decisive actions of emergent Sudanese leaders.
306
 On January 
5th, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ended Sudan‟s civil war, 
granting the SPLA the power to govern South Sudan. Unsurprisingly, the new semi-
autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS) viewed the LRA as a significant 
threat to peace and security in a fragile postwar environment.
307
 While the northern 
Government in Khartoum had supported the LRA and provided them a base in the 
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south, the newly empowered GoSS sought to ensure that the LRA did not return to 
Southern Sudanese territory.
308
In early 2006, the GoSS established contact with 
members of the LRA
309
 and declared that they must engage in negotiations and fully 
cease their operations in south Sudan, or face war with the SPLA.
310
 As Dr. Riek 
Machar Teny-Dhurgon, the vice president of Southern Sudan and chief negotiator of 
the Juba talks put it: “The Government of South Sudan is more than just a mediator in 
this process; we are a key stakeholder.”311 Following concerted efforts of the GoSS to 
gain the commitment of the LRA and the Ugandan Government to restart negotiations 
in the early months of 2006, peace talks opened in Juba in July.  
 
A number of closely related factors at the international level may have also motivated 
the LRA to engage seriously in the negotiations at Juba. Firstly, it is important to note 
that by early 2006 the strategic position of the LRA was significantly weakened.  The 
critical support of the Khartoum Government had declined since 1999 and was further 
compromised by the signing of the CPA of 2005, which forced the Sudanese army to 
withdraw from the South.
312
 The LRA‟s need for food and supplies, and their desire 
to avoid being completely forced from Southern Sudan by the SPLA may have 
provided the LRA with an immediate incentive to participate in the talks.
313
 
Controversially, Machar also gave US$20,000 to the LRA in cash upfront.
314
 
Secondly, the approach of the GoSS‟s mediation team must have appeared 
particularly palatable to the LRA, who had expressed renewed interest in peace talks 
since 2004.
315
 The new leadership of South Sudan clearly acknowledged that the LRA 
had a legitimate cause, and that the Ugandan Government had previously lacked 
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commitment to ending the conflict. For the LRA, it is likely that the prospect of 
external mediators that were prepared to engage politically sounded highly 
promising.
316
 Furthermore, the GoSS mediation team supported the withdrawal of the 
ICC arrest warrants in order to facilitate a peaceful agreement.
317
 Finally, while the 
frequently repeated mantra that „the ICC brought the LRA to the negotiating table‟ is 
at best an overstatement by ICC advocates, it may accordingly hold some truth.
318
 It is 
certainly possible that the LRA was in part spurred to participate in the talks to 
remove the ICC‟s indictments.    
 
Strong incentive for the Ugandan Government to engage in the talks was also brought 
about through the critical pressure applied by a range of international players. Despite 
the Government‟s attempt to garner international support through its referral to the 
ICC, in 2005 Museveni‟s regime faced heightened global criticism. Most 
conspicuously, the International Court of Justice ruled that Uganda had indeed 
violated international law during in its military operations in eastern DRC.
319
 Critical 
attention on the northern conflict also continued. In July 2005, the international 
pressure group Human Rights Watch published a highly damning report on the 
behavior of the UPDF in the north, in which it boldly concluded “UPDF forces were 
responsible for widespread abuses against the civilian population.”320 In addition, 
criticism of the squalid conditions of IDP camps increased as high profile 
international figures visited and the UN released a critical report on displacement.
321
  
 
 In this context, a new alignment of foreign donors emerged that strongly favored 
peace effort over military endeavors to end the war. Critical of Uganda‟s lack of press 
freedom and dubious 2006 electoral process, several of these donors reallocated 
                                                 
316
 In this vein, it is also important to note that the new leadership of Southern Sudan lacked the 
personal ties to Museveni‟s regime that would have induced the mistrust of the LRA. The first 
president of southern Sudan, Dr. John Garang di Mabior who had close personal loyalties to Museveni 
died suddenly in a helicopter accident. Atkinson, p.210-211 
317
 Ibid 
318
 For examples of scholars that emphasize that the ICC brought the LRA to the negotiating table see 
Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, 'The ICC's Possible Deferral of the LRA Case to Uganda', Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 6.4 (2008): Akhavan, The Lord‟s Resistance Army Case 
319
 The International Court of Justice, „Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda,‟ http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=co&case=116&k=51 [Accessed 11 August 2011]  
320
 Human Rights Watch, Uprooted and Forgotten, p.2  
321
Perrot, Sandrine, 'Northern Uganda: a 'Forgotten Conflict' Again? The Impact of the 
Internationalization of the Resolution Process', in The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. 
by Tim Allen, and Koen Vlassenroot (London, New York: Zed, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.194   
80 
 
significant funding from Governmental budget support to the relief work and peace 
advocacy efforts of locally run NGO groups based in Northern Uganda. It was these 
donors (the “Group of Seven plus One) that formally united to supply financial and 
political support for the peace talks in Juba.
322
 As Quinn notes, this group, which 
includes Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Canada and 
the United Kingdom provided great impetus for peace talks at Juba, and contributed 
to mounting international pressure for the Government to finally seek a resolution to 
the northern conflict.
323
 
 
However, in 2006 Uganda found itself caught between the conflicting pressures of 
international actors. As emphasized by UN agencies, a stark contradiction existed 
between the Juba Process and the ICC arrest warrants.
324
 In the face of increased 
international scrutiny, the Ugandan Government appeared to falter between engaging 
in the Juba talks, and holding to the ICC process. The Ugandan Government became 
increasingly hesitant. In response to Machar‟s proposal, Museveni stated on May 16th 
that if Kony was “serious about peaceful settlement” the Government would 
“guarantee his safety,” implying that the arrest warrants could be lifted.325 The next 
day the ICC reiterated strongly that Museveni was under obligation to honor the ICC 
process.
326
 Over the following months Museveni oscillated, at times appearing willing 
to negotiate in Juba, at others declaring that he would instead attack the LRA in the 
DRC.    
 
The Ugandan Government‟s dilemma in 2006 reflects the extent to which its policy is 
shaped by the need to maintain relations with the international community. On the 
one hand, it is possible that Museveni may have perceived that the peace talks offered 
a real opportunity to end the war and regain international prestige. As already noted, 
the talks had the political support of many important donors, as well as the United 
Nations. On the other hand, engaging seriously in the talks risked compromising the 
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support of international advocates of the ICC. As a pragmatic attempt to keep both 
options on the table, Museveni initially presented the ICC arrest warrants as a flexible 
bargaining chip with the LRA.  Even after the Ugandan Government commenced 
talks with the LRA party in July 2006, he stated that “if he [Kony] comes out, we can 
talk to the ICC to remove him from the list of those wanted for crimes against 
humanity” but if not, “we shall get him, and the ICC will prosecute him.”327  
 
Nonetheless, the Government‟s willingness to negotiate at Juba proved genuine.328 
Grounded in the long-term efforts of local civil society groups and peace activists, 
international actors successfully forged a political space in which critical engagement 
could take place. Local civil society actors continued to play a crucial role, acting as 
“co-mediators.”329 Despite numerous delays and serious obstacles throughout the two 
years of talks, the interaction between the parties at Juba process was 
unprecedented.
330
 Certainly, at various points throughout the two years of 
negotiations the commitment of both sides to the talks faltered as parties expressed 
mistrust and made military threats.
331
Inevitably, the ICC arrest warrants proved to be 
a continual stumbling block. However as Schomerus contends, serious political 
engagement was evident in both sides‟ extensive interactions with stakeholders and 
continued attendance of meetings.
332
 Before the final collapse of the talks in 
November 2008, the negotiations resulted in the signing of a series of remarkable 
agreements, which I discuss in the following section.   
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The Juba Peace Agreements: An Expanded Justice Discourse  
In the unique circumstances engineered by international and local actors, the 
negotiations at Juba became a forum in which critical counter narratives of the war 
surfaced. Throughout the negotiations, the LRA delegation insisted that the “root 
causes” of conflict and violations committed by all parties must be examined, 
“regardless of the identity of the perpetrator.”333As Dolan astutely observed, during 
the Juba negotiations “the Government‟s political will to resolve the Northern 
Ugandan conflict [was] greater than at any point in the past.”334In this context, the 
agreements wrought significant concessions by Ugandan Government. Two key 
agreements, together with their addendums, addressed the most pertinent issues. The 
Agreements on Comprehensive Solutions (ACS) focus on the underlying causes of 
conflict including political and socio-economic inequalities, while the Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation (AAR) addresses the question of how to deal with 
violations and abuses committed during the war. If enacted together, these agreements 
have potential to unearth Government violations perpetrated during the war, and 
oblige state actors to assume responsibility and address inequalities in the north. As I 
explore at the end of this section, the radical political gains made at Juba were, to a 
certain extent, grounded in the language and framework of transitional justice, 
although this is perhaps less evident in the ACS.  
 
Socioeconomic Justice, Truth Telling, and Reparations  
 
Perhaps most significantly, the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions (May 2007) 
and its implementation protocol (February 2008) requires the Government to directly 
address the socio-economic and political inequalities between Northern Uganda and 
the rest of the country.
335
The extensive provisions outlined in this agreement cut to 
the heart of the underlying dynamics of the northern conflict. The preamble 
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recognizes “the regional disparities…in terms of socio-economic and infrastructural 
development of the country as a result of history and the conflict.”336  
 
It is worth considering the radical nature of the key provisions in the texts. Firstly, the 
agreement commits to include “all peoples in Uganda in governance,” remedying  
“any imbalances and disparities for the north and north eastern parts of the 
country.”337Secondly, the Agreement commits the Government to address the social 
and economic development of Northern Uganda, particularly through the “fast-track” 
implementation of the Northern Uganda Peace Recovery and Development plan 
(PRDP). The implementation protocol to the agreement specifies that the Government 
must “revamp the institutions of health, learning and other social services in conflict 
afflicted areas,” and provide additional territory scholarships.338Thirdly, the ACS 
includes specific compensation provisions for livestock and land. For instance, the 
protocol commits the Government to implement a restocking program, recognizing 
the “severe economic and social implications” of the substantial loss of livestock in 
the north.
 339
 Assurance is also given that appropriated land will be compensated 
for.
340
 Finally, the ACS requires the Government to adequately support the return and 
resettlement of IDPs, and strengthen the capacity of District Land Boards to oversee 
land ownership disputes.
341
 
 
The AAR, which has received much greater international attention, establishes a role 
for both „formal processes‟ and „non-formal processes‟ for achieving accountability 
and reconciliation. Formal processes include mechanisms driven by the state, such as 
criminal prosecutions and truth telling bodies. Non-formal processes primarily refer to 
traditional justice mechanisms, which the agreement provides “shall be promoted…as 
a central part of the framework for accountability and reconciliation.”342 The 
relationship between formal mechanisms and traditional justice, however, was 
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essentially left undetermined. In the AAR, it is simply emphasized that that there is no 
clear division between the two goals of accountability and reconciliation. According 
to the text, “the parties recognize that any meaningful accountability proceedings 
should... [also] promote reconciliation.”343  
 
Underpinned by the LRA‟s insistence that the roots and manifestations of the conflict 
be examined, the AAR provides for a truth-telling body.
344
 In the fraught, politically 
charged context of peace making, the Ugandan Government affirmed in the AAR 
(clause 7.2) that: 
 Comprehensive, independent and impartial analysis of the history and 
manifestations of the conflict, especially the human rights violations and crimes 
committed during the course of the conflict, is an essential ingredient for 
attaining reconciliation at all levels. 
 
The specific clauses regarding „reconciliation‟ in the AAR and its annexure are 
certainly vague.‟345Given that the Government has often portrayed the conflict as a 
localized Acholi matter however, it is significant that the Agreement also specifies 
that reconciliation processes must be advanced “at all levels” (clause 7.2). It is 
implied that national reconciliation, presumably between marginalized regions such 
as Northern Uganda, and the Ugandan Government is vital. While the Agreement 
failed to specify details, the inclusion of a provision requiring “independent and 
impartial” analysis of the conflict marked a significant step.346  
 
The Agreement also commits the Government to provide reparations for victims of 
the war. In the Agreement, reparation encompasses many measures; “rehabilitation; 
restitution; compensation; guarantees of non-reoccurrence and other symbolic 
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measures such as apologies, memorials and commemorations.”347Firstly, it is notable 
that the definition of „victim‟ adopted is extensive, including not only individuals, but 
also those who have suffered collectively as a result of the violations committed 
during the conflict.
348
 As Wrange notes in his analysis of the Agreement, this 
definition is ambitious, reflecting the strong views expressed by local communities 
during the parties‟ consultations.349 Secondly, the inclusion of the symbolic measures 
of apology and guarantees of non-reoccurrence are also significant. Reparations that 
include an element of apology would amount to acknowledgement from the 
Government of failure during the war, and stimulate future change. It should be noted, 
however, that the Agreement remains fairly vague on how a reparations scheme will 
be implemented, simply stating that “the Government shall establish the necessary 
arrangements.”350 
 
The Question of Formal Accountability for State Actors in the AAR 
 
While the elements of the AAR and its annexure discussed above are relatively 
straightforward, the provisions regarding criminal accountability for state actors have 
been subject to considerable debate. The annexure of the AAR provides for the 
establishment of “a special division of the High Court of Uganda” to try “individuals 
who are alleged to have committed serious crimes.”351While the following section 
addresses the origins of the inclusion of formal criminal justice in the agreement, here 
I focus on its applicability to state actors. Clause 4.1 of the AAR itself specifies that: 
Formal criminal and civil justice measures shall be applied to any individual 
who is alleged to have committed serious crimes or human rights violations in 
the course of the conflict. Provided that, state actors shall be subjected to 
existing criminal justice processes and not to special justice processes under this 
agreement.
352
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 A common interpretation of the agreement is that state actors bearing responsibility 
for grave crimes committed during the conflict would face the jurisdiction of the 
military court martial, while only LRA would be subject to the proposed new division 
of the High Court, the „International Crimes Division (ICD). Essentially, this 
understanding stems from the assumption that “existing criminal justice processes” 
refers to the court martial system which tries UPDF soldiers, while “special justice 
processes” refers to the new division. 
 
The implications of this interpretation are vastly significant. For several reasons, 
restricting the trial of state actors in Uganda to the court martial would amount to 
partial justice. Firstly, the operation of the military court is non transparent. As a 
member of a prominent local northern NGO involved in transitional justice notes, “the 
court martial is very problematic because no civilians attend…and their records are 
classified and never released.”353 Secondly, while defenders of the idea of exclusively 
prosecuting state actors in the court martial often point out that it is a very harsh 
system,
354
 it could lead to impunity for state actors other than UPDF. Non-military 
state actors that could be implicated are unlikely to fall under the jurisdiction of the 
court martial.
355
Finally, the court martial has a tendency to prosecute low ranking 
commanders rather than those most responsible. As a NGO critic contends: “Is the 
chain of command noted? Often the people who are shot are just foot soldiers. The 
guys who actually command these operations go scot-free!”356  
 
The analyst Pal Wrange, however, has argued that the Agreement does not restrict the 
prosecution of state actors to the court martial.
357
Wrange contends that the best 
interpretation of the proviso in clause 4.1 is that it was intended to exclude state actors 
from being subjected to any traditional justice processes that might be incorporated 
into the practice of the new ICD. He understands “existing criminal justice 
processes,” to include the proposed ICD because criminal prosecution in the High 
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Court is an existing justice process, even though the ICD will be a new division.
358
 
Wrange interprets "special justice processes" (clause 4.1) to refer to features such as 
traditional justice processes that might be introduced as special rules to facilitate 
reconciliation between LRA perpetrators and their victims. Wrange argues that the 
inclusion of such special features was likely to simply reflect a “political 
compromise,” allowing some LRA to receive more lenient sentences.359 
 
Ultimately, as key actors involved in the Juba process recall, the key clause on 
accountability (4.1) was simply left ambiguous by its drafters.
360
To clarify the 
wording of this clause would have forced the mediation to align with one side of a 
highly contentious issue.
361
According to involved actors however, most people left 
Juba feeling that state actors would probably not be brought before the special 
division.
362
 This (albeit ambiguous) understanding that state actors might be exempt 
from the ICD certainly represents a significant weakness in the agreement, for the 
reasons outlined above.  
 
However, it is also important to note that the ambiguity of the text perhaps 
deliberately leaves open the possibility of alternative interpretations such as 
Wrange‟s. Significantly, the sentiment of many key actors involved in the talks was 
that that state actors should be accountable. At the Fairway workshop, the Principal 
Judge also emphasized that the Agreement should not be understood to let “state 
actors off the hook.”363 Making a pointed reference to the court martial, he also stated 
that if it is “proven that systems to deal with state actors are inadequate, other means 
of pressure can be applied.”364In his 2007 commentary on the AAR, the chief legal 
analyst to mediator Barney Afako also makes several critical points, arguing that the 
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agreement essentially implies that state actors should be “subjected to investigations 
of the same yardstick.”365While the ambiguity in clause 4.1 is clear, the Agreement 
can be broadly interpreted to promise to hold state actors accountable for their actions 
during the war. The Agreement again represents a not insignificant (if albeit 
imperfect) step towards holding the Government as well as the LRA accountable for 
its actions during the conflict.  
 
The Role of Transitional Justice Discourse  
 
The framework and concept of transitional justice was pivotal in shaping the 
agreements made in Juba. While the phrase „transitional justice‟ is not specifically 
referred to in the text of either Agreement, the community consultations undertaken 
by both parties relied heavily upon a transitional justice framework.
366
 Notably, the 
legal advisor to the chief mediator of the Juba talks, Barney Afako, was an “expert on 
transitional justice.”367 In March 2008, an independent research report funded by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on transitional justice in Uganda was 
submitted to the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) to build on, and complement 
the Juba agreements.
368
 Furthermore, during the negotiations, civil society, technical 
and political Government actors framed their discussions in terms of transitional 
justice, notably at the third JLOS forum on “Developing and Managing an Effective 
Transitional Justice System for Uganda” in August 2008.369 By providing a widely 
accepted theoretical framework and language, the concept of transitional justice 
assisted the development of the radical agreements made at Juba. As I explore in 
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depth in chapter five, transitional justice has predominantly been employed as 
language of positive transformation that assumes the Government must bear 
responsibility for its role in the war.   
 
In 2008 however, it was already evident that involved actors seldom included 
socioeconomic issues in their transitional justice framework. Although the ACS, with 
its focus on economic injustices, was clearly conceived as part of the postwar justice 
package, the Agreement has since been kept distinct from transitional justice 
discourse. For instance, at the 3
rd
 JLOS forum in August 2008 on transitional justice, 
almost exclusive focus was given to the issues of truth telling, reparations, traditional 
mechanisms and formal justice outlined in the AAR. While in passing, the Chief of 
Justice noted that northerners were particularly concerned with the process of return 
from displacement, it is clear that implementation of the ACS, including the „fast 
tracking‟ of the PRDP, was simply not included in JLOS‟s discussion agenda.370 As I 
discuss in chapter five, the failure of the transitional justice discourse to fully engage 
with socioeconomic justice has significant repercussions for the implementation of 
the ACS.  
 
Despite this, the agreements signed in Juba were certainly radical and progressive. 
The negotiations carved a space in which counter narratives of the war could be 
expressed. In stark contrast to the ICC‟s narrow demands for justice, the concept of 
justice encapsulated in the Agreements is broad, addressing social and economic 
injustices as well as the restoration of relationships at multiple levels. While the one-
sided ICC intervention was shaped by the Court‟s compliance with the Ugandan 
Government, at Juba the Government was required to engage with many parties in 
deep political struggle, addressing underlying causes of the conflict. Certainly, the 
Juba Agreements examined above are by no means comprehensive, and in many 
respects reflect the compromise of negotiation. However, the extent to which the 
Agreements reflected the post war vision of many Northern Ugandans is evident in 
the passionate calls from a wide variety of civil society groups for their 
implementation.  In the final section I analyze the impact of the pending ICC arrest 
warrants upon the development of the Juba negotiations. 
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The Impact of the ICC on the Juba Peace Talks  
The ICC and the Trajectory of Transition: Towards Criminal Justice  
 
While it is often posited that international criminal justice has a tendency to 
overshadow other transitional justice processes, little research provides detailed 
analysis of how this occurs at the domestic level in practice.
371
 In this section, I 
demonstrate the ways in which the ICC intervention produced an urgent focus on the 
development of criminal justice mechanisms within Uganda‟s national transitional 
justice programs.  
 
The Government‟s decision to fast track the implementation of formal criminal justice 
stemmed from the urgent need to terminate the ICC process. From the outset of the 
negotiations, the LRA delegation pointblank refused to sign any peace agreement 
unless the ICC arrest warrants against the top LRA leadership were withdrawn. Afako 
notes, “for the LRA, the prospect of its leaders being paraded before an international 
Court represented a particularly acute form of political humiliation.”372The pivotal 
issue facing the mediation team in Juba was, therefore, to find a way to terminate ICC 
proceedings against the LRA leadership. Under the Rome Statute, the sole legally 
viable avenue to permanently halt ICC proceedings is the principle of 
complementarity, enshrined in Article 17 of the Rome Statute.
373
According to this 
principle, a case is inadmissible before the ICC if genuine domestic investigations and 
trials have taken place or are underway in a state that has jurisdiction over the case. In 
other words, the only way to terminate the ICC process was for the Ugandan 
Government to conduct its own domestic proceedings against the individuals for 
whom the ICC had issued arrest warrants.
374
By 2007 when the AAR was drafted and 
signed, the Ugandan Government appeared willing to take this path.
375
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The nature of „domestic processes‟ that would be conducted against the LRA in place 
of the ICC however, was a point of contention at Juba. Initially, both the Government 
and LRA parties to the talks expressed the view that traditional justice mechanisms 
should provide the required domestic substitute for ICC proceedings.
376
As noted 
above, various local leaders promoted traditional justice since 2004 for this very 
reason: the application of „traditional justice‟ was closely associated with prospects of 
achieving peace. For the LRA, altogether avoiding formal criminal trials was no 
doubt particularly attractive. However legal analysts at Juba advised that traditional 
justice mechanisms were unlikely to meet the complementarity standards of the ICC‟s 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), given that such rituals do not involve formal 
prosecutions.
377
As traditional justice mechanisms would not suffice, the Agreement 
specifies the establishment of the ICD to satisfy the complementarity principle.
378
 
 
Despite contrary concerns of international observers,
 
it was apparent that the Ugandan 
Government anticipated conducting uncompromising formal criminal prosecutions 
against the indicted LRA commanders.
 
International critics feared that the somewhat 
ambiguous provisions of the AAR relating to the relationship between formal justice 
and traditional processes could effectively result in an insufficient trial and 
consequently, impunity.
 379
However at a civil society led workshop that brought 
together representatives of the Government and LRA to clarify aspects of the Juba 
Agreements, Ugandan actors agreed unequivocally that individuals responsible for the 
most serious crimes would face criminal prosecution in the ICD, without the benefit 
of alternative penalties and non-formal mechanisms.
380
 „Alternative‟ mechanisms 
would apply only to lower ranking LRA, and former abductees. While it cannot be 
certain that Kony himself was prepared to accept this solution, LRA representatives at 
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the workshop “clarified that the LRA are willing to have those who are responsible 
for the most serious crimes tried.” 381  
 
It became evident in Juba that the need to instigate domestic criminal proceedings in 
place of the ICC was urgent if the peace deal was to be signed. Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute is clear that it is not sufficient for Uganda to be ready to conduct 
investigations; genuine investigations and prosecution must be underway before a 
challenge to the ICC‟s jurisdiction can be made.382This legal requirement put the 
parties at Juba in an extremely difficult position. Essentially, the LRA leadership 
would have had to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA), leave Garamba, and submit 
itself to investigations and trials in Uganda before the Government could even 
challenge the ICC‟s admissibility to the case on the grounds of complementarity. This 
would be intimidating to the LRA. It is likely that Kony feared that the peace talks 
were designed to entice him out to hand him over to the ICC.
383
Simultaneously, this 
process could not take place until the ICD was fully established, which would also 
take time.  
 
The strategy outlined in the Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring was 
designed to address this dilemma. This Agreement, signed on the 29
th
 February 2008, 
established a one-month „transitional‟ period that would take effect immediately 
following the planned signing of the FPA.
384
 During this transitional month, the 
agreement committed the Government to “urgently” take measures to implement the 
AAR, and “give priority” to establishing the ICD.385 The Government was also 
obliged upon the signing of the FPA to request that the UN Security Council demand 
the ICC to defer prosecution of LRA leaders.
386
 The Agreement was clearly designed 
to buy the Ugandan Government time to establish the ICD in order to challenge the 
ICC‟s admissibility, assuring the LRA that they would not face arrest by the ICC.  
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The impact of the ICC process upon the negotiations in Juba was therefore to propel 
the development of formal criminal justice ahead of other reconciliation measures 
provided for in the Juba agreements. Even after Kony failed to sign the FPA on the 
10
th
 April, preparations for the new division went ahead rapidly in hope that the 
agreement could still be signed. By the end of July, the judiciary had appointed a team 
of judges and a registrar for the special division.
387
 By mid 2010, while the ICD was 
almost operational, JLOS had largely failed to work towards implementing other 
mechanisms outlined in the AAR that could have held Museveni‟s regime responsible 
for its actions during the war. In retrospect, many JLOS actors recognized that the 
need to rapidly create a domestic alternative to ICC proceedings played a significant 
role in establishing this trajectory.
388
 The pressing need to „deal‟ with the ICC arrest 
warrants at Juba evidently made the development of formal criminal justice 
mechanisms a priority.  
 
Furthermore, it appears that the ICC process instilled a sense of need to strive towards 
the “international standards” of criminal justice amongst technical Government 
actors.
389
 Many JLOS actors adopted the approach that precisely replicating the 
practice of ICC was necessary to successfully challenge the ICC‟s admissibility, and 
furthermore generally desirable. A state official in August 2008 emphasized the need 
to “put in place laws and systems that would be seen as internationally acceptable.”390 
A senior judge similarly stressed, “the ICC wants us to do everything the way they 
did it.”391 Interestingly, as Nouwen reveals, the Ugandan Government‟s plans to 
model the ICD on international standards of criminal law resulted from a perception 
of the ICC‟s requirements, rather than the complementarity threshold specified in the 
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Rome Statute, which is much less stringent.
392
 This misperception stems from the 
complementarity benchmarks promoted by international NGOs, as well as the 
imprecise oratory of the ICC itself.
393
 
 
The rhetoric of international actors as well as the fixtures of international law 
therefore compelled Uganda to prioritize the replication international justice 
mechanisms over other approaches. Rather than relying on existing national criminal 
justice mechanisms, Uganda perceived it necessary to establish new facilities, 
buildings, staff, procedures and legislation that could meet broadly interpreted 
„international standards.‟ As I explore in subsequent chapters, such measures are 
costly.  
 
The ICC Warrants and the Failure of the Peace Talks 
 
Ultimately, the ICC arrest warrants proved to be an unassailable stumbling block to 
the peace talks at Juba. For its part, the ICC expressed strong resistance towards their 
case being taken away. Following the signing of the annexure, the pretrial chamber 
rapidly notified Uganda that until ICC Judges had determined that a challenge to 
admissibility was successful, the Government was obliged to arrest and surrender the 
LRA to the ICC as soon as they set foot on Ugandan territory.
394
 In March 2008, a 
delegation of the LRA met with ICC legal advisors.
395
 After the meeting, the OTP 
emphasized to journalists that: “we assess that our case is and remains admissible and 
the Prosecutor has indicated that he will fight any admissibility challenge in court.”396  
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Representatives of the Court further emphasized that the arrest warrants: “have to be 
executed, the top LRA commanders have to be isolated, marginalized, must receive 
not support, direct or indirect, they must be surrendered to the Court.”397 The hostile 
stance of the ICC is likely to have caused the LRA to doubt that the arrest warrants 
would ever be withdrawn.   
 
The impasse between the parties at Juba and the ICC proved intractable. As a reporter 
at the time neatly put it, “the LRA says it will not sign the Agreement unless the ICC 
lifts the indictments, yet Uganda cannot ask the Court to do that unless the Agreement 
is signed.”398 Following Kony‟s failure to conclude the FPA on the 10th April 2008, 
the timeframe for him to sign the Agreement was extended until the end of 
November. Immediately before the agreed date, Kony met with cultural and religious 
leaders involved in the Juba negotiations.
399
 As one participant described, Kony gave 
an exceedingly long speech, in which he repeatedly stated that he would not sign the 
agreement until the ICC arrest warrants were removed.
400
 The following day, the 
gathered leaders were informed by the LRA that Kony would not sign the Agreement, 
and were held at the meeting place while Kony fled. While Kony‟s exact motives for 
repeatedly failing to sign the FPA remain uncertain, the ICC arrest warrants were 
evidently a significant factor.  
 
Shortly following Kony‟s failure to sign the FPA, Museveni launched the military 
venture Operation Lightning Thunder against the LRA, quashing the hopes of many 
civil society actors that negotiations could continue. As noted above, advocates of the 
ICC seeking the arrest of the top LRA commanders had kept the possibility of this 
joint military venture between Uganda, DRC and Southern Sudan alive in case of 
such an eventuality. LRA bases in Garamba Forest in Congo were bombed, but 
ground troops failed to launch an attack for several days. As a result, the LRA 
escaped, and Kony and his key commanders once again eluded capture. In response to 
the sudden attacks, the LRA unleashed a campaign of violence against Congolese 
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civilians. By January 2009 the LRA had roamed into northeastern DRC and the 
Central African Republic (CAR), leaving a trail of destruction in their wake. It is 
estimated that in just this brief period over 700 civilians were abducted and 1000 lost 
their lives.
401
 To this day, the top LRA commanders wanted by the ICC are yet to be 
arrested. The LRA remains active, and continues to commit atrocities in the DRC, 
CAR, and Southern Sudan. While those living in Northern Uganda have experienced 
increasing physical security and stability from 2007 and there is an ever-growing 
sense of peace, LRA violence is clearly not over, merely exported across Uganda‟s 
borders.
402
  
The failure of the parties to sign the final agreement at Juba undermined the 
obligation of the Government to fulfill its „transition‟ promises. While the unsigned 
Juba AAR has been officially adopted as the framework for the development of a 
transitional justice process, it is still unclear how much of the Agreement will be 
implemented. As Dolan, the director of Kampala based Refugee Law Project mused, 
will the peace Agreements in Juba be:  
 …regarded by the Government of Uganda as marking the end of the problem 
rather than the beginning of its resolution? Will the political will which is 
demonstrated in the talks be sustained in the process of meeting commitments 
made during those talks?
403
 
 
Essentially, Dolan asks whether the Government will pursue any form of „transition‟ 
or „justice‟ in the wake of the war. This question drives Chapter Five, in which I 
explore the development of transitional justice mechanisms in Uganda after the failure 
of the Juba talks, and the lasting impacts of the ICC intervention.  
 
Conclusion  
Reflecting on the emergence of peace in Uganda and the impact of the ICC‟s 
intervention, in 2010 Tim Allen concluded:  
For a long time it was hard to see how Government soldiers deployed in the war 
zone could have had protection of the population as their primary objective. 
During the past few years that situation has changed. At least in part, that is due 
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to greater international scrutiny of human rights issues directly and indirectly 
associated with the ICC involvement. Has that really been such a bad thing?
404
 
  
While the ICC has undoubtedly increased international attention on the conflict in 
Northern Uganda, this chapter demonstrated that the impact of the ICC‟s intervention 
cannot be so simply surmised or conflated „directly and indirectly‟ with the influence 
of other international groups. International actors have had profound, yet ultimately 
contradictory influence on national processes in Uganda, relating in disparate ways to 
the demands and perspectives of local civil society groups. The interventions of 
different international actors served to narrate vastly different stories about the 
conflict and its remedy.   
The ICC‟s intervention did not reflect an impartial effort to hold the perpetrators of 
war accountable, but rather the dovetailing of self-interest of the Ugandan 
Government and the ICC. Seeking an easy case to establish its institutional 
credibility, the ICC did not challenge the Ugandan Government, in order to secure its 
ongoing cooperation. The ICC‟s intervention lent support to a discourse of justice that 
narrowly confines the definition of „violation‟ to extreme physical atrocity, 
overlooking structural and socio-economic injustices. On balance, the ICC‟s 
intervention lent international legitimacy to the Government‟s dominant narrative of 
the war, further „demonizing‟ the LRA.  
As discussed, the radical political space that was created in Juba resulted from the 
culmination of local and international efforts to secure a negotiated end to the war.  
While many advocates of the Court contend that the 2005 ICC arrest warrants 
„brought the LRA to the negotiating table,‟ I have demonstrated that it was the 
decisive actions of high level international actors, riding on the back of many years of 
local level work that cultivated the conditions where the unparalleled negotiations 
could take place. Drawing heavily on the language and concepts of transitional 
justice, the Juba Agreements presented a strong counter narrative of the war, and 
promised to hold the Government accountable. The Agreements radically expanded 
the scope of justice to address socio-economic inequalities, structural injustices and 
affliction, and restoration of relationships at all levels. The subsequent failure of 
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involved actors to specifically encompass socio-economic injustice in transitional 
justice discourse, however, could compromise such gains. 
Ultimately these different international approaches contradicted each other. In several 
key ways, the ICC intervention directly undermined the radical political gains 
wrought in Juba. Firstly, the ICC served to create pressure and momentum to 
prioritize formal criminal trial of the indicted LRA leaders in Uganda ahead of the 
other measures agreed upon in Juba. Predictably, some scholars are likely to perceive 
this as a major triumph of the domestication of international law; the success of the 
ICC‟s influence in precluding the possibility that blanket amnesty was included in a 
peace agreement. However, this pressure served to constrict the domestic scope of 
justice prioritized after the war to urgent efforts to replicate the ICC‟s lopsided mode 
of justice that failed to address socio-economic dimensions of violation or the role of 
the Government. As I demonstrate further in Chapter Five, the drive in Uganda to 
prioritize criminal justice reflected not only the Government‟s pragmatic efforts in 
2008 to secure peace, but a subtler instillation of the language and aspiration of 
attaining „international standards of justice‟ amongst various technical actors in JLOS. 
Secondly, the ICC was a major factor in the eventual derailment of the Juba process, 
thereby compromising the future implementation of the radical agreements.  
The following chapter explores the views of northern Acholi communities affected by 
the war. This grounds my discussion on the struggle over the nature of „justice‟ and 
„transition‟ between civil society and international actors in an awareness of local post 
war priorities and perspectives on justice. 
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Chapter 4: Local Approaches to Postwar Justice  
 
Introduction 
Scholars and civil society actors vigorously debate the question of which approaches 
to dealing with the war and its aftermath best serve and reflect local needs and 
priorities. Inevitably, while the war dragged on, the nature of postwar „justice‟ was 
closely related to the question of how best to secure peace. Typically, these debates 
pivoted around the relevance of various mechanisms and strategies to local 
communities: the trial of perpetrators by the ICC or national courts, the Amnesty Act, 
traditional justice ceremonies, and to a lesser degree, truth telling and reparations. In 
particular, scholars have focused on the extent that the widely proclaimed Acholi 
„traditional‟ culture of reconciliation and forgiveness is broadly manifest in local 
opinion and practice. The vast majority of scholars, it should be noted, do not frame 
socio-economic recovery and reform as a justice issue prioritized by locals. As 
already evident, many actors have claimed a stake in these issues: the Ugandan 
Government, the ICC, international and domestic NGOs, and cultural and religious 
institutions. The development of a national transitional justice program will inevitably 
reflect an unevenly balanced struggle between these parties, who often portray local 
needs very differently.  
 
This chapter explores the diverse views of Acholi communities affected by the war, in 
order to ground the wider discussion of transitional justice in an awareness of local 
justice priorities. I draw upon several key studies and surveys, as well as my own 
observations and interviews from fieldwork undertaken in mid-2010. As identified in 
Chapter One, transitional justice scholars heavily debate the role of international, 
national and local actors in transitional justice. Academics also dispute whether 
socioeconomic development issues should be included in the scope of transitional 
justice. Addressing both these debates, I contend that the commonly drawn 
distinctions between international, national, and locally implemented justice, and 
traditional and criminal justice are not particularly helpful. Rather, I develop the 
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concepts of „embedded‟ and „indirect‟ justice, adapting a framework first outlined by 
Paul Gready.
405
 
 
„Embedded‟ justice encompasses actions that directly and tangibly affect people‟s 
lives and work, and restore broken social and economic situations caused by the war. 
Conditions are fostered in which war affected communities can “rebuild their family 
and social relations, relations with the land, and livelihoods.”406 Embedded justice can 
include processes initiated at both the local and national level, and can also be 
fostered by international actors. I focus on two particular forms of „embedded‟ justice: 
socioeconomic justice (in which the state must play a central role), and local 
processes of social and spiritual restoration, including traditional mechanisms. 
„Indirect justice,‟ on the other hand, encompasses processes that affect individuals or 
communities intangibly, remotely, or purely symbolically. This concept does not 
simply refer to processes in which locals never directly partake. It is entirely possible 
for „justice‟ processes which local people participate in to serve a broader symbolic 
purpose and not directly impact people‟s lives. For instance, people may participate in 
local trials or a public inquiry commission, and gain wider symbolic value from the 
experience, but not receive tangible change to their daily social and practical reality. 
Drawing on this framework, I develop several key arguments about local approaches 
to justice after the war.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of the 
various scholarly and advocacy positions on local approaches to justice and 
accountability. The second explores the views and experiences of local communities 
towards a core aspect of „embedded justice:‟ socio-economic and livelihood issues. In 
particular, I highlight social and economic development, land conflict, and reparation. 
I contend that these issues are top priority postwar „justice‟ issues. In the third section 
I address another form of embedded justice: local processes of social and spiritual 
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restoration. First, I dispel the exaggerated claims made about local traditional justice 
processes. I then argue that the struggle to develop a more inclusive, flexible and 
effective approach to the restoration of local level relations must take place primarily 
amongst local communities.  Involved international, national and local civil society 
actors, however, can nurture this development, while taking care to avoid entrenching 
current local power imbalances.  
 
Finally, in the fourth section, I examine the diverse views of local villagers on broader 
issues of the accountability of leading perpetrators and the resolution of the northern 
situation. I argue that for most Acholi people, these issues are questions of „indirect‟ 
justice. While many Acholi viewed the broad questions of forgiveness, accountability 
and punishment as pivotal during the Juba process when peace seemed to hinge on 
these issues, I found that such issues are now generally deemed less important than 
more tangible, proximate justice concerns. Nevertheless, I contend that local Acholi 
have strong, and often divergent opinions regarding the best way to deal with 
perpetrators of crimes, reflecting the varied influences of a multitude of involved 
actors.  
 
Literature Review: Local Approaches to Postwar Justice in Northern Uganda 
Local Justice Approaches: Controversial Claims 
Debates on the nature of local approaches to justice in Northern Uganda usually pivot 
around questions of whether and how „traditional‟ practices should be applied to the 
North‟s transition from war.  Firstly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Acholi 
religious and traditional leaders originally zealously promoted the role of traditional 
justice in achieving justice and reconciliation at both a local and national level. Such 
leaders fervently attacked the ICC‟s intervention, arguing that it reflected the 
neocolonial imposition of a western form of justice that was alien to local 
communities. In the context of the search for peace, leaders emphasized 
unequivocally that Acholi people value forgiveness and reconciliation rather than trial 
and imprisonment.
407
 At times, such leaders called for top LRA leaders to engage in 
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Mato Oput ceremonies rather than face the criminal trials of the ICC.
 
Even when it 
became apparent during the Juba Peace talks that the ICC would not withdraw its 
indictments unless Uganda tried LRA leaders in a national court, some leaders 
continued to advocate that „traditional justice‟ should nevertheless play a central part 
in post war transition processes.
408
 
 
The dramatic contrast between the ICC intervention in Uganda and the fervent 
contentions of northern cultural and religious leaders sparked a flurry of research on 
local approaches to justice in Acholiland, most particularly the role of traditional 
justice. Domestic Ugandan NGOs and their affiliated foreign scholars carried out 
much of this research. Typically, their reports present a more subtle view. Most 
contend that traditional justice has an important role to play, but also highlight its 
current shortcomings. Authors have widely varied opinions, however on the role 
traditional mechanisms should play in relation to national and international processes.  
 
Several authors emphasize that cultural leaders must lead the way to modify 
traditional mechanisms to the post war context. The seminal 2005 report “Roco Wat I 
Acholi,” for instance, argues that as traditional structures and practices are currently 
weak, the traditional leadership institution Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) should “embark 
upon a cultural revival.” 409 The report argues that the specific ritual Mato Oput 
cannot be easily adapted, as “the requirements of Mato Oput do not easily translate to 
the scope and scale of the present conflict.”410 Furthermore, traditional practices 
suffer from a number of limitations, such as exclusion of women from leadership 
positions. Accordingly, KKA must work with communities to develop and initiate 
modified traditional justice processes that would be suitable to the war context. The 
authors envision a reasonably structured index of traditional practices.
 411
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Other authors have extended this argument to claim that with adequate „modification,‟ 
traditional practices could legitimately meet the requirements of the international 
community. A 2005 Refugee Law Project (RLP) report suggests that if appropriately 
adapted and codified, traditional mechanisms could conform to international justice 
and human rights norms, and potentially even replace the ICC process.
412
 They 
accordingly recommend that:  
 …the expectations of the community ought to be written down so that everyone 
in the community  knows or is able to access such rules. These rules would then 
also inform the decisions taken by the elders or community leaders. This would 
clearly address any questions of bias and flexibility.
413
 
 
Such codification, they suggest, could “satisfy neutral observers” (presumably 
international actors).
414
  
 
Increasingly however, some reports have cautioned against the formal codification of 
traditional practices. A 2009 study by the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies 
(IPSS), Gulu University, entitled “Community perspectives on the Mato Oput 
process,” also supports the adaptation of traditional processes by cultural leaders to 
the current context.
415
 The authors strongly specify however, that the Government 
should refrain from making detailed policy regarding Mato Oput, or seek to codify 
traditional practices, but rather allow “for local autonomy.”416 The role of the 
Government and domestic NGOs should be to support institutions in Northern 
Uganda that draw on traditional mechanisms.
417
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traditional leaders, the IPSS study argues that both formal trials and traditional 
mechanisms have a role to play after the war.
418
 
 
Another recent perspective is that the principles of local traditional justice must 
inform the development of national transitional practices. A 2009 report entitled 
„Tradition in Transition‟ contends that traditional practices and values are relevant on 
both the local and national level.
419
 The report refrains from concluding on whether 
traditional practices should be adapted and formally codified into national law, or left 
flexible. Rather they emphasize that traditional principles must be “integrated into a 
national transitional justice process.”420 The authors identify broad “fundamental 
principles or elements” of traditions across regions, and argue that many of these 
elements are already encompassed in the mechanisms specified in the Juba AAR 
framework, such as a truth telling body, and a reparations scheme.
421
 Furthermore, the 
report identifies how these mechanisms could be designed in way that is sensitive to 
traditional principles. For instance, they suggest that a truth-telling process should be 
based on inter-active dialogue rather than individualized confession.
422
  
 
In contrast to many of the reports identified above, a few authors deliberately seek to 
analyze and understand local „traditional‟ justice processes „on its own terms,‟ 
without reference to international standards or national mechanisms.
423
 Recently, 
Baines argued that the true meaning and value of local processes “slip under the radar 
when „justice‟ after war is studied from universal definitions and standards, or where 
the „local‟ is defined solely as a space for intervention, not comprehension, not 
knowledge, not capacity.”424 In several articles, she examines how local, traditional 
processes in Northern Uganda promote „micro level‟ social construction in the context 
of the war‟s aftermath. Baines argues that through engagement in the spirit world, 
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locals seek to understand and exert control over their own situations, and actively 
seek moral rejuvenation and restoration of social relationships.
425
 
 
Finally, while the above authors locate significant value in traditional approaches, 
anthropologist Tim Allen has consistently critiqued the potential role of traditional 
justice in peacemaking and postwar transition. In effect, Allen argues that the 
enterprise of „traditional justice‟ is irretrievably tainted by local power dynamics, and 
lacks meaning for much of the Acholi population. Firstly, he contends that the recent 
focus on local Acholi rituals simply reflects an invention of „tradition‟ by self-
interested local elites supported by foreign donors.
426
 Secondly, Allen argues that 
while Acholi have diverse views, overall his research found “no widespread 
enthusiasm for Mato Oput ceremonies.”427 In defense of the ICC intervention, Allen 
contends that in his fieldwork he encountered no “general rejection of international 
justice,” rather concern that arrests will never be made and the ICC will simply prove 
toothless and ineffective.
428
 
 
Beyond finding little local support for the application of Mato Oput ceremonies 
within the war context, Allen argues that focusing on traditional justice could prove 
destructive. Firstly, Allen objects that a postwar justice process that leans too heavily 
upon „traditional justice‟ risks implying that the war was simply a local affair, and 
that Government bears no responsibility. The reconciliation of LRA with northern 
civilians through traditional rituals such as Mato Oput, he argues, risks further 
“demonizing” northerners, reinforcing notions that they care less about human rights 
abuses than other people.
429
 Secondly, Allen warns against codifying traditional 
justice mechanisms into a legal transitional justice framework.
430
 While numerous 
authors argue that traditional mechanisms can be adapted to meet human rights 
standards, Allen believes that embedding traditional rituals in the formal legal system 
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could result in further entrenchment of gender-based hierarchies and local elite 
power.
431
 While recognizing that traditional spiritual practices may be helpful for the 
social reintegration of returning abductees, overall, his analysis reveals little of the 
constructive social role of traditional practices portrayed by Baines and others.
 
 
 
The Exclusion of Socioeconomic Issues in the Conceptualization of Justice  
 
Overall then, most study of local approaches to justice focuses on the highly 
contentious topic of „traditional‟ practices and approaches, often in relation to formal 
criminal justice. Less critical scholarly debate has formed around the issue of local 
views on other transitional processes such as truth telling and reparations. With some 
exceptions, most authors affirm that these mechanisms are locally supported, and that 
elements of these mechanisms can be located in traditional practices.
432
 The most 
striking omission in the literature on local justice priorities and approaches, however, 
is consideration of socio-economic recovery beyond reparations schemes. 
 
While numerous reports and studies emphasize that socio-economic rehabilitation is 
an essential and locally prioritized part of Northern Uganda‟s wider recovery from 
war, very few works clearly identify this process as an issue of „justice.‟ In RLP‟s 
2005 work discussed above, for example, a clear line is drawn between social and 
economic development and „justice,‟ which is narrowly conceptualized to include 
measures for dealing with the past, such as retribution, reconciliation, and truth 
telling. In their conclusion, the authors contend that:  
Any successful post-conflict rebuilding must necessarily address elements 
above and beyond simply issues of „justice.‟…The reconstruction process must 
also consider tools needed to support a life unencumbered by the devastation of 
war: economic stability, physical rebuilding of homes, hospitals, roads and 
schools.
433
 
 
Also written in the context of ongoing displacement and an uncertain peace, an 
excellent 2007 report entitled “Fostering the Transition in Acholiland: From War to 
Peace, From Camps to Home,” by Gulu-based Human Rights Focus (HURIFO) 
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similarly contends that “In our research, we found an absolute primacy of demands 
for peace, return and reconstruction over demands for justice.” 434 They forcefully 
argue that „justice‟ or reconciliation interventions must come second to the need for 
people to return home from the camps and rebuild their livelihoods, and the need for 
rehabilitation of services and infrastructure.
435
  
 
Frequently, involved scholars and advocates have accordingly limited their 
conceptualization of postwar „justice‟ measures that address the everyday practical 
priorities of local communities to reparations or compensation policies. For instance, 
while HURIFO‟s 2007 report highlights a range of critical socio-economic issues, its 
recommendation relating to the development of postwar justice mechanisms focuses 
exclusively on compensation.
436
 While the report also includes recommendations 
concerning land access and the facilitation of voluntary return from camps, they are 
not categorized as matters of justice.
 437
As I discuss in the following Chapter, this 
position prevails.  
 
As this brief literature review demonstrates, many authors advocate that traditional 
justice mechanisms be advocated to the postwar situation, though their positions 
differ as to how traditional mechanisms should interface with justice implemented at 
the national and international level. Allen, conversely, deeply challenges the entire 
enterprise and emphasizes that local communities have not rejected international 
justice. While various scholars also draw attention to the local recognition and 
demands for truth telling and reparations, scholarship on local approaches largely 
excludes socioeconomic issues from the scope of justice.  
 
In the rest of this chapter, I explore local perspectives and priorities regarding postwar 
justice, drawing on the concepts of „embedded justice‟ and „indirect justice‟ to shape 
my discussion. While the literature discussed above has helped to break down the 
often-assumed dichotomies between local, national and international justice, 
retributive justice and restorative justice, I argue that the broad distinction between 
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embedded and indirect justice provides a further helpful framework to acknowledge 
widespread local priorities, but also the diversity of local views. 
 
Socio-Economic Justice Issues: the Linchpin of ‘Embedded Justice’ 
While many scholars draw a sharp distinction between social and economic recovery 
and „justice,‟ this section demonstrates that socioeconomic issues are a critical aspect 
of „embedded justice.‟ Socioeconomic recovery and development are top postwar 
priorities for most northerners. Given that the current livelihood and land struggles of 
local northerners stem directly from the war in which the Government bears 
significant responsibility, it is arbitrary and misleading to exclude these concerns 
from the scope of justice. This issue is not merely semantic. As I explore in 
subsequent chapters, locating socio-economic mechanisms within the enterprise of 
„transitional justice‟ could determine whether such issues gain momentum as part of 
an internationally backed, civil society driven push for the Government to engage in 
„transition.‟ Below, I explore three key, closely related dimensions of socioeconomic 
embedded justice in Northern Uganda: broad recovery and socioeconomic 
development, land issues, and finally, reparations. I contend that the notion of 
reparations certainly holds special significance for many Northern Ugandans, but 
should nevertheless be part of a broader push for socio-economic justice.  
 
Social and Economic Recovery and Development  
 
It is first vital to note that while economic reforms since 1980 have brought marked 
improvements in national social welfare, inequality between northern regions and the 
rest of the country has grown. 438 Largely due to insecurity and disruption during the 
years of conflict, the north has lagged behind advances in other regions of Uganda in 
healthcare, food security and education. Poorly planned relocation away from IDP 
camps since 2007 has led to widespread lack of access to water, and heightened food 
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security issues. 439 Pham et al‟s 2010 survey suggests that the literacy rate in Northern 
Uganda (15% of respondents aged 18 or above) is significantly lower than the 
national average (67% of the population aged 15 or above).
440
 Seventy five % of the 
surveyed respondents had not completed primary school.
441
 School attendance and 
education quality is significantly lower in Northern Uganda.
442
 Access to healthcare 
in the northern regions is similarly lower than the national average.  
 
My own qualitative research in 2010 led me to conclude that many people in the 
Acholi region are first and foremost concerned with pressing economic and social 
needs (embedded justice), rather than „indirect‟ justice. While I was initially keen to 
focus my interviews with individuals in rural communities on people‟s opinions 
regarding amnesty, criminal trials and traditional justice, I found that most people 
were much more engaged when discussing issues that concerned their immediate 
surroundings and livelihoods. Unsurprisingly, when I asked people broad questions 
about their greatest concerns and priorities following the war, almost all volunteered 
their pressing welfare struggles and hopes and fears for the future, rather than abstract 
notions of justice and accountability for wrongdoers. Whereas at first I naively 
expected answers about the need for perpetrators to face accountability, or 
alternatively engage in reconciliation rituals, I received answers about boreholes, 
schooling, and pig farming. I quickly learned to expand my own narrowly conceived 
notions of „justice.‟ 
 
A local councilor responded that for his community, the greatest challenge in the 
wake of the war was that:  
There is no water bore hole. And health! From here to town there is no health 
unit! You have to take your child so far, it is hard, so we are appealing to the 
Government to construct a health unit close by. 
443
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Many community members, including community leaders expressed great concern 
about access to adequate education:  
People have great poverty. We stayed in the IDP camps but now we are coming 
back home. We try to fight the poverty by digging together…but you find 
paying school fees is very difficult.
444
 
 
An LC3 explained:  
There is a lack of teachers deep in the villages after the war. Education is very 
poor. It comes as a result of the war- the school buildings and the houses for the 
teachers that used to be there were destroyed. Now our teachers have no houses 
at school and they have to come a long distance.
445
  
  
Frequently, I found that when people discussed their immediate problems, they held 
the Government responsible, and made demands for Museveni‟s regime to take 
action. One formerly abducted young man I spoke with also held the Government 
responsible for his lost opportunity to receive an education:  
The Government wasted my time. Some people who came back from the bush 
were given some support…like training to do some skill, but for me they didn‟t 
give me that chance, not even going to school. I feel bad about it. 
446
 
 
Similarly, another man I spoke with viewed that northern children should be “given 
priority in education” nationwide because of their lost opportunities in the 
Government‟s IDP camps. 447 
 
Three key surveys undertaken by research teams in 2005, 2007 and 2010 also 
demonstrate that northern populations identify security and socio-economic concerns 
as top priorities. The 2005 survey was undertaken during a time of great insecurity 
with the majority of the population living in squalid displacement camps. By 2007 
however, numerous people had left the IDP camps and return to their land.
448
 In 2010, 
with the LRA withdrawn, most of the population had returned to the villages, leaving 
only 8% of the population remaining in IDP camps.
449
 Although people still face great 
challenges, security has been largely restored, and to a certain degree I found that 
people have been able to resume normal patterns of life.  
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Despite the vast changes in life circumstances, people‟s responses remained fairly 
similar between the surveys. In one section of the survey, respondents were asked to 
identify their most immediate priorities. In 2005, the top concerns identified were 
food (34%) and peace (31%).
450
 Only 1% mentioned „justice,‟ which was defined 
broadly as „trials‟, „reconciliation‟ or „truth and fairness.‟451 Similarly, in the 2007 
survey, only a small proportion (3%) of respondents identified „justice‟ as a top 
priority, while the majority placed “emphasis on resolving immediate needs for peace, 
food and health.”452 In 2007, 45% of respondents prioritized health, 45% peace, 31% 
education, 43% food and 37% land.
453
 Northerner‟s top priorities according to the 
2010 survey were similar: food (28%), agriculture (19%), education (15%) and health 
services (13%). As the report itself notes, such findings do not indicate that issues of 
accountability and reconciliation are not vital to northerners, simply that such issues 
are of secondary importance to immediate social welfare issues. 
 
In the 2007 and 2010 surveys, respondents were also asked what they thought the 
Government should prioritize. The most common responses in 2007 were that the 
Ugandan Government should focus on assisting the return home (33%), and 
maintaining security of the North (21%). In 2010 when relative peace was secured 
and most of the population had returned home, participants indicated that the 
Government should prioritize developing education programs (45%), and health 
services (44%).
454
 Providing access to water, resettlement assistance, and furthering 
economic development including money, employment and food was also frequently 
mentioned.  
 
While these population-based surveys categorize „justice‟ separately from socio-
economic issues, it appears that this distinction was simply a tool to quickly identify 
local priorities. The survey clearly demonstrated that immediate social and economic 
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concerns are more important to Northern people than trials and reconciliation 
processes. The authors themselves, however, appear to recognize that social-
economic concerns should be included in a broader scope of justice. Pham et al 
summarize in their 2007 survey that “any approach to peace and justice in Northern 
Uganda must take into account the strong desire on the part of the people to have their 
most basic needs met.”455 My own fieldwork supports the view that a concept of 
postwar justice that fails to encompass socioeconomic issues will appear very empty 
to communities affected by the war. Social and economic development is a core 
component of „embedded‟ justice.  
  
Land Conflict 
 
Access to land is a critical embedded socio-economic issue in Northern Uganda that 
was adversely affected by the Government‟s policy of displacement. Resettlement in 
the villages has been complicated not only by limited access to basic welfare facilities 
and the absence of key infrastructure, but also by conflicts over land.   
As people return home, disputes have ignited within or between families, clans, or 
tribes over the forgotten borders of long-abandoned communal land. In the context of 
eroded or splintered family ties in the wake of war, some marginalized individuals 
have been excluded from previously shared land. Others have taken advantage of the 
confused situation to appropriate territory.  During my time with Caritas, the 
community workers were frequently involved in mediation of land conflicts. At the 
first Caritas social services weekly planning meeting I observed, land conflict was 
identified as the most pressing issue facing local communities: wrangles widened rifts 
in families, and prevented people from cultivating land.
456
 One community worker 
reported that the previous day an intra-family dispute had broken into physical 
fighting, and three members had been hospitalized.
457
 One man I interviewed in 
Patiko exclaimed: 
When you want to go back to your original place and they tell you, you no 
longer have land! This is what happened to me when I came back from the IDP 
camp. When this issue of land wrangles comes up, some people say for now no 
one should settle here, you should stop digging.
458
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While his dispute was being resolved, he was unable to farm his land.  
 
The elderly, disabled, orphans and former abductees of the LRA are particularly 
vulnerable to land disputes.
459
 For example, during my time accompanying Caritas 
community workers on their excursions to the villages, we encountered an elderly 
woman who had been left blind and sustained extensive burns from an LRA attack. 
Perhaps considered an easy target, Jennifer had faced numerous struggles from non-
immediate relatives who had attempted to lay claim to the land she had lived on with 
her immediate family before she had been displaced.
460
 Given her age and disabilities, 
the disputes proved particularly distressing and isolating. I found that for such 
individuals, the resolution of struggles over land was often a top priority. „Embedded‟ 
justice is generally viewed as more pressing than wider, symbolic forms of justice.  
 
Resolving land disputes is often a difficult task. Two key mechanisms exist for 
determining the outcome of land wrangles in Acholiland: traditional authority 
structures, and LC2 courts, which were given jurisdiction over customary land tenure 
in the 1998 Land Act. While both systems have significant shortcomings, and the 
relationship between the two is often unclear, I saw some evidence that the 
mechanisms could work in tandem to successfully resolve land disputes.
461
  In 
Jennifer‟s case, the matter was first taken to the police, who referred the dispute to an 
LC2 who worked in coordination with local traditional leaders who knew the original 
boundaries of the land. The dispute was arbitrated in Jennifer‟s favor, and the other 
claimants respected the decision.  
 
While in this instance the LC court and traditional authorities worked together, this is 
not always the case. Too often, the LC courts are ignorant of original land boundaries, 
and fail to take into account the customary land knowledge of local elders and 
traditional leaders.
 462
 Furthermore, local court officials are often accused of being 
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subject to bribery.
463
According to HURIFO, the traditional leaders are sometimes 
poorly equipped to deal with new land problems that have arisen such as “illicit sales, 
fraud and land grabbing.”464 Nevertheless, many people I spoke to were confident in 
the ability of elders and traditional leaders to justly determine land boundaries. One 
man emphasized, that it was only when “the elders and the traditional leaders have sat 
together and decided whose land this is” that disputed land can be resettled.465 During 
my time with Caritas, the community work team worked to intervene before conflicts 
over land became violent, and where necessary, facilitated the participation of 
traditional leaders in teams that arbitrated disputes.  
 
The resolution of the land conflicts that have arisen as a result of the Government‟s 
policy of encampment during the war and the inadequate facilitation of return is a key 
aspect of „embedded‟ justice in Northern Uganda. Given the direct adverse 
socioeconomic impact of such disputes on people‟s access to land and livelihood, 
development of the LC court and traditional systems to effectively mediate and 
arbitrate land disputes must be included in any transitional justice program.  
 
Targeted Reparations: An Element of Socio-Economic Justice 
 
An aspect of embedded socio-economic justice that appeals to local communities‟ 
sense of justice is reparation and compensation. Over the course of the war, 
northerners suffered many losses, both material and immaterial: the lives of loved 
ones, property and livestock, land, the opportunity for education or training. As 
explored in the first chapter, both the LRA and the Government bear significant 
responsibility for such losses. It is evident from my own experience and the work of 
many other scholars that Northern communities value special material amends in 
acknowledgement of wrongs done to them. Pham et al‟s 2010 survey revealed that an 
overwhelming 97% of respondents believed that victims affected by the war should 
receive some form of compensation.
 466
As I discuss further in the following chapter, it 
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should be noted that many locals do not distinguish clearly between reparations and 
wider socioeconomic development.  
 
For some locals however, the notion of reparation appears particularly tied to apology 
and recognition of the harm wrought by the Government during the war. As a local 
activist based in Gulu town emphasized, for instance:  
It needs to come out – the Government needs to apologize and say we are sorry 
for what has happened in Acholiland, we should have protected you…with 
reparations it may be difficult to reward individuals for what is lost, but …in a 
place where many people have lost life, like Pader district, in Atiak, you could 
give something that benefits people generally.
467
  
  
An LC1 also connected the need for compensation to the failings of the Government: 
“The Government should at least compensate people- because they are the ones that 
killed.”468 Not infrequently, I found that Acholi furthermore believed that targeted 
reparations could help tangibly reassure them that the Government‟s approach to the 
North had changed. For instance, a LC3 contended that the Government should 
provide special scholarships for northern children, to show that “we may also be a 
part of this country.”469  
 
Many Acholi are particularly passionate about the provision of reparation for cattle 
lost during the war. This is particularly evident in Pham et al‟s 2010 survey, which 
reveals that 74% of the population preferred that compensation given be in the form 
of cattle. Before the war, farming of cattle was a critical form of livelihood as well as 
cultural prestige.
470
 Hundreds of thousands of livestock were looted or eaten by the 
LRA and Government soldiers.
471
 The LC3 of Paicho sub-county accordingly 
contended:  
 During this war our community lost their free resources in terms of cattle and 
sheep and so on. The Government should bring back these resources. We 
depended on keeping cattle and small small farming. The Government should 
compensate our cattle lost during the war.
472
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The desire of many Acholi for the Government to facilitate the return of livestock is 
reflected in relatively successful local efforts to lobby the Government, and the 
eventual formation of the Acholi War Debt Claimants (AWDC) in 2005. In response 
to vigorous local petitions, the Government established the „Compensation 
Committee‟ to oversee Government repayment for stolen cattle. However, only 20% 
of claimants were partially reimbursed, and the process subsequently stalled.
473
 The 
AWDC since registered 6436 claimants who have collectively demanded UgSh1.4 
trillion for 245,046 animals raided during the war in a Court case filed against the 
Government. As yet, the Government has only paid a small proportion of these 
claims.
474
  
 
While widespread local demands suggest a reparations scheme should play a role in 
postwar justice, it is vital that it be carefully designed, and set in the context of wider 
socio-economic justice measures. As Miller contends, it is easy for the “question of 
who owes whom how much…[to] triumph over issues that might by contrast result in 
increased solidarity among a broader sector of the country‟s economically repressed.”  
Inevitably it is difficult to define who is a victim, and who deserves particular 
restitution. Another danger associated with reparations is that the most active and 
vocal complainants, such as members of the AWDC, might receive copious 
compensation while others receive little. Furthermore, by nature, even substantial 
reparations schemes do not provide means to address the deep structural inequities 
and the need for long-term recovery and economic development.
475
 Nevertheless, 
local popular demand suggests that reparations could assist vulnerable individuals, 
and demonstrate to communities that the Government recognizes their suffering and 
has shifted its approach. 
476
  
 
Referring to the enduring poverty of northerners and vast economic inequalities with 
the rest of the country, one man I interviewed contended:  
In some ways, the war has not yet ended. The type of peace we need is not there 
now. For real peace there needs to be change from the Government. If there is 
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no change, people will continue to suffer.
477
 
 
The socioeconomic issues discussed above are clearly prioritized as critical issues of 
embedded justice by local communities. Justice policies on the development of key 
welfare services and infrastructure, livelihoods, land conflicts and also targeted 
reparations directly and tangibly address the most pressing daily concerns of those 
affected by war. It is finally important to emphasize that this form of „embedded‟ 
justice inevitably demands the involvement of the state. Local groups and individuals 
will always engage in efforts to restore their livelihoods and land, but ultimately, 
Government action is required. The following section explores another aspect of 
embedded justice that is determined primarily at the local level: restoration of social 
relationships.  
 
Local Cosmology and Social Restoration as ‘Embedded Justice’  
A Point of Clarification  
 
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, the controversial issue of traditional justice 
and its supposed archetype Mato Oput enters my discussion of local approaches to 
justice in two different ways. The distinction I draw reflects the varied ways that local 
people speak about traditional justice. Firstly, I found that people speak about 
traditional justice practices in relation to social and spiritual problems directly 
experienced by themselves or other people in their community. In this way, traditional 
practice is a form of „embedded justice.‟ Secondly however, locals also refer to 
traditional justice (and specifically Mato Oput) in a broader, less personal capacity. 
Reflecting wider discussions about the controversial claims articulated by prominent 
Acholi leaders, locals offered varied views on the role that traditional justice should 
(or should not) play in reconciling figurehead LRA commanders with the Government 
or northern communities, and achieving final symbolic resolution of the LRA 
situation. Although there are inevitably points of overlap with „embedded justice, I 
contend that this second approach to traditional justice could usefully be conceived as 
„indirect justice.‟ This section discusses traditional mechanisms as „embedded 
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justice,‟ while the following section explores diverse Acholi approaches to „indirect 
justice.‟  
 
The Reinvention of Traditional Justice: Power Interests and a Quest for Peace  
 
Before exploring local approaches to social dislocation, it is necessary to explore the 
source of the contemporary focus on traditional justice, and consider the context in 
which „traditional‟ structures were established. The surge of bold claims about Mato 
Oput arose from various interests of international, national and local actors in the 
reinvigoration of „traditional‟ leadership in Northern Uganda.478 While the 
reinvention of traditional justice sprung from a desire to cultivate a culture and 
practice of reconciliation, it is crucial to recognize that it also reflected the self-
interest of powerful elites.  
 
The recent focus on traditional mechanisms ironically stems at least in part from 
international intervention. Allen traces the surge in prominence of the Mato Oput 
ritual to a report on local reconciliation processes written by the anthropologist 
Dennis Pain in 1997 that sought to identify mechanisms to assist the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict.
479
 In his report, Pain, a close friend of the Anglican Acholi 
community, advocated for a “radical law enabling traditional resolution” through such 
ceremonies as Mato Oput to be applied in “special circumstances of social 
breakdown.”480 The project of traditional justice gained increasing momentum as 
donors keen to support „traditional‟ African culture provided funding to research and 
reinstate a system of traditional leadership to facilitate rituals.
481
 As Dolan contends, 
for some international NGOs it appeared an easier undertaking to “strengthen 
traditional leadership than to challenge the modern leadership.”482 For some time, 
support of traditional justice indeed reflected the attitude that the northern conflict 
was a „local affair.‟483  
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The resurrection of traditional structures was also supported by national and local 
powers. The Ugandan Government also originally backed, and furthermore facilitated 
the establishment of „traditional‟ structures. In 1995, Museveni‟s regime officially 
reinstated traditional leadership through the institution KKA in Uganda‟s new 
constitution. Contemporary observers perceived that the state hoped to co-opt the 
traditional leadership to bolster its own political standing.
484
 Furthermore, the 
movement inevitably became popular with local male elders and church officials, 
perceiving that a revival of „tradition‟ would also boost their authority that had waned 
over the course of the war.
485
 It was against this backdrop that local religious and 
traditional leaders in the north lobbied for traditional justice to replace the ICC 
process. 
 
The claims of such leaders about Mato Oput and the Acholi „culture of forgiveness,‟ 
in response to the ICC‟s intervention, however, are best understood as a concerted 
effort to reach a negotiated end to the war at any cost in the context of widespread, 
prolonged suffering. Certainly it is likely that some elders, Rwodi Kweri and church 
officials supported bold claims about traditional practices for reasons of self-interest 
and power. In contrast, other leaders‟ promotion of traditional mechanisms to 
reconcile the LRA leadership with northern communities and the Government may 
have stemmed from personal conviction about the value of forgiveness and 
reconciliation. However, it is also clear that leaders used an exaggerated depiction of 
traditional justice strategically to challenge the approach of both the Government and 
the ICC to resolving the war. As evident in the previous chapter, KKA and the ARLPI 
were heavily involved in the civil society struggle against the Government‟s long-
favored a military approach. Elements of the traditional leadership developed 
resistance against state cooption.
486
 The claims of such leaders were reasonably 
representative of the wider Acholi community insofar as they offered a strategic 
avenue to end the war, but were overall misleading as a portrayal of Acholi 
perspectives on justice.  
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The increasingly measured views of religious and cultural leaders after the failure of 
the Juba process and departure of the LRA strongly suggest that their earlier bold 
claims were tied to the quest for peaceful settlement. In his 2010 article „Bitter 
Roots,‟ Allen refers to a recent interview with the Acholi Paramount Chief, in which 
the Rwot states that Kony and the other commanders should be prosecuted for what 
they did. As Allen paraphrases the Chief‟s comments: 
Traditional customs were something people could draw upon if it helped them, 
but they [are] not an adequate alternative to formal processes where the most 
serious crimes [have] been committed.
487
  
 
My own informal discussions with Anglican Acholi leaders similarly suggest that 
their views have shifted considerably. In one conversation, a religious leader reflected 
that Acholi people no longer share a widespread culture of forgiveness: the war has 
eroded cultural structures, mob justice is common, and people are also more familiar 
with „modern‟ retributive systems.488 In his personal view, it was critical to forgive 
others, but those who have done wrong must still be answerable to the law. 
Forgiveness, he contended, was a matter of the heart. Regarding „traditional‟ systems, 
he acknowledged that while attempts have been made to reinstate cultural institutions, 
many people are losing respect for the elders who sometimes abuse their role.
489
 
 
The phenomena of local „traditional‟ justice and the recent exaggerated claims about 
its potential as a postwar justice mechanism resulted from actions at all levels. It is 
clear that while many local actors supported adopting traditional mechanisms as a 
strategy to achieve peace, others also have vested interests in the project for their own 
selfish reasons. As I explore below, the power dynamics embedded in the structures 
of traditional leadership inevitably have implications for the practice of „traditional‟ 
approaches to social restoration.    
 
Locally „Embedded‟ Justice: Social Restoration  
 
Throughout the course of the war, communities have been actively involved in locally 
„embedded‟ ways to deal with the social repercussions of widespread violence and the 
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breakdown of relationships.
490
 Despite the exaggerated nature of claims about 
traditional justice described above, it is clear that notions of the spiritual realm and 
practices considered „traditional‟ often shape local responses to the war. Like 
Harlacher et al, I adopt the approach that the terms „tradition‟ or „traditional‟ simply 
mean what local people believe them to mean: current, living practices and beliefs 
that are rooted in a collective memory (real or imagined) of a past way of doing 
things.
 491
 Traditional beliefs and practices, however, cannot be equated with „Acholi‟ 
beliefs. As I discuss below, traditional approaches are not the only way that Acholi 
communities seek social restoration in the wake of war. Some Acholi furthermore 
may find no meaning at all in traditional practices. 
 
In rural Acholiland, I found that many people strongly adhere to a spiritual worldview 
sometimes described as Acholi cosmology or religion. This worldview provides a 
framework for people to understand the deeper causes of misfortune, and to seek 
remedies.
492
 As elders and traditional leaders narrate, when the social-fabric is torn, 
free joggi (bad spirits) send misfortune until appropriate action is taken and social and 
spiritual conciliation takes place.
493
 Most commonly, people I spoke with referred to a 
free joggi called Cen, the spirit of a person who died in bad circumstances, or was not 
given proper burial. People who kill, intentionally or otherwise, can become haunted 
and plagued by the vengeful spirit Cen. The ground where people died badly can also 
become infected. One woman I spoke to recalled that for many months after a killing, 
her local school was deemed uninhabitable due to lingering Cen.
494
 The widespread 
experience of violence during the war resulted in a proliferation of free joggi.  It is 
particularly common for LRA returnees to experience Cen after returning from the 
bush to the community. Former LRA and community members I spoke to explained 
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that Cen usually manifested itself in the form of nightmares, physical ailments, bad 
fortune or reproductive problems.
 495
   
 
Belief in spiritual forces does not always invoke an attitude of forgiveness and 
reconciliation within communities. Baines notes instances where people deliberately 
buried victims away from their ancestral burial grounds to encourage their dead spirits 
to seek revenge upon a perpetrator.
496
 I found that it is common for people to respond 
with fear and anger towards returnees showing signs of Cen. This is perhaps 
unsurprising, especially in instances where a former fighter returns to a village where 
they committed atrocities. One former abductee of the LRA recounted that when he 
first returned, community members ostracized him from village social life and called 
him names.
497
  
 
However, „traditional‟ beliefs and practices also provide local communities with a 
way to restore ruptures in the moral-spiritual and social order brought about through 
mass violence.
498
 Many people I encountered believed strongly in the need to appease 
and disperse the bad spirits unleashed by social-wrongs. Ritual responses to Cen or 
other bad spirits often appear both socially and psychologically beneficial. When a 
ceremonial cleansing was performed referred to as moyo piny at the site of the school 
ground referred to above, locals agreed that the space was purified and could be used 
again.
499
 In Harlacher‟s in-depth fieldwork in 2006, he relates numerous instances in 
which individuals are relieved from the affliction of Cen through various spiritual 
interventions by elders, and reunited with their communities.
500
 Perhaps the most 
commonly practiced ritual is nyono tonggweno, „stepping on the egg.‟ In recent years, 
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this ritual has been performed en masse at the palace of the Paramount Chief to 
welcome back LRA returnees and cleanse them from their time in the bush.
501
 While 
some rurally based elders are skeptical about large-scale rituals performed in Gulu 
town rather than in the villages, the ceremonies nevertheless appeared helpful to many 
returnees, giving them a sense that the wider Acholi community was prepared to 
accept them back.
502
 
 
The reconciliation practice Mato Oput, appears to be applied only rarely, while little 
evidence suggests that the process has ever occurred between former LRA and their 
victim‟s family.503 Interestingly, I found that most people considered Mato Oput to be 
completely compatible with formal justice procedures: the reconciliation process 
often followed the return of the perpetrator from a time of imprisonment. One LC1 
who recently witnessed the concluding ceremony of Mato Oput contended, “The best 
thing” for murderers: 
 …is to take them straight to the police, from there they decide, they may put 
them in prison, fine! But when you come back…reconciliation must take place. 
The anger needs to be eased and cooled, so the families don‟t fight one 
another.
504
  
 
A common reason given by traditional leaders for the infrequent practice of Mato 
Oput is high levels of poverty and lack of resources for compensation, a critical 
element of the process.
505
 Others cite that knowledge about Mato Oput has waned 
during the course of the war.
506
 As many other scholars have noted, traditional leaders 
explain that Mato Oput is not undertaken between former LRA and Acholi clans 
because the ritual is simply not suited to a situation in which there are a multitude of 
victims, and perpetrators and/or victims are not present or even known.
507
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Nevertheless, it is evident that local communities draw upon traditional 
understandings and practices to mediate and restore relationships between clans who 
have become alienated through the atrocities of war. Baines provides a detailed 
example, for instance, of a case in which a woman (Florence) becomes haunted by the 
spirit of her son who was abducted and died in the bush.
 508
 She blames Ojok, the son 
of her neighbor was also abducted but returned alive because he revealed the 
whereabouts of her child to the LRA. In order for her son‟s spirit to leave her, she 
believes Ojok‟s family must provide compensation. A back and forth mediation 
process was accordingly initiated by the elders of the clan.
509
 Intervention of the 
spiritual realm clearly serves an important social role in bringing about reconciliation. 
As Baines puts it, in this case the spirit that haunted Florence effectively “forces the 
crime into public domain for discussion and demands a collective response” and 
resolution. 
510
 It is interesting to note that in this case, the process of reconciliation 
contained similar elements to Mato Oput: mediation, truth telling, and compensation.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that in some cases, the local approach to dealing with 
the return of perpetrators of extreme violence is simply rejection and ostracism. While 
I was informed of specific instances in which the families of victims accepted the 
return of command-level LRA to their neighborhoods, this is not always the case. One 
woman I spoke with believed that reconciliation processes were good in principle, but 
that reunion was simply not possible between members of her village and another 
returned Gulu-based LRA commander:  
People are still very bitter. In that family [points to nearby hut] four boys were 
killed…In reality…if you see these commanders you feel like the community 
should spear them. There was one commander who came to buy sorghum here 
from town. People were saying, last time you were killing people around here- 
we could even stone you right now.
511
 
 
Frequently, I found that members of the home village of LRA high commander 
Brigadier Kenneth Banya who received amnesty in 2004 and returned to live in Gulu 
town were simply not ready to welcome him back or share in any traditional process. 
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One woman exclaimed derisively, “Banya is the responsibility of the Government, not 
the community now.”512 She said that even though he “stood on an egg with the 
paramount chief” he was not welcome back. 513 In some instances, the restoration of 
former relationships appears out of the question.  
 
The Search for an Inclusive Approach to Local Reconciliation  
 
While traditional approaches to local social healing are evidently important to many 
people, in practice, it is clear that „traditional‟ structures are in crisis. In part, this 
stems from the local power dynamics involved in the re-establishment of traditional 
leadership structures described above. Weak and often corrupt leadership at the 
grassroots level threatens to undermine the role of traditional mechanisms as an 
effective form of local embedded justice. The rise of traditional leadership is to an 
extent associated with the male elders‟ bid for increased authority. 
 
The inactivity or abuse of power by some traditional leaders frequently appeared to 
leave individuals without spiritual or social conciliation. While many people in theory 
held respect for traditional leaders, I found that traditional leaders often proved 
unhelpful, or even exploitative. One formerly abducted youth that sought relief from 
Cen explained that his local Rwot did little to assist him. He explained: “when I 
returned there was no ceremony. They did slaughter a goat, but they didn‟t tell me 
whether it was for me, or for another purpose.”514 Like many others, while this man 
felt he needed to be cleansed of Cen, he was not sure what processes could help him, 
or how he should approach his elders.
515
 Another woman I encountered sought several 
different methods to cleanse herself, including approaching a witchdoctor (ajwaki), 
but found that leaders demanded excessive payment.
516
 Many Acholi are clearly 
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frustrated with the weakness of the traditional system, and lack opportunity to access 
assistance. 
 
More broadly, the „crisis‟ of the traditional system in the Acholi region reflects a 
general erosion of „traditional‟ culture and the growing lack of knowledge of rituals 
and customs.
517
 A project officer of an NGO involved in strengthening community 
reconciliation shared a widely held view: “the cultural leaders are no longer really as 
active and playing their role. In the past, they used to speak and people would listen, 
but these days they do not listen.”518 This trend is often attributed to the social 
breakdown that occurred during the war, and the decline of the practice of wang-oo, a 
nightly sharing of traditional laws and wisdom around a fireplace, which suffered due 
to imposition of a curfew in the IDP camps.
519
 While many locals genuinely subscribe 
to „Acholi cosmology,‟ traditional structures are currently weak and ineffective.  
 
It should also be noted that local embedded approaches to justice and social 
restoration are not restricted to traditional practices. Some people draw more strongly 
on Christianity than traditional beliefs, although the two are often mingled. In some 
instances, the process of reintegration and acceptance of former combatants that had 
perpetrated crimes against locals is assisted through mediation and counseling by 
local NGOs such as ARLPI, or through prayers.
 520
 The Caritas community workers I 
accompanied had yet another approach. They regularly facilitated local dialogues and 
meetings in their own local villages, in which village members discuss and strategize 
remedies for ongoing local social problems such as alcohol abuse, domestic violence, 
or social ostracism.
521
 The LC of one such village explained that such “dialogue and 
discussion in the community” helps to prevent people from “pointing fingers at one 
another,” and builds social cohesion.522 The prevalence and social impact of such self-
initiated community dialogues warrants further research. 
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As discussed above, scholars take a range of positions regarding the approach various 
actors should take to traditional justice practices. However, many of these approaches 
are problematic. National codification of traditional mechanisms risks imposing rigid 
structure on what is ultimately a highly flexible, locally embedded process of 
negotiation. To assume KKA as the exclusive actor responsible for the development 
of traditional practices also risks entrenching the often self-interested power of male 
elders. While in theory KKA aims to address gender imbalances in the traditional 
leadership, there is little evidence that suggests that this has been undertaken on a 
wide scale.
523
 Allen‟s work certainly highlights the troubling power dynamics 
entrenched in the structures of traditional justice. However, given the strong belief of 
many Acholi in the need for traditional approaches to social and spiritual 
reconciliation, the project should not be completely abandoned as he suggests. 
 
 Ultimately, the development of constructive, inclusive and flexible local mechanisms 
for social and spiritual renewal and a representative, engaged leadership must involve 
the active participation of a wide range of local actors. As Branch recognizes, this 
process is not simply a matter of refining the content and practice of particular rituals, 
and ensuring that they comply with particular standards.
524
 Rather, it must involve a 
local struggle over the very leadership structure and nature of the practice of 
traditional justice itself. Inevitably, international NGOs, donors, and domestic 
Ugandan civil society groups will continue to be involved in the development of 
approaches to traditional justice. As explored above, international actors were deeply 
involved in the resurrection of a traditional leadership structure itself. The 
involvement of such groups, however, must not simply be to support KKA, or to 
support the traditional practice through the provision of compensation as the IPSS 
study suggests. Rather, such groups must nurture the development of an inclusive 
approach to traditional justice, while remaining critically alert to local power 
dynamics. Examining the impact and approach of the many involved civil society 
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groups in the search for an effective traditional justice system was beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Future research, however, should focus on critically assessing the 
contribution of civil society actors to this process, rather than simply documenting 
local perspectives on traditional justice and the practice of different rituals.  
 
„Embedded‟ justice in Northern Uganda therefore involves actors at all levels, not 
simply local. For most Acholi communities, socioeconomic justice is a critical 
component of embedded justice. While local actors are certainly involved in seeking 
ways to collectively address their livelihood struggles after the war, socioeconomic 
justice ultimately requires a transformation of the national approach. The struggle for 
an inclusive, effective approach to social restoration furthermore, inevitably involves 
international and domestic civil society groups. In the following section, I turn to 
local perspectives on „indirect justice;‟ broader issues of reconciliation, accountability 
with distant perpetrators, and the symbolic resolution of the northern conflict. 
 
Indirect Justice: Wider Notions of Reconciliation and Accountability  
As with societies anywhere, war affected communities in the Acholi region have 
diverse beliefs about how the perpetrators of serious crimes should be dealt with. 
Many internal and external voices influence local perspectives. Religious leaders, 
KKA, the Local Council system, the Amnesty Commission, the formal court 
system,
525
 and the ICC (which has been repeatedly featured in local radio programs) 
all offer different approaches to issues of reconciliation, accountability, and 
forgiveness. These influences may produce ideas that compete and contradict, but also 
overlap and complement. As is already evident, those who ground their perspective in 
Acholi cosmology may also believe in the necessity of formal criminal accountability. 
Views may vary enormously between different subsections of the population: Acholi 
spiritual beliefs are simply not relevant for most educated, town-based people, who 
also lived and suffered through the war.
526
 Furthermore, local perspectives inevitably 
change over time according to context. For instance, while there was evidently 
widespread support for blanket amnesty while conflict persisted, the return of security 
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and relative peace has given rise to higher recognition of a role for criminal 
accountability.
 527
   
 
It is first vital to note that when I spoke to Northerners in mid-2010 about 
accountability for at large perpetrators and the symbolic resolution of the northern 
conflict, most people treated such questions as hypothetical concerns. There was a 
general sense that in the short term it was unlikely that Kony and other commanders 
would either be captured or reengage in peace talks, although a few people feared 
Kony‟s return. The debates that raged while a peace deal still seemed possible over 
whether the top leaders of the LRA and other high commanders should be subjected 
to the ICC, national criminal courts, or the Mato Oput process were now usually 
viewed as theoretical matters. Many people I talked to doubted that Kony and high-
level LRA commanders would return alive. One Local Councilor I interviewed 
laughed and responded that no method to deal with Kony and his commanders could 
work now, because Kony cannot be caught: 
The Government is saying some of these rebel offenders will be dealt with by 
the ICC, but when will they come back, when are they coming? The traditional 
justice like Mato Oput is not going to work either, because the LRA is still out 
there!
528
 
 
Likewise, when I asked a traditional leader (Rwot) if Mato Oput could be adapted to 
the post war situation to deal with LRA leaders, his answer simply focused on the 
failure of the Juba Process, and the subsequent absence of Kony:  
 We traditional leaders were saying we should handle Kony through the 
traditional system, but the ICC provoked them [the LRA] so much…They may 
never come back now! 
529
 
 
In general however, people were willing to air their views on reconciliation and 
accountability.  
 
In Favor of Reconciliation with the LRA  
  
Many people I spoke with expressed a desire for all the LRA to return peacefully and 
reintegrate with the community, and even extended their welcome to top 
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commanders. Some simply referred to the amnesty, without mentioning traditional 
processes. One expressed: “I feel that for anyone who comes back from the bush, they 
should come to the community. They are used to the community. The legal aspect- 
maybe we should leave it pending.”530 Those who supported the general amnesty 
were not without criticism of the Government‟s handling of returnees. A recurring 
theme was disillusionment with the Government‟s habit of recruiting returning rank 
and file LRA for the UPDF. The same man (above), for example went on to exclaim, 
“Many are brought back to the UPDF instead of taking them back and giving them 
support in the community!” 531 Some people I spoke with were also dissatisfied that 
high commanders who had returned from the bush received high-class treatment by 
the Government, while their victims received no assistance.
532
 Others who overall 
supported the amnesty also noted that returned LRA sometimes misperceived their 
certificate as a permanent waiver of all accountability.
533
  
 
A few people appeared strongly convinced that, where possible, LRA, including 
higher commanders, should reconcile with their victims through traditional processes 
immediately upon their return. Those that strongly supported the use of traditional 
rituals to reconcile former high LRA with Acholi communities tended to hold a 
leadership position, whether traditional, Governmental or in an NGO. Most 
commonly, people referred to Mato Oput or Nyono Tonggweno. An LC3 I 
interviewed responded for instance,  
We feel that if any court of this world arrests Kony it will not heal the loss of 
life in this community. But you know Mato Oput, you have to come and 
apologize before the community. It means apology. So we believe Mato Oput is 
the only solution for this problem here.
534
  
 
One woman I spoke with contended,  “I am appealing to the LRA leaders, if it is 
possible, come back home to stay with your people…so we eat together in harmony.”  
 In conclusion, she noted that “courts provoke people…and they can just want more 
revenge.” 535Such views reflected the idea that lasting peace would only be finally 
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secured when the LRA commanders returned and were reconciled with their 
communities.  
 
Another common perspective was that while reconciliation with the LRA might be 
desirable to provide final resolution, in practice it was unlikely to work. Even those 
who professed to favor traditional reconciliation in theory recalled the communal 
tension with former commanders such as Brigadier Banya, and concluded that Kony 
and other leaders would never be truly accepted and forgiven in the Acholi district. 
Another woman also expressed the opinion that “The ICC, they do a lot of analysis, 
but with the Mato Oput it is direct. I feel that the ICC shouldn‟t be there- what should 
be there is Mato Oput, reconciliation between the Government and the LRA.” But 
again, she recognized that this outcome was unlikely: “Dealing with Kony is not easy. 
During the dry season he may say let us reconcile. Then during the wet season when 
the grass is tall he will disappear.” 
 
In favor of Criminal Accountability for the LRA 
 
In contrast to those who favored reintegration, many people that I talked to were 
adamant that high LRA commanders should face criminal accountability. One male 
elder put it particularly bluntly:  
They [the higher commanders] are the ones that destroyed Uganda, they killed 
and pillaged. They should be arrested and taken to court. Amnesty is a sign that 
people have forgiven what you have done. People like Kony should not get 
amnesty. We should accept back the lower LRA because they are our children. 
But people like Banya should be taken to prison! He did so much atrocity! 
536
 
 
Similarly, a young man formerly abducted who experienced Cen and sought personal 
spiritual conciliation, believed that for some members of the LRA, the formal court 
system was most appropriate:  
Those people should be given punishment according to a court judgment, and if 
they find they have done wrong, they should be jailed. If Kony came back, 
people would not accept him easily. The Government should keep them in an 
isolated place.
 537
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While it is difficult to determine conclusively how widespread such views were, as 
Allen found it certainly appears that a significant number of people believe that it is 
preferable for the higher commanding LRA to face a criminal trial. It is notable 
however, that numerous people believed reconciliation and formal retribution were 
not mutually exclusive. Several people specifically emphasized that Kony and other 
leaders could return to Northern Uganda and reconcile after facing trial in either 
Kampala or The Hague.  
 
United Voices: Accountability for State Actors 
 
Local opinion regarding appropriate measures for state actors (particularly UPDF) 
who perpetrated atrocity in the north appeared unified and adamant: state actors 
should be held accountable. In Pham et al‟s 2010 survey, when asked to name the 
group that they wanted most to see held accountable for violence during the conflict, 
64% responded Government actors, 19% mentioned LRA leadership, and only 5% 
mentioned all of the LRA.
538
 Most people I spoke to drew attention to UPDF soldiers 
rather than non-military state actors, likely because direct, tangible violence was 
experienced at the hands of such soldiers. An LC3 emphasized:   
Both the Government and LRA made that atrocity of killing people…. Many 
lives were lost to the UPDF, and many people were raped by the UPDF, but 
nothing has been done against these people. They should be punished.
539
 
 
A young man similarly stated: “The people who should be punished are these big 
people in the UPDF. I was in Pader- and it was the UPDF that were hurting us.”  
Overall, it appeared that the issue of accountability for UPDF and other state actors 
was much more straightforward than the question of how to deal with LRA.  
 
I also found that many people in the Acholi district attributed much general 
responsibility for the sufferings of the war to Musveni‟s regime. In addition to the 
widespread calls for the Government to provide recognition and apology, many 
people I spoke to affirmed that a truth telling process could help to hold the 
Government accountable. However, I also found that many people were skeptical that 
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the Government would engage in a truth telling process with integrity. One woman 
affirmed that  
It is very important, truth telling should be there…but I don‟t see whether the 
Government will accept this truth telling. If we are to form a truth telling 
commission…the president has said we are returning all your cattle, but even up 
to now there is nothing, not even that is done! 
540
 
 
It was also apparent that most people believed that truth telling only was not 
sufficient: many people were adamant that any truth telling process would lack 
meaning if tangible benefit did not follow. One local council leader emphasized for 
instance, “Truth telling alone, without follow up, that will cause us problems. If there 
is a follow up team then there would be compensation.”541 Indirect justice is only 
viewed as meaningful if it is accompanied by tangible social and economic change. 
Measures such as formal accountability, symbolic national reconciliation, and truth 
telling must ultimately lead to embedded justice.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the diverse approaches towards justice of northern Acholis in 
the wake of war. While much of the literature on local justice has framed the debate 
between traditional and international justice, restorative or retributive justice, I found 
that most locals were primarily concerned with „embedded justice.‟ Overwhelmingly, 
people were focused on „justice‟ that directly and tangibly affects their everyday lives.  
 
First and foremost, people prioritize socio-economic issues such as the (re) 
development of key infrastructure and social services, restoration of livelihood and 
education opportunities, access to land, and targeted reparations. While many scholars 
excluded such issues from the scope of justice, I argued that socio-economic recovery 
is a critical justice issue. Not only is it prioritized by Acholi people; socioeconomic 
development is considered a key way in which the Government can be held 
accountable for its failings during the war, and actively demonstrate a transformed 
approach to the north. Unequivocally, if the concept of „transitional justice‟ is to be 
meaningful to those affected by war, it must encompass the concept of socio-
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economic justice.  
 
Another aspect of „embedded justice‟ involves local approaches to dealing with the 
social and spiritual implications of abduction and violence. As I have shown, 
traditional beliefs and mechanisms often play an important role in the way that locals 
seek remedy for the traumas and social dislocation of war. However, traditional 
practices are hampered not only by a degree of cultural decline, but also neglect and 
abuse by traditional leaders. While many locals genuinely subscribe to „Acholi 
cosmology,‟ the rise of traditional leadership is to an extent associated with male 
elders‟ bid for increased authority. Ultimately, the struggle for constructive, inclusive 
and flexible local mechanisms for social and spiritual renewal and a representative, 
engaged leadership must take place at the local level. The inevitable involvement of 
local civil society groups, domestic research NGOs, international donors and national 
transitional justice policy makers however, should be geared towards nurturing this 
development while remaining alert to the risk of power abuse. 
 
I have shown that for most war-affected communities, „indirect‟ justice is a lower 
priority, although still important. While some believe that the leaders should return 
and be reconciled to both Northern Ugandans and the Government in order to secure 
lasting peace, others are adamant that commanders must face criminal trial. Still 
others prefer reconciliation in theory but believe it to be impossible, while others view 
that local reconciliation rituals could follow criminal trial and punishment. Regarding 
accountability for UPDF however, Acholi seem united in their desire for perpetrators 
to face trial and imprisonment. Many locals also view the Government as bearing 
wider responsibility for the afflictions and losses of the war, and affirmed that truth 
telling and apology was appropriate. However, if such measures are to be truly 
meaningful, they must lead to forms of embedded justice.   
 
To a certain extent, therefore, the radical agreements made at Juba do address critical 
justice priorities of local communities. In the following chapter, I explore the 
development of national transitional justice mechanisms in Uganda. I assess the 
extent to which different actors involved in the struggle for transition represent local 
perspectives, and the degree to which the national approach reflects the priorities of 
northern communities.  
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Chapter 5: The Global Struggle for Transitional Justice in 
Uganda 
 
Introduction 
 
In Kampala, August 2010, in a spacious, well-air conditioned room within the 
International Crimes Division (ICD) a select group of leaders involved in the Justice 
Law and Order Sector (JLOS) Transitional Justice Working Group earnestly 
discussed the needs of the new court in preparation for the first trial of a former LRA 
commander, Thomas Kwoyelo.
542
 The conversation moved rapidly, traversing 
numerous pressing topics:  
 
We will require a library of relevant books, electronic subscriptions, and also 
materials from the ICC, the ICTY and ICTR to see how each statement has been 
interpreted…. 
 
What progress has been made regarding the drafting of the legal notice and 
rules of procedure? We cannot hear any trial until these are in place! 
 
What is the status of the furniture? Is it true that JLOS gave us $200 million 
[Ugandan Shillings]? We need recommendations on screens, benches…Filing 
cupboards were bought, but they were substandard. Her Lady Justice refused 
them!
543
 
 
It is clear that while funding is a complex issue, donor support for the remaining 
preparations has been forthcoming. One actor present exclaimed that they were 
inundated with offers to assist the court.  
 
As the meeting concluded, the donor coordinator for transitional justice emphasized 
that although there were many pressing issues, they needed to prioritize. My thoughts 
wandered to my conversations outside grass-thatched huts under blue skies in Paicho, 
Acholi region, only days ago. For most people, the most pressing issues after the war 
were education, healthcare, and access to land. Their priorities were compensation 
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for stolen cattle, repair of neighborly relations, and assurance that the Government 
would fully integrate them into the political and economic life of Uganda.
544
 The 
sincere, diligent work of the JLOS transitional justice technocrats in Kampala to 
establish an internationally reputable ICD seemed largely beside the point.  
  
In mid 2008, JLOS established the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) to 
“study, research, design,” and ultimately implement, the various processes and 
mechanisms outlined in the Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation 
(AAR).
545
 After the final collapse of the peace process in November 2008, the 
unsigned Juba agreements continued to provide the framework for a transitional 
justice program in Uganda. Two years later, however, when I conducted fieldwork in 
Kampala, JLOS Government actors had focused primarily on the development of the 
international crimes division that would exclusively try non-state perpetrators. As the 
staff of the ICD hurriedly prepared for the trial of Kwoyelo, the traditional justice, 
truth telling and reparations subcommittees of the transitional justice working groups 
were unable to make substantial progress. While the Peace Recovery and 
Development Program (PRDP) for Northern Uganda had been implemented, it was 
yet to make a significant impact.    
 
This chapter maps the „political ecology‟ of the development of a national approach to 
transitional justice in Uganda. I draw primarily on my own experience and 
observations from working with the local transitional justice group NUTJWG, as well 
as interviews with a range of actors involved in the transitional justice scene in 
Uganda. The development of transitional justice in Uganda is characterized by 
ongoing struggle involving actors at all levels. Power, however, is concentrated in the 
hands of the state. Despite the efforts of various actors, there is a high risk that 
Uganda‟s transitional justice policy will constitute an empty performance of „victor‟s 
justice‟ that lacks meaning for war-affected communities and fails to address 
underlying socioeconomic dynamics of the war. Throughout my analysis, I emphasize 
that international, domestic and local actors play varying, sometimes contradictory 
roles in the struggle for transition. Different Government actors, civil society groups 
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and international actors either critically challenge or inadvertently justify the 
Government‟s dominant narrative of the war and convenience-driven approach to 
transitional justice. I demonstrate that civil society actors use „transitional justice‟ as a 
language of resistance, pressing the Government to engage in „transition‟ in the 
absence of meaningful change after the war. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, I demonstrate that the 
development of transitional justice policy reflects the political interests of Museveni‟s 
regime, and the predominance of state power. The second section examines the 
impact of international actors that directly shape the Government‟s approach to 
transitional justice.  I argue that the ICC‟s intervention continues to lend international 
support to the Government‟s narrow, one-sided justice agenda, and has inadvertently 
provided incentive to prioritize formal justice. In addition, foreign donors have largely 
failed to maintain sufficient pressure to compel the Government to genuinely 
implement the radical agreements signed. In the third section, I explore the role of 
„global‟ civil society actors involved in transitional justice in Uganda, highlighting 
that „international‟ actors, ideas, and finance are inextricably embedded in the 
national and local civil society landscape. I argue that the efforts of groups to draw on 
transitional justice as a political language of resistance are often in tension with the 
actions and inactions of other civil society players. The last section examines the 
failure of actors at all levels to clearly include socioeconomic justice and development 
in the scope of the transitional justice.  I contend that the omission of long-term socio-
economic development severely weakens the capacity of „transitional justice‟ as a 
radical tool of resistance in Uganda.  
Development of Transitional Justice: The Primacy of Sovereign Power 
The Approach of the Ugandan Government to Transitional Justice 
 
In contrast to many other cases around the world, the struggle for transitional justice 
in the wake of the northern conflict takes place in the absence of political transition.  
As a local Gulu-based transitional justice NGO worker put it, “it is the same 
Government in power that has been accused of so much atrocity over the years.”546 
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The landscape of transitional justice in Uganda is therefore characterized by a 
growing collection of actors at the local, national and international level who strive to 
engage a largely unwilling regime in the project of postwar justice. 
 
As demonstrated in chapter three, plans for a national transitional justice program 
emerged during the Juba peace talks. In response to agreements signed in Juba, the 
JLOS TJWG was established, which comprises of four subcommittees to address 
formal justice, truth telling and national reconciliation, traditional justice, and 
integration and budgeting.
547
 In mid 2008 the key actors congregated at the 3
rd
 
National JLOS forum on Transitional Justice appeared determined to 
comprehensively implement the policies specified in the AAR.
548
 The outcome policy 
document affirmed that the Government would work towards “a legitimate system 
that is tailor made for the Ugandan context, which is diagnostic of the underlying 
causes of the conflict.”549 The TJWG ambitiously committed to “regularly consult 
with stakeholders,” and to complete a “report with concrete proposals on an 
integrated, coherent and robust transitional justice system for Uganda” within four 
months to be presented to a steering committee before being tabled in Cabinet.
550
 In 
the context of significant international pressure conclude the Juba peace process, 
JLOS actors appeared confident of the Government‟s will to instigate even politically 
costly mechanisms such as truth telling and reparations processes.
551
 
 
Following the collapse of the Juba process however, while many technical JLOS 
actors remain committed, the political will of Musveni‟s regime to engage in many 
aspects of transitional justice has increasingly dissolved. Certainly, the „Government‟ 
                                                 
547
 See „Report of the Third National JLOS Forum‟   
548
 Ibid the forum was designed to kick-start planning and preparation of a transitional justice 
framework. It involved 100 participants, including key Government and Judicial representatives, civil 
society stakeholders and donors. 
549
 Ibid  
550
 Government of Uganda, „Supplement for the Report on the Third National JLOS Forum, 
Developing and Managing an Effective Transitional Justice System,‟ Justice Law and Order Sector, 
Kampala, 2008 www.jlos.go.ug/uploads/Supplement%20for%20the%203rd%20Forum.pdf) [Accessed 
12 August 2011], p.4 
551
 A policy briefing that emerged following the forum noted: “The truth telling processes should 
include reparations in terms of compensation, restitution and rehabilitation for victims for it to be 
credible and effective.” See Government of Uganda, Policy Issues from the Third National JLOS 
Forum, „Developing and Managing an Effective Transitional Justice System,‟ Justice Law and Order 
Sector, Kampala, 2008 www.jlos.go.ug/uploads/Policy%20Issues%20from%203rd%20Forum.pdf 
[Accessed 13 August 2011]  
 
140 
 
itself is not a unified actor. There are many individuals within the Government at the 
judicial and technical level that continue to sincerely pursue the development of 
transitional justice policy.
552
 Some individuals, notably the Principle Judge of the 
High Court (also the head of the TJWG), have become prominent advocates for a 
national truth and reconciliation process.
553
 However, is it is clear that in the absence 
of international pressure to reach a final peace agreement, senior actors in 
Government are largely disinterested in „transition,‟ and are only willing to 
implement post war justice mechanisms in a manner that suits the regime‟s political 
interests. Accordingly, sympathetic technical and judicial Government actors in 
Uganda must work within the political constraints of Museveni‟s regime. JLOS actors 
I spoke to expressed skepticism that future policies they developed would be 
implemented without political interference, or even enacted at all.
554
 
 
The Empty Performance Formal Criminal Justice  
 
The trajectory of national transitional justice in Uganda therefore reflects the political 
interests of Museveni‟s regime. In mid 2010 when I conducted my fieldwork, the 
Government continued to focus almost exclusively on the development of formal 
justice mechanisms. Numerous steps had been taken to prepare the new ICD of the 
High Court for trial. Modeled on international criminal tribunals, the ICD 
incorporates a panel of four judges and a registry, while special units for war crimes 
have also been created in the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Police, 
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and Prisons.
555
 Numerous special training 
sessions in international criminal legal practice and „study tours‟ have been 
undertaken for involved actors, while regional consultations were conducted in 2009 
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to survey the views of civil society actors on various aspects of the ICD and 
legislation domesticating the Rome Statute.
556
 At the time of writing, the trial of the 
ICD‟s sole LRA suspect, former commander Thomas Kwoyelo, was scheduled to 
commence in July 2011. 
 
Despite the apparent good will of involved technical and judicial actors, it is highly 
unlikely that the ICD will address the crimes of state actors during the northern 
conflict. While the new court has legal jurisdiction over state actors, and judicial 
staffs earnestly advocate impartiality,
557
 most JLOS and civil society actors I spoke to 
recognized that Museveni‟s regime was unlikely to allow investigation and trial of 
state actors.
558
 Given the heavy constraints of Museveni‟s regime, actors in the army, 
the police and DPP are unlikely to investigate state actors, simply because “have no 
incentive to enter into this highly politically arena without external pressure.” 559 As 
one JLOS actor confided, “There would be fear by…people in the DPP that they 
might be putting themselves out of a job” if they were to investigate state actors.560 In 
all likelihood cases against UPDF soldiers will be dealt with in the martial court away 
from public scrutiny, while non-military state actors will elude investigation of their 
actions during the war altogether.
 561
   
 
The Government‟s focus on criminal justice is evidently driven by political 
convenience. Initially, as discussed in chapter three, JLOS‟s propulsion of formal 
justice ahead of other mechanisms stemmed from the need to rapidly create a 
domestic alternative to the ICC in order to secure a peace deal. Since the collapse of 
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the Juba peace talks however, it has grown improbable that Kony will reengage in 
negotiations. Most JLOS actors contend that it is unlikely Uganda will challenge the 
ICC‟s admissibility, and that the ICD will instead focus on trying LRA commanders 
other than those indicted by the international Court.
562
Uganda‟s continued exclusive 
focus on the development of the ICD to try LRA simply reflects a politically 
expedient strategy for the Government to demonstrate to onlookers that effort is being 
made to bring about „justice‟ for the northern conflict.563 While mechanisms such as 
truth telling and reparations put the Government at risk of public scrutiny, preparation 
for the criminal trial of Kwoyelo serves the Government‟s interest in focusing 
international attention exclusively on the crimes of the LRA.  
 
It is uncertain however, that the ICD will effectively and efficiently achieve criminal 
accountability for the LRA. In mid 2010, many JLOS actors felt that progress towards 
postwar criminal justice was plagued by ongoing contradictions between the ICD and 
the Amnesty Act, and the sheer inaccessibility of the LRA. Despite the amendment of 
the Amnesty act in 2006, the Amnesty effectively remains blanket, extending to all 
former rebels that denounce rebellion.
564
 From the point of view of many ICD actors, 
the Amnesty threatens to undermine their work. As the head of the war crimes unit of 
the DPP succinctly put it, “the issue is, we don‟t have the suspects…some are still in 
Garamba or elsewhere, some have received Amnesty, and some will still get Amnesty 
while we are investigating.”565 She went on to contend with frustration that in 2010, 
several high ranking LRA received Amnesty that the DPP believed should have faced 
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the ICD.
566
 In 2010, the DPP certainly anticipated that the Amnesty Act would not 
hinder the prosecution of Kwoyelo under the Geneva conventions, as “international 
criminal law does not recognize domestic Amnesty.”567 However, as actors in the 
Amnesty Commission are quick to point out, Kwoyelo‟s exclusion from Amnesty 
appears to be an arbitrary exception to current domestic law. 
568
  
 
Ironically, failure to resolve the blatant legal contradictions between the ICD, the 
newly passed ICC act, and the Amnesty Act reflects the continued vested political 
interests of various state actors. The UPDF, for instance, have integrated returned 
LRA into their ranks and to use the insiders‟ knowledge to locate LRA “hiding 
places.”569 It appears that political Government actors also maintain interest in 
allowing LRA commanders to receive Amnesty. In the past, returned LRA have acted 
as witnesses against opposition MPs from the Acholi region, implicating them in LRA 
operations.
570
 As a northern-based lawyer commented, even while the Government 
needs to justify the establishment of the ICD by holding trials, it is also highly 
convenient to induce returning commanders who have received Amnesty to implicate 
key political opponents.
571
  
 
Overall, the development of criminal justice processes in Uganda amounts to an 
expensive and largely empty performance of justice. Given that the ICD is no longer 
pivotal to prop up the failed Juba peace negotiations, the utility of the new court is 
questionable. The ongoing conflict between the Amnesty Act and the ICD, and the 
absence of many LRA from Uganda renders it unlikely that the ICD will hold many 
trials related to the northern conflict. Several JLOS actors I spoke to questioned 
whether such heavy investment in the new division and investigation of LRA is a 
waste of scarce resources.
572
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Government Resistance to Non-formal Transitional Justice Mechanisms  
 
In mid 2010, while the staff of the ICD selected furniture and recording equipment in 
preparation for their first trial, members of the TJWG truth telling and reparations and 
traditional justice subcommittees continued with their regular jobs, awaiting the 
opportunity to conduct regional consultations to inform their preliminary policy 
making.
 573
While the long-delayed consultations were eventually conducted in June 
2010, it remains uncertain whether Museveni‟s regime will allow any policies 
subsequently developed to be implemented without political interference.
574
  
 
Certainly, lack of progress in development of a national approach to traditional justice 
does not appear to stem from resistance from Government officials. Rather, the delay 
of traditional justice consultations reflects the sheer complexity of the issue, and 
disagreements between donors and state actors. Generally, I found that Government 
officials were quick to refer to traditional justice mechanisms as an appropriate way to 
deal with the aftermath of war. When I asked one official about the possibility of the 
establishment of a reparations program, he repudiated the guilt of the Government and 
declared defensively (and somewhat inexplicably) that “reconciliation through Mato 
Oput is an agreed upon method!”575 As stated in the previous chapter, the notion of 
local reconciliation through traditional mechanisms complements the Government‟s 
portrayal of the northern war as a local affair.   
 
In mid-2010, JLOS actors had drawn extensively on existing research to inform their 
preliminary analysis of the possible role that traditional justice might play in a 
national transitional justice scheme. While I encountered numerous varied views, 
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JLOS actors appeared generally convinced that traditional practices could lose their 
meaning and usefulness if they are forced into a rigid national straight jacket and 
imposed from above.
576
 JLOS policy makers were also conscious of the criticisms and 
debates surrounding the possible „uses‟ of traditional justice, the need to ensure 
traditional practices did not breach human rights, the possible pitfalls of codification 
and the need for local ownership.
577
 A policy decision however, awaited further 
analysis of regional consultations. 
 
It became clear during my fieldwork in Kampala in 2010, however, that senior 
Government actors were either disinterested or hostile towards the application of truth 
telling and reparations. In interviews, such actors openly denied the need for such 
transitional justice polices.
578
 As one senior JLOS actor contended regarding a truth 
telling process:  
 Many people have been discussing it, but it seems some people do not yet agree 
to the idea of truth telling- people higher up. Once you go into truth telling it 
opens a lot of other things you may not want brought out into the open.
579
 
 
Although the Government has undertaken a number of ad hoc compensation 
„initiatives‟ for northern victims, such measures do not amount to an adequate 
reparations scheme.
580
 Rather, such piecemeal acts largely reflect politically driven 
attempts to pacify communities in the build-up to national elections.
581
 While many 
technical JLOS staff affirmed the need for a comprehensively planned reparation 
program that included acknowledgement, Government actors clearly resist the idea.
582
 
An official at Okello house stated that reparations with apology were inappropriate 
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because they “indicate some kind of guilt…[when] the war was imposed upon the 
Ugandan Government by the rebels!”583 While JLOS consultations and policy 
development slowly progress, it is uncertain and furthermore unlikely in the current 
political climate that proposed mechanisms will be implemented with genuine good 
will from the Government.  
 
As yet, the development of transitional justice in Uganda simply reflects the political 
interests of Museveni‟s regime. While policy is still unfolding, there is clearly a high 
risk that transitional justice in Uganda will constitute an empty performance of 
„victor‟s justice‟ exclusively focused on the trial of the LRA. Certainly, the 
Government is not a homogenous unit. Public servants and policy analysts from 
within Government support policies that would challenge the Government‟s narrative 
of the northern war. However, given the political resistance of Museveni‟s regime, the 
capacity of such actors to push for change is limited.  
 
The Diverse Impact of International Actors 
Just as international actors were deeply involved in the northern conflict and 
Uganda‟s fraught emergence from war, a diverse range of international players 
continue to influence the struggle for transitional justice in Uganda.
 
In addition to the 
ICC, a plethora of international actors shape the postwar terrain, including 
international NGOs and agencies, the Government‟s „development partners,‟ and the 
foreign donors of domestic NGOs (whether private or state). This section examines 
the more direct impact of the ICC and the state‟s development partners on the 
trajectory of transitional justice. The following section goes on to explore the role that 
international actors and institutions play within Uganda‟s „global‟ civil society 
landscape.  
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The Ongoing Impact of the ICC Intervention   
 
Firstly, the ICC‟s intervention continues to provide a cloak of legitimacy for the 
Government‟s narrative of the war and the regime‟s lack of genuine engagement with 
transitional justice beyond the criminal trial of the LRA. As discussed at length in 
Chapter Three, the ICC‟s intervention facilitated the narrowing of violence discourse 
in Uganda to physical violence, rather than structural, systemic injustice. In the 
absence of ICC proceedings against any state actors, no pressure emerged for Uganda 
to investigate the role of UPDF or other state actors in the northern war and hold them 
accountable. The ongoing role of the ICC is evident in the rhetoric of Museveni‟s 
regime. Ugandan political actors continue to emphasize that the ICC has „cleared‟ 
high-ranking UPDF and other state figures, vindicating them from domestic criminal 
accountability. Recently for instance, the army drew on the absence of ICC 
proceedings against state actors to quash accusations levied at the UPDF‟s conduct 
during the war.
584
 A Government official I spoke to similarly declared:  
 At the [ICC] Review Conference, [political opponent] Otunno insinuated that 
Government was guilty during the war. But it was Kony who was indicted by 
the ICC for crimes against humanity, not people from the Government, not the 
UPDF. Not always being able to protect civilians in context of war is not a 
crime against humanity.” 585 
 
By effectively validating the Government‟s narrative of the war, the ICC also acts to 
justify Uganda‟s disengagement with the concept of „transition.‟   
 
In a broader sense, the ICC continues to provide incentive for Uganda to focus on the 
development of criminal justice mechanisms. As explored in Chapter Three, the 
impact of the ICC on the Juba Peace process was to propel the trajectory of 
transitional justice towards rapid establishment of the ICD, in order to encourage the 
LRA to sign the FPA. Even after the conclusive collapse of negotiations, the ICC 
continues to inadvertently spur Uganda to prioritize formal justice. No doubt aware of 
the potential to gain international prestige, Uganda successfully bid to host the first 
Review Conference of the ICC in May 2010. 
586
 In order to host the Review 
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Conference, the Ugandan Government was obliged to accelerate the passing of 
legislation that domesticated the Rome Statute in national law.
587
 For many years, 
various versions of the „ICC Bill‟ had stalled in Parliament, partly due to fear that 
enacting the bill into law would further interfere with peace processes. However, as a 
JLOS actor commented, “the commitment to have the bill passed before they hosted 
the Review” proved a driving force.588 In 2010 the Act was intensively revised by the 
Legal and Parliamentary council and rapidly passed into law with the President‟s 
signature in the months immediately preceding the conference.
589
 The ICC‟s 
intervention remains a strong influence shaping Uganda‟s priorities.  
 
Uganda‟s continued focus on establishing the ICD evidently reflects a bid to boost 
international support. This was particularly evident at the ICC Review Conference 
itself, where Uganda showcased its development of the ICD before an international 
audience. In the plenary hall of the Review Conference, the head judge of the ICD, 
Akiki Kizza, proclaimed that the new Ugandan court would extend the reach of 
international justice in Uganda and complement the ICC, trying actors other than 
those already indicted by the international Court.
590
At a well-attended „side event,‟ 
the staff of Uganda‟s new ICD performed a mock international trial, exemplifying 
Uganda‟s awareness of the standards of international criminal law and ability to 
replicate the procedures of the ICC.
591
 Uganda‟s establishment of the ICD was 
celebrated at the Review Conference as a successful example of positive 
complementarity, and an exemplar of a state party joining the global „fight against 
impunity.‟592 The Review Conference, awash with potential international funders 
wishing to support the work of the ICC, is likely to have been considered a ripe arena 
in which to capitalize on the development of formal justice processes in Uganda. 
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Finally, the ICC‟s mark on the postwar landscape in Uganda has been to continually 
drive Uganda to imitate the standards of international criminal justice.
593
 Beyond the 
escalating financial costs involved in establishing a new division of the High Court, 
ironically, the pursuit of international justice may unnecessarily complicate the trials 
performed in the ICD. In particular, the decision of JLOS actors to apply international 
rather than domestic law may create legal hurdles for the Prosecution. While it was 
initially proposed that the ICD apply the Ugandan Penal code, JLOS actors discarded 
this option because they deemed it necessary to charge suspects in terms that reflect 
the severity of the crimes specified in the Rome Statute.
594
 After great deliberation, 
JLOS actors decided that the ICD would apply the Geneva conventions.
595
 A major 
problem that could complicate the trial of Kwoyelo is that the Geneva Conventions 
are only applicable to crimes committed in the context of an international armed 
conflict.  JLOS actors I spoke to were not confident that the northern war could be 
successfully categorized as an international conflict in court.
596
 Ironically then, the 
ambitions of JLOS actors to replicate international standards could inhibit the 
successful prosecution of LRA.
 
 
 
The Role of Uganda‟s International Development Partners  
 
The international donor partners of the Ugandan Government also play an important 
role in shaping the trajectory of national transitional justice processes. Transitional 
justice policy in Uganda is determined through a process of negotiation between 
donors („development partners‟), JLOS TJWG actors, and the higher political actors 
in Government.
597
 The funding for the development of transitional justice is primarily 
external, drawing on the contributions of range of development partners, including 
Denmark (DANIDA), the United States (USAID), Sweden, Finland, Ireland and the 
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Netherlands.
598
 While a project rejected by the political ranks of the Ugandan 
Government is unlikely to go ahead, donor partners maintain significant influence and 
retain the power to exert significant sway in decision-making processes.  
 
The relationship between the Ugandan Government and its donor‟s partners is 
inevitably shaped by wider trends in international community. While the critical 
international attention on Northern Uganda that surfaced in 2003 has certainly not 
evaporated, it is clear that following the return of relative peace and stability, many 
international players have become increasingly complacent regarding the 
Government‟s approach to the north. For the most part, the flurry of critical outcries 
and international reports on Northern Uganda that reached a climax in 2005 have 
since subsided.
599
 The U.S, a long-time major donor to the Ugandan Government 
emphasizes on its current State Department „Uganda profile,‟ for instance, that the 
“vast majority” of former IDP‟s have returned home, and that the PRDP “has helped 
communities in Northern Uganda rebuild and recover from the 20-year humanitarian 
catastrophe caused by the LRA.”600 Somewhat understandably, given the marked 
security improvements in the North, critical international pressure on the Ugandan 
Government has waned.  
 
Against this backdrop, donors involved in the development of national transitional 
justice have so far failed to apply sufficient pressure on the Ugandan Government to 
stay true to the spirit of the Juba agreements. From a very early stage, a host of donor 
partners offered to fund the development of postwar criminal justice.
601
 Unlike other 
justice processes, criminal justice provides donors with a straightforward project to 
support: the requirements of the ICD are relatively clear, and political resistance has 
                                                 
598
 Ibid  
599
 For instance, Human Rights Watch, which contributed to raising critical awareness about the 
Northern Ugandan situation in 2005, has since drawn less attention to ongoing postwar recovery and 
reconciliation issues. For various reports, see http://www.hrw.org/africa/uganda [Accessed 12 August 
2011]. Amnesty International‟s most recent report on Uganda, furthermore, includes no reference to the 
socio-economic plight of Northern Uganda or lack of meaningful engagement in transition, rather 
focusing exclusively on issues such as discrimination against homosexuals and election malpractice. 
See Amnesty International, Annual Report: Uganda 2011 (Amnesty International, 2011)  
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-uganda-2011 [Accessed 13 August 2011]  
600
 U.S Department of State, „Uganda Profile‟ http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm [Accessed 12 
August]  
601
 Author‟s interview with a senior donor representative in the Justice Law and Order Sector 
(Kampala, August 2010): The United State, for instance, offered to support the process of developing 
the ICC act and various aspects of the establishment of the ICD, while DUNEDA supported fact-
finding missions to The Hague  
151 
 
not proven to be a major obstacle.
602
 For the U.S, funding the development of the ICD 
was possibly viewed as an attractive way to support the idea of domestic jurisdiction 
as a viable alternative to the ICC. It is certainly important to note that different donor 
agencies have diverse views and agendas, and pursue varied approaches.
603
 As yet 
however, foreign donors that provide support to the Ugandan Government‟s 
transitional justice process have proven insufficiently critical. In 2010, numerous 
donors continued to provide extensive support to the ICD without requiring that the 
court also investigate and prosecute state actors. While certainly aware that one-sided 
criminal accountability could be detrimental to national reconciliation, Uganda‟s 
donor partners have mostly adopted the approach that “it is better to support partial 
justice for atrocity…than no justice at all.”604 Effectively, the donor community has 
facilitated Uganda‟s enactment of victor‟s justice through the ICD.  
 
Donor‟s interface with JLOS actors on the development of other transitional justice 
processes has been more critical. In fact, progress on the development of truth telling, 
reparations and traditional justice mechanisms initially stagnated due to 
disagreements between the Government and donor partners. Accordingly, regional 
consultations on non-formal mechanisms that were initially scheduled to take place in 
2008 did not take place until June 2011.
 
Essentially, donors lacked confidence that the 
Government would undertake consultations on truth telling and reparations 
inclusively and with impartiality. As a senior donor agent emphasized, “...truth telling 
and reparations issues are politically sensitive.” While the “Government wanted 
control over the process,” donors were concerned “about making sure the 
consultations are really broad and transparent.”605 Regarding traditional justice, the 
delay of consultations reflected difference in preferred research approach between 
donors and JLOS actors. While JLOS actors initially sought to „study‟ and document 
the practice of various traditional justice mechanisms, donors favored an approach 
that allowed locals to express their own views about how traditional practices should 
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best be used.
606
 Despite such critical input, donor‟s support to Uganda‟s criminal 
justice process has continued in spite of the Government‟s reluctance to engage with 
the politically sensitive aspects of transitional justice.  
 
Overall then, the Government‟s development partners and the ICC have largely failed 
to challenge the Ugandan Government‟s narrative of the war, despite the critical input 
of particular donor groupings. To differing extents, such international actors have 
facilitated the Government‟s pursuit of narrow, „victor‟s justice.‟ Below however, I 
illustrate that international actors play a more varied role through active participation 
in the „global‟ civil society scene engaged in transitional justice in Uganda. Often, the 
same donors that fund the Government also fund critical civil society groups.  
 
Global Civil Society: The Struggle for Transitional Justice  
Since 2004 a small number of critical international and domestic civil society 
organizations and networks based in both Kampala and Northern Uganda have 
emerged that champion the project of transitional justice in Uganda. Asides from 
groups that specifically advocate for transitional justice, however, a number of other 
Kampala-based groups have been more narrowly involved in supporting the 
development of postwar international criminal justice. As I explore below, while 
groups that specifically advocate for transitional justice take diverse approaches, they 
share a critical common characteristic. Unlike many „civil society‟ organizations in 
Uganda, transitional justice groups are critically engaged in national policy, and aim 
to affect political change. Transitional justice is used as a language of resistance to 
challenge dominant narratives of the war, and make demands from the Government in 
the absence of change.   
 
As increasingly recognized in scholarly literature, the civil society landscape often 
transcends the categories of local, national, and even international.
607
 In Uganda, 
while most organizations can at least be defined as either „international‟ or domestic, 
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in reality, many projects draw on the collaboration of actors at all levels. For instance, 
the Gulu-based Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) was originally founded by 
individuals from the Canadian Liu Institute for Global Studies and the local Gulu 
District NGO Forum, and currently receives its funding from the Norwegian 
Embassy.
608
 While mostly comprised of „local‟ staff from Gulu, JRP has recently 
been granted a nationwide mandate by Uganda‟s National NGO board.609 Another 
example is the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in Kampala. 
Currently headed by Michael Otim, a Northern Ugandan who also co-founded JRP, 
the ICTJ engages at both the national and local level.
 
 During my time working with 
the NUTJWG, for example, Michael Otim was actively involved in co-facilitating 
community transitional justice workshops across the north. Given the degree of 
overlap and collaboration between key actors and organizations involved at different 
levels, it is often impractical to tease out the distinct impacts of local, national and 
international civil society. In fact, some involved individuals may locate their identity 
in all three levels. A domestic civil society worker may for instance identify as 
Acholi, Ugandan, and also as a representative of a part of a broader global 
movement.
610
 Equally, I also found that individuals of international origin have come 
to identify themselves as part of the „local‟ civil society scene.611 Both personally and 
institutionally, civil society in Uganda is often best understood as „global.‟612 
 
Kampala-based Civil Society  
 
Undoubtedly, Kampala-based groups involved in transitional justice have so far 
proven most successful in cultivating direct working relationships with JLOS. As 
JLOS actors widely recognize, RLP, and its offshoot the Beyond Juba Project (BJP) 
have proven particularly influential.
613
 While RLP has maintained a constructive 
relationship with the TJWG, for instance providing numerous training operations, 
„study tours‟ and workshops for technical JLOS actors and parliamentarians on 
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transitional justice, it has also consistently pursued a highly critical approach.
614
 The 
research reports, policy briefings and press releases produced by RLP/BJP not only 
challenge the actions of state actors during the war, but also the trajectory of 
transitional justice in Uganda.
 
In a 2009 press release, for instance, RLP strongly 
condemned Uganda‟s apparent exclusive focus on formal criminal justice: “Can 
Uganda really afford to pass over all its victims, and their need to see past wrongs 
righted, in the interests of replicating the ICC model of prosecutorial justice?”615 
Another press release disparaged the „partial‟ justice of the ICC, and provocatively 
queried what “the Rome Statute [has] to say about punishments for those responsible 
for forcible displacement?”616 In addition to calling for a reparations scheme and 
accountability for state actors, the work of RLP and BJP has provided critical, in-
depth research on many relevant topics, including traditional justice, perspectives of 
urban IDPs, and gender issues.
617
   
 
The most tangible contribution of Kampala-based civil society to the development of 
transitional justice is the BJP‟s work in building momentum for the adoption of the 
draft National Reconciliation (NR) Bill.
618
 A „working draft‟ of the NR Bill was 
originally produced through the Coalition of Organizations for Reconciliation in 
Uganda (CORU), a short-lived umbrella group of civil society organizations 
committed to peace building.
619
 After CORU collapsed, the BJP continued to 
champion the project, and has successfully kept the draft under discussion within 
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JLOS.
620
 The draft NR Bill outlines the establishment of a National Reconciliation 
Forum (NRF) that provides a broad, integrated framework to address various 
reconciliation issues after the war. The proposed NRF is mandated to: 
Examine the causes, nature and extent of the legacy of violence underlying 
present day conflict; investigate and document human rights violations and 
abuses beginning in 1962; provide an opportunity for victims, perpetrators and 
witnesses to share their perspectives; facilitate reconciliation with assistance 
from existing institutions, including Amnesty commission, UHRC [Ugandan 
Human Rights Commission], Equal Opportunities Commission, alternative and 
traditional justice mechanisms, and ensure accountability for past violations.
621
 
 
Integrating these existing institutions, the proposed forum has the power to hold 
hearings, take statements and grant or deny amnesty dependent on a truthful 
disclosure of relevant facts. The forum could also recommend to the Government 
appropriate methods of implementing reparation and rehabilitation schemes.  
 
While the draft NR Bill still lacks clarity on a number of points, it continues to play a 
vital role in the development of a national transitional Justice program. As a recent 
appraisal of the proposed Bill by the Uganda Victims Foundation (UVF) points out, it 
is currently unclear that the forum would have power to “follow up on 
recommendations for prosecution,”  or ensure that other reforms proposed are actually 
implemented.
622
 Current weaknesses aside, the NR bill provides an alternative vision 
of transitional justice in Uganda. As Oola points out, given the “nature of the state in 
Uganda” the Government would be very unlikely to draft a bill that would act against 
its own interests.
 623
 CORU/RLP‟s initiative in drafting the NR Bill has provided a 
platform for JLOS actors to continue discussion of an independent truth telling 
process. Furthermore, it is clear that the NR Bill has helped to clarify particular 
technical issues for JLOS actors and has built significant support for a national 
reconciliation process from within Government.
 624
 At the national level, therefore, 
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the RLP and BJP in particular continue to strive to carve out critical space for counter 
narratives of the war to surface. Such groups demonstrate the capacity of civil society 
to challenge Government policy.
625
 
 
Not all Kampala-based civil society groups that engage in postwar justice however, 
provide a rigorous challenge to the Government‟s approach. A number of 
organizations, both national and international, focus their post-war justice advocacy 
almost exclusively on the development of international criminal justice. Groups such 
as the Ugandan Coalition for the International Criminal Court (UCICC), Human 
Rights Network Uganda (Hurinet-U) and No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) for 
instance, have campaigned for domestication of the Rome Statute, and worked to 
widen understanding about the ICC through local outreaches and build the capacity of 
the ICD through the provision of training opportunities.
626
 Certainly, such groups are 
not without critical input. UCICC and Hurinet actors for instance, emphasize that they 
have raised the issue of the ICC‟s lack of investigation of UPDF soldiers.627 However, 
such groups are principally concerned with improving the performance of 
international criminal justice in Uganda, such as the advancement of witness 
protection, rather than critically questioning and challenging the broader trajectory of 
post war „justice.‟628 Such efforts are ultimately orientated around the cause of 
international justice, rather than the justice priorities of local northerners. This reflects 
a wider tendency identified in the critical literature for „southern‟ based NGOs to 
share “stronger cultural affinities with global managers than with local 
communities.”629 In Uganda, the narrow focus of such groups can affirm the approach 
that „partial justice is better than no justice,‟ and ultimately fails to provide sufficient 
challenge to the Government‟s narrative of the war.   
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The exclusive focus of these organizations on international justice contradicts the 
agenda of groups that advocate broadly for transitional justice. On one hand the RLP 
has lobbied against the enactment of „partial‟ justice and the Ugandan Government‟s 
apparently exclusive focus on the trial of LRA in the ICD. Meanwhile groups such as 
the UICC narrowly concentrate their efforts on Uganda‟s domestication of 
international criminal justice. During my time in Kampala, I detected understandable 
tension between such groups. A member of one international-justice focused NGO 
contended, “For a long time we have had our differences with Refugee Law 
Project…. it is well known that they are anti Court…they criticize everything.” 630 
Kampala-based civil society is by no means united in approach to postwar justice. 
The struggle to engage the Ugandan Government clearly takes place within „civil 
society.‟631As I explore below, civil society groups based in Gulu also take diverse 
approaches to postwar justice and development. 
 
„Local‟ Gulu-based Civil Society  
 
Amongst a plethora of human rights, peace-building and development organizations, 
two key groups based in the Acholi region specifically define their key objectives in 
terms of transitional justice: the Justice and Reconciliation Project (JRP) and the 
Northern Ugandan Transitional Justice Working Group (NUTJWG).
632
JRP seek to 
directly engage local grassroots communities through a range of mechanisms 
including dialogues, research processes and community mobilization. In addition to 
performing local work, JRP lobbies the Government to implement transitional justice 
processes.
633
 NUTJWG operates as a loose coalition of over sixty northern civil 
society groups (both NGOs and CBOs) involved in postwar justice, recovery and 
reconciliation work, driven by a Gulu-based secretariat.
634
 In this section, I focus on 
the efforts of these two particular groups to build momentum for Uganda to engage in 
transitional justice, in the wider context of the local civil society landscape. As I 
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explore below, it is often hard to untangle „international‟ influences from local. 
International actors also play a significant role in shaping the local NGO „scene.‟ 
Many of the organizations operating in Gulu town are local branches of international 
NGOs, which employ local management and staff (such as CARE, Caritas, Save the 
Children, and World Vision), while foreign donors also provide the funding for a 
multitude of domestic NGOs and CBOs.  
 
Local civil society actors in Northern Uganda undoubtedly utilize the concept of 
transitional justice as a political discourse of resistance.
635
 While NUTJWG and JRP 
staffs are set apart from the grassroots communities they seek to work with by their 
advanced education and employment status, for the most part they are local 
northerners who also lived and suffered through the war. They strategically draw on 
the framework of transitional justice to shape to their understandings of the local 
communities‟ postwar justice needs. During an early conversation with Charles, the 
coordinator of NUTJWG‟s secretariat, I skeptically pondered whether the concept of 
transitional justice restricted our thinking about postwar recovery. Charles laughed, 
and responded that the transitional justice framework was simply a tool to be wielded 
as desired. He likened civil society to a swarm of ants, and the Government to an 
impenetrable elephant: the ants must coordinate strategically to make any impact. 
“It‟s a political game we are playing and the protagonist is the state. What is needed is 
a clear message. It‟s important to rally around common ground.” 636 Transitional 
justice, he insisted, provides a powerful discourse that is recognized nationally and 
internationally which could hold the Government accountable, and change their 
approach to the north. It allows local demands to be „translated‟ into the language of 
national policy.
637
 Transitional justice is utilized as a strategic, political language. 
 
 While it is difficult to quantify, it is clear that over the years NUTJWG and to a 
greater extent JRP, have played an important role in building momentum for 
transitional justice processes in Uganda. In 2009, NUTJWG (in collaboration with 
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ICTJ) hosted several high profile multi-day conferences on truth telling
638
 and 
reparations
639
 that drew together civil society workers from across northern regions. 
These conferences certainly generated wider civil society support for the development 
of these particular processes. Despite poor attendance from invited Government 
actors, the conference reports provide a rich resource that highlight areas of 
controversy (such as the relationship between truth-telling and formal justice), as well 
as key points of consensus amongst participants.
640
 Since the Juba peace talks, JRP 
has played a particularly active role in engaging the Government in transitional 
justice. In 2010, JRP ran a campaign to “to put Transitional Justice on the Election 
Agenda,” and directly engaged with JLOS officials following a series of community 
consultations across the north.
641
 JRP has also received increasing media coverage 
that has drawn national attention to local demands for transitional justice, particularly 
for reparations.
642
 Perhaps most significantly, JRP has steadily produced a wealth of 
local research, documentation, and policy statements on local communities‟ 
experiences of the war and their perspectives on justice issues.
643
 In this way, along 
with Kampala based groups such as RLP, local-based civil society groups have 
actively challenged the Government‟s narrative of the war, and demanded a response. 
It should be noted that international donors undoubtedly contribute to this process 
through financial support.
644
  
 
However, it is vital to recognize that the broader civil society scene operating in the 
local north can directly and indirectly work against the political efforts of such 
transitional justice groups. Essentially, the internationally sponsored „civil society‟ 
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scene in the Acholi region is overwhelmingly apolitical. This reflects much broader 
trends in the nature of civil society organizations in developing countries worldwide, 
as increasingly recognized in the critical literature.
645
 As Branch describes, the 
plethora of internationally-funded NGOs in Gulu town typically conform to the „new 
humanitarianism‟ mode of development that emerged in response to the failures of 
„traditional humanitarianism.‟646 Instead of simply focusing on provision of 
immediate relief and food aid, the „new humanitarianism‟ model adopts a „rights 
based‟ approach that engages in longer-term „peace building‟ activities such as 
„community reconciliation and development,‟ „human rights promotion‟ and „psycho-
social support.‟647 To a certain extent, this movement has become co-opted by the 
World Bank‟s agenda to absorb the negative effects of neo-liberal structural 
adjustment policies on poorer communities by promoting “grassroots development” 
mediated by NGOs.
648
 Essentially, this approach focuses exclusively on community 
level development and peace building, rather than striving for radical social reforms at 
the national level.
649
 
 
With some notable exceptions, civil society in Gulu town appears overwhelmingly 
shaped by this apolitical model of humanitarianism.
 650
 The majority of NGOs in Gulu 
are occupied with engineering community-level development and meeting donor 
requirements rather than affecting political change or representing the demands of 
local communities at the national level.
651
 It appears that the majority of international 
aid money flows to apolitical community-focused local projects. International support 
for politically engaged projects is less forthcoming: groups like JRP are a minority, 
while NUTJWG has struggled to sustain sufficient funding since it was established in 
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2008.
652
 Interestingly, groups such as ARLPI that played a prominent role in 
activating and facilitating peace processes including the Juba talks are now much less 
politically engaged with Government policy.
653
 
 
As many civil society actors are well aware, the NGO economy in Gulu is an 
increasingly self-sustaining enterprise that threatens to stifle the possibility of long-
term radical change. It does not take long in Gulu town to discover that the local 
educated elite classes are primarily employed in internationally funded humanitarian 
work.
654
 Moreover, the ambition of most young English-speaking Acholi I spent time 
with in Gulu town was to become employed by NGOs. Essentially, the abundant 
presence of NGOs allows the Government to disengage from economic development 
and social service provision. As a local Acholi NGO director openly noted, “Our 
presence as NGOs gives the Government the opportunity to relax. People don‟t even 
know necessarily that the Government has a responsibility to provide and assist. 
People think NGOs do that.”655Rather than challenging the Government, many NGOs 
simply take its place, while lacking formal accountability to their „constituencies.‟ 
 
In this context, the efforts of a small handful of groups that strive to critically 
influence Government policy are working against the tide of apolitical „civil society‟ 
in the North. While I worked with NUTJWG, it became evident that the reluctance of 
many NGOs to engage politically risks undermining NUTJWG‟s core goals. 
NUTJWG aims not only to lobby the Government, but also to spur Northern civil 
society groups to engage their grassroots constituents in direct political action. The 
difficulty of this task was evident at a „high segment meeting‟ entitled „Rethinking the 
Future‟ hosted by NUTJWG with assistance from JRP in August 2010, which drew 
together the most prominent civil society leaders in Gulu.
656
 Participants recognized 
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the need for „civil society‟ to influence national policy on transitional justice, and 
push the Government to make recovery of the north a top priority. However, most 
participants directed their ideas solely towards the secretariat.
 
The widespread 
expectation (with a few notable exceptions) appeared to be that the task of influencing 
national policy should fall squarely on the small NUTJWG secretariat. 
657
  
 
 NUTJWG‟s goal to ignite the participation of civil society in political advocacy was 
also constricted by conformity to the norms and expectations of the predominant 
NGO culture. Like most NGOs, the „activities‟ of NUTJWG secretariat are shaped by 
their perception of donor requirements and performance evaluation criteria.
658
 This 
was perhaps particularly evident during a series of „workshops‟ facilitated by 
NUTJWG across the north, which aimed to identify the advocacy priorities of its 
membership, and build momentum for wider political engagement in transitional 
justice.
659
 NUTJWG‟s workshop in Lira for instance, was held in a hotel conference 
room complete with complementary note-pads, pens, lunch and refreshments. The 
participants were also paid a not-insubstantial „sitting allowance‟ to attend.660 While 
broadly helpful in building connections between the Secretariat and local Langi 
groups, interaction with participants was clearly limited. As the Secretariat critically 
reflected, the event involved far too much „expert‟ presentation of transitional justice 
history and theory by guest speakers from ICTJ, leaving minimal time for participants 
to discuss and define their own priorities.
661
 Perhaps reflecting the paid attendance, 
hotel setting and formality of the workshop, the atmosphere was restrained, lacking 
urgency and a drive for activism.
662
 This „workshop consultation‟ model adopted by 
NUTJWG reflects the wider norms of NGO practice in Northern Uganda. While this 
model is convenient and complies with donor expectations, it does not inspire a sense 
of community activism.   
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Aside from the entrapments and expectations of predominant NGO culture, there are 
other reasons why national change is difficult to instigate from a local standpoint. 
Developing effective strategy is challenging, particularly for groups such as 
NUTJWG that operate with minimal staff and low funding. A member of the 
Secretariat ambitiously contended that “where the Government is silent, or not 
prioritizing aspects of the Juba peace agreement, NUTJWG aims “to wake them 
up.”663 However, in mid 2010, it seemed unlikely that many NUTJWG activities 
would have much impact at the national level.
664
 Not infrequently, opportunities were 
missed to capitalize on the advocacy opportunities generated from NUTJWG‟s 
research and events. On one occasion for example, several days were spent 
investigating the local Government‟s politically motivated interference in the election 
of the Acholi War Debt Claimants (AWDC) leaders. While intending to highlight this 
local scandal to draw attention to the wider need for comprehensive post-war 
reparations, the deadline for a press briefing was missed. As was often the case, 
results suffered from tight timing and inadequate strategizing. 
 
Ultimately, given the reality of a reluctant Government, it is simply very difficult for 
advocacy groups to impact state policy. The JLOS TJWG works in the shadow of 
Museveni‟s regime, and lacks the authority and funding to progress with many 
meaningful aspects of transitional justice. A staff member at JRP put it this way:  
The biggest challenge is making an impact at all…we might do the research, 
[give] the recommendations, take Government officials to a workshop, 
disseminate the findings…but do they actually take it up?665  
  
Civil society groups, incorporating actors at all levels, draw on transitional justice 
discourse to press the Government to transform its approach to Northern Uganda and 
engage in politically sensitive justice issues. Through their research, consultation and 
advocacy work, organizations based in both Gulu and Kampala actively challenge the 
Government‟s narrative of the war.  However, it is also evident that the efforts of such 
groups are directly and indirectly in tension with elements of the broader civil society 
landscape. As scholars increasingly recognize, „global‟ civil society space is diverse: 
NGOs often play contradictory roles, pursue different agendas, and base their goals 
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on diverging theoretical assumptions.
666
 As Scholte points out, while civil society 
actors can “open political space” and “give voice to stakeholders,” they may equally 
serve to “constrain discussion and suppress dissent.”667 
 
The Socioeconomic Justice ‘Void’ of Transitional Justice in Uganda  
Although civil society groups, opposition politicians and to a lesser extent, technical 
JLOS actors and parliamentarians draw on transitional justice discourse as a language 
of resistance, such actors tend to express demands for postwar social and economic 
recovery solely in terms of reparations. For the most part, such actors fail to strongly 
and clearly include the broader project of socio-economic justice in the scope of 
transitional justice. As I explore below, this omission threatens to substantially 
weaken the capacity of transitional justice discourse as a tool to bring about 
meaningful transition from war. After outlining the failings of the Government‟s 
approach to postwar recovery through the PRDP and the detachment of the PRDP 
from justice discourse, I focus on exclusion of socioeconomic justice from the 
rhetoric of civil society actors.  
 
The Divorce of Transitional Justice and the PRDP 
 
Currently, the national framework of transitional justice policy excludes widespread 
socioeconomic recovery and rehabilitation beyond reparations. The JLOS TJWG did 
not establish a committee on socioeconomic justice, while discussion of a reparations 
scheme is relegated to the truth telling committee. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
socioeconomic justice was outlined in the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions 
(ACS) in Juba as a critical component of postwar transition. The Implementation 
Protocol to the ACS states that the Government must implement the Northern 
Ugandan Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) “expeditiously” and ensure 
that the Plan encompasses the “principles and commitments” of the agreement, which 
includes the remedying of disparity between north and the rest of the country, and 
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numerous specific measures such as the provision of special tertiary scholarships.
668
 
However, the PRDP is currently implemented through the Office of the Prime 
Minister (OPM) without reference to the principles and specific commitments of the 
ACS.
669Rather than constituting an aspect of postwar „justice,‟ the PRDP largely 
functions as merely another recovery and development program for the North.
670
  
 
The disconnect between the project of transitional justice and the PRDP weakens the 
potential of the program to radically break from the past. As civil society actors 
believe, the idea of transitional justice can be used as a catalyst for political change.
671
 
Museveni‟s regime is resistant to proposals for a truth telling and reparations for this 
very reason: such programs could require the Government to acknowledge and 
actively rectify its past wrongs. Separating the PRDP from the idea of „justice‟ has 
allowed it to become one of a series of poorly performing „recovery and development‟ 
schemes implemented since 1992. Previous plans such as the Northern Uganda 
Reconstruction Program (NURP-1), and NURP-II, for instance, received harsh 
criticism for their top down imposition, severely curtailed expenditures, and endemic 
siphoning of funds through corruption at all levels.
672
 Rather than marking a 
„transition,‟ in many ways the PRDP appears continuous with previous ineffective 
programs.
673
 
  
The broad mandate of the PRDP is to address the socio-economic inequalities 
between Northern Uganda and the rest of the country. Rather than constituting an 
independently financed program, the PRDP policy framework aims to allocate 
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additional funding to war affected districts in Northern Uganda.
674
 The program‟s 
weak funding scheme, however, casts considerable doubt upon the Government‟s 
commitment to the recovery and development of northern war affected regions. When 
the plan was finalized in September 2007, the PRDP budget for the entire three-year 
period amounted to UgSh 1, 091.7 billion (USD606.5 million).
 675
 Even in 2008, 
donors and public servants recognized that the budget “grossly underestimated the 
actual need for additional resources.”676 In addition, it also became clear that the 
Government‟s financial contribution to Northern districts would be much less than 
originally projected. Initially, the Government indicated that it would provide 86 % of 
the funding.
677
 In the final budget however, the Government contribution was a 
meager 30 %, leaving 70 percent to be provided by donors.
678
 It appears that the 
Government reneged on their original financial commitment, reflecting a wider lack 
of commitment to socioeconomic justice.  
 
It is furthermore doubtful that the 70 percent of the budget supposedly provided by 
donors in fact supplies additional resources to PRDP districts. Evidence suggests the 
Government subsumed pre-existing donor funded NGO projects and budget support 
into the PRDP in order to account for the remaining 70 %. In mid 2010, the director 
of a prominent NGO in Gulu, informed me:  
You know the way PRDP is designed is that the Government would contribute 
30 % while the donors contribute 70 %. That proved too ambitious…the 
moment they began tapping the money which is already in the country, already 
in the district, that is already doing work, then I knew that the 70 % is not 
forthcoming. This program that we run…would be there whether PRDP or no 
PRDP.
679
  
 
As the Norweigan Agency for Development Cooperation (NADC) anticipated in 
2008, additional donor funds “over and above current direct budget support, sector 
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program funding, and project tied aid” were not forthcoming.680 This is perhaps 
unsurprising given that donors are significantly scaling down their assistance as the 
transition from war-time humanitarian intervention to conventional development 
support takes place. NADC noted that in 2008, Government officials acknowledged 
that PRDP could provide an opportunity to shift “off budget” humanitarian donor 
funds onto the national budget.
 681
 Evidently, the Government has simply padded the 
PRDP with existing donor resources. 
 
Overall, the PRDP has failed to provide adequate redistribution of resources to war 
affected northern districts. Local Government, an essential actor in post war 
development, has been insufficiently funded.
682
 While the average poverty level 
rating of PRDP Northern districts is 30 % higher than non-PRDP districts, in 2008/09, 
the overall national budget allocation to PRDP districts actually decreased slightly by 
0.4 %.
683
 As NADC concluded, “considering the central role of local Government 
sector as implementers of the PRDP, the decrease in the share of budget allocations to 
PRDP districts is not consistent with ambitions to reach the overall goals of the 
PRDP.”684 The Government‟s poor commitment to local Government in Northern 
Uganda further demonstrates a lack of political will to pursue socioeconomic justice 
in the wake of war.  
 
Unsurprisingly then, it is difficult to discern any tangible impact of the PRDP at the 
district and village levels. During the first year of implementation, district officials 
expected funding over and above budget allocation.
685
 It was not communicated that 
PRDP funds would merely be allocated through existing budget processes which 
exacerbated mistrust of the central Government.
686
 There is little awareness of the 
PRDP at grass roots levels in the sub-county and parish levels. In 2008, research by 
RLP found that most people were either confused about PRDP, or had never heard of 
it. In mid 2010, the presidential advisor to Northern Uganda responsible for 
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monitoring PRDP progress acknowledged to me that the plan is still “not widely 
known by the people.”687 
 
Finally, the PRDP replicates key failings of previous northern recovery programs. 
Firstly, it appears that initial consultation with stakeholders was poor. While a range 
of stakeholders were supposedly given the opportunity to review drafts of the PRDP, 
consultations “stopped at the district level, severely limiting the process.688 Poor 
consultation processes result in poor community involvement and identification of 
project priorities. Secondly, the PRDP mirrors previous programs with apparent 
corruption and political exploitation. Funds have been allocated to dubious projects in 
areas relatively unaffected by conflict. In 2008, UgSh 621 million of the PRDP 
budget was spent on the construction of a 25km road in a district between Mbale and 
Bududa (not in Northern Uganda).
689
 While the Government failed to offer 
explanation for this project, a district official indicated that the Mbale road had been 
prioritized because it “will serve the home area of a central Government official690” 
With only one year of implementation remaining (financial year 2011/2012), there is 
little to suggest that the PRDP will significantly impact those it was intended to assist. 
While the situation in Northern Uganda is undoubtedly improving due to the return of 
many people to their land and agriculture and relative peace and security, the 
commitment of the Government to socioeconomic transformation of the north appears 
weak.  
 
The failure of involved actors to hold the Government accountable to PRDP 
implementation according to ACS benchmarks has allowed the program to subside 
into the background with limited critical attention. Foreign donors that support the 
PRDP have largely failed to significantly challenge the Government‟s poor efforts to 
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redistribute resources to the north in order to target inequality.
691
 As I explore below, 
with a few exceptions, transitional justice civil society actors have also failed to 
include socioeconomic justice in their demands to the state for postwar justice.  
 
Civil Society: Socio-Economic Justice at the Margins  
 
For the most part, Kampala-based groups that champion the project of transitional 
justice do not include socioeconomic justice in the core focus of their work. Although 
their conception of justice may include socio-economic concerns, disproportionate 
attention is paid to these issues in their practical work.  For example the prominent 
groups BJP/RLP have adopted an expansive, holistic view of transitional justice that 
encompasses socioeconomic issues. The „Beyond Juba‟ research mandate on 
transitional justice highlights a myriad of such „justice‟ issues, such as poverty, 
HIV/Aids, landlessness, and family breakdown.
692
 RLP has also intermittently 
engaged in critique of the PRPD.
693
 Despite these efforts, RLP has not concentrated 
on pushing the Government to fulfill its commitments in the ACS as an urgent matter 
of justice. The majority of RLP/BJP‟s active engagement with the Ugandan 
Government is framed in terms of the more conventional aspects of transitional 
justice, such as truth telling and reparations. As I argue below, reparations are an 
important, but are ultimately an insufficient form of socioeconomic justice.   
 
Despite its expansive theoretical perspective, there appears to be a tendency for RLP 
to exclude socioeconomic and development justice from the scope of transitional 
justice in its advocacy work. In a 2009 three-day Parliament training program on 
transitional justice, for instance, RLP structured discussion around three key areas: 
truth telling, reparations and traditional justice. Rather than directly embracing 
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socioeconomic issues as core element of transitional justice, speakers distinguished 
between development and reparations programs.
694
 In its critical media releases 
demanding for victims-focused postwar justice, RLP also emphasizes the need for a 
reparations program, rather than pointing to broader socioeconomic justice issues and 
the PRDP.
695
 As discussed above, RLP‟s pivotal contribution to transitional justice 
has been to build momentum for the establishment of a national truth telling and 
reconciliation forum through the NR Bill. Certainly, such a forum has the potential to 
generate recommendations on socioeconomic justice issues, reparations schemes and 
furthermore spur the establishment of an Equal Opportunities Commission. However, 
such an approach also risks backtracking on the radical obligations of the Government 
regarding socioeconomic equity of the north already agreed upon in the Juba. While 
efforts to engage critically on the PRPD are commendable, ultimately Kampala based 
groups involved in transitional justice are yet to significantly challenge the 
Government‟s failure to address socioeconomic inequality of the north as a critical 
„justice‟ issue. 
 
Northern-based Civil Society  
 
 
Similarly, although some Gulu-based transitional justice civil society actors aim to 
directly address socioeconomic injustice, often this manifests only in demands for 
reparations. In 2010, members of the NUTJWG secretariat were, at least in theory, 
keen to frame what they perceived as the most pressing needs of Northern Uganda in 
terms of socioeconomic justice.
696
 We discussed various strategies, including working 
in connection with Gulu business actors and farmers associations. For a few local 
actors, socioeconomic development concerns are not conceptually distinct from 
transitional justice. 
 
However, local groups have a strong tendency in practice to translate demands for 
socioeconomic justice into demands for reparations. Arguably, this trend reflects the 
fact that the inclusion of socioeconomic justice and „development‟ issues within the 
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transitional justice framework has not yet gained widespread acceptance. This was 
evident, for instance, at NUTJWG‟s consultation workshops across the north in mid 
2010. Participants at the Lira workshop raised many issues they felt their communities 
were concerned about after the war, including broad socioeconomic concerns such as 
access to health, education, and infrastructure redevelopment. However, an ICTJ 
facilitator of the workshop emphasized in response that it is essential to consider how 
such priorities can be “fitted in” to the transitional justice model, and suggested such 
demands could be framed as reparations or compensation. He concluded, “There is a 
need to distinguish such mechanisms from ordinary development.”697 This approach 
was also evident during a high-profile civil society conference on reparations held in 
October 2009 at which socioeconomic issues were framed exclusively in terms of 
reparations.
 698
 
 
Accordingly, in 2010 it did not appear that Gulu-based transitional justice 
organizations had included socioeconomic justice beyond reparations in their 
advocacy work. JRP (and as yet, NUTJWG) media coverage focuses on reparations 
and other transitional justice mechanisms, rather than wider economic reforms or the 
PRDP.
699
 Furthermore, socioeconomic justice was not included in JRP‟s 2010 
election campaign or highlighted in the recommendations of their 2010 „Gender 
Justice Statement.‟700  
 
As discussed in Chapter four, it is clear that at the grassroots level, communities 
demand socioeconomic justice beyond reparations. At NUTJWG‟s 2009 conference 
on reparations, a JRP member even reflected that when asked what they want as 
„reparations,‟ most victims mention things such as bridges, health centers, roads and 
schools.” He accordingly noted that victims often “fail to clearly distinguish between 
normal Government programs and reparations.
701
 While this comment suggests that 
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communities may need better education about the difference between simple material 
reparations and wider development, the more important point is that the scope of 
transitional justice must be expanded to encompass local‟s expectations of justice. 
Despite this, even local NGOs tend to package the social and economic „justice‟ 
demands of local communities exclusively as demands for reparations. 
 
Essentially, even a comprehensive reparations scheme would prove grossly 
insufficient to achieve a measure of „justice.‟ Certainly, reparation in the form of 
individual payments or returned cattle would ease the suffering of northern 
communities, while formal recognition and apology could assist in the process of 
national reconciliation. However, a one off payment and apology, however symbolic, 
cannot in itself dramatically alter the vast inequity and socioeconomic disadvantage 
that both kindled and resulted from the northern conflict. Moreover, without genuine 
Government engagement in long term redistribution and socioeconomic 
transformation, the „symbolism‟ and apology carried with a reparation measure is 
essentially meaningless. Rather than marking a break with the past, reparations can 
provide an excuse for the state to relinquish further action. A broader project of 
socioeconomic justice is required to set in motion the long-term transformation of 
Northern Uganda.  In its current local form, the capacity of transitional justice 
discourse to give expression to the needs and demands of grassroots communities is 
therefore limited. In practice, dominant global conceptions of transitional justice 
constrict local action. 
 
Conclusion  
Overwhelmingly, the power to shape the postwar project of „justice‟ in Uganda is 
concentrated in the hands of the state.  As with its role in the northern conflict, the 
Government‟s approach to postwar „justice‟ is clearly shaped by political 
convenience. The Government is very resistant to any mechanisms that could expose 
its own negligence and complicity in the war and require the regime to assume 
responsibility and implement radical structural reforms. Accordingly, the Government 
has focused almost exclusively on the development of mechanisms to try LRA 
commanders. While JLOS actors continue to work on developing an approach to 
traditional justice, truth telling, and reparations schemes, it appears that the regime 
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will not allow these mechanisms to be implemented without significant political 
interference. As demonstrated, the PRDP appears grossly inadequate to fulfill its 
mandate to address the gaping inequality between the north and the rest of the 
country. Rather than marking a „transition‟ in terms of the Government‟s approach to 
the north, the PRDP replicates many inadequacies of previous northern „development‟ 
programs, ultimately failing to significantly redistribute resources. Moreover framing 
the PRDP as a Government development program rather than a matter of justice 
reaffirms the Government‟s narrow focus on the physical violence of the LRA. This 
again shifts the focus from structural, socioeconomic violence perpetrated by the 
state. There is evidently a very high risk that transitional justice in Uganda will 
constitute an empty performance of „victor‟s justice‟ that fails to address underlying 
socioeconomic dynamics of the war.  
 
In this highly politically-charged context, a complex web of domestic and 
international actors partake in a struggle to influence national policy and press the 
Government to engage in „transition.‟ As illustrated, it is not possible to broadly 
generalize about the impact of „international,‟ „national‟ or even „local‟ actors and 
organizations on the development of transitional justice in Uganda. Different actors at 
all levels play diverse roles in the struggle for national change, while in some ways, 
civil society organizations transcend such categories. While some actors critically 
challenge the Government‟s narrative of the war and the enactment of victor‟s justice, 
the actions and inactions of other local, national or international actors can undermine 
such efforts.  
 
At the international level, the ICC continues to lend a cloak of legitimacy to the 
Government‟s narrative of the war. Furthermore, the ICC provides ongoing incentive 
for senior political and technical Government actors to concentrate their efforts on 
developing formal criminal justice mechanisms. In the wider context of waning 
critical international attention on the „northern situation,‟ foreign donors engaged in 
transitional justice have also largely facilitated Uganda‟s pursuit of victor‟s justice. 
While such actors may genuinely believe that for the time being, „partial justice is 
better than no justice,‟ this approach fails to exert any political pressure on the 
Government to genuinely address ongoing inequality, and merely bolsters the 
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dangerous narrative that the Government bears no responsibility for the suffering of 
northern communities.  
 
Organizations based in both Kampala and Gulu such as RLP, JRP and NUTJWG have 
adopted transitional justice discourse as a language to challenge the Government‟s 
narrative of the war, push for meaningful transition, and give political expression to 
local demands. Their collective efforts to push the Government to adopt the NR Bill, 
implement a comprehensive reparations program, investigate state actors and 
critically consider a wealth of postwar justice issues including the role of traditional 
justice have certainly not been without impact at the national level. However, 
engaging a reluctant Government in such issues is an uphill struggle. Their efforts are 
also weakened by the contradictory approaches of other civil society actors. Kampala 
based groups that seek a comprehensive approach to postwar justice work in tension 
with civil society groups that primarily champion the project of international justice. 
At the local level, the efforts of transitional justice advocacy groups risks being 
undermined or stifled by the predominantly apolitical „professionalized‟ culture of the 
local civil society scene, and the reluctance of many NGOs to directly confront 
Government policy. International actors contribute to the political struggle for 
transition when agencies or donors financially support or directly engage in this 
project. However, international actors also counteract such efforts by perpetuating a 
largely apolitical civil society landscape that often takes the place of Government. 
 
The capacity of transitional justice discourse to challenge the Government‟s narrative 
of the war and give political voice to locals‟ postwar priorities is severely limited by 
the failure of most actors to unequivocally encompass socioeconomic justice within 
their advocacy framework. Civil society actors tend to translate and constrict local 
demands for development and social services into demands for reparations. This trend 
is likely to reflect the marginal status of socioeconomic justice within the wider field 
of transitional justice scholarship and practice. Socioeconomic justice is yet to gain 
strong „normative‟ global traction. While reparations are important, they are 
inadequate to remedy the deep social and economic injustices that underpinned and 
resulted from the war. To give political expression to local justice priorities, civil 
society actors must expand the scope of transitional justice discourse to 
uncompromisingly include socioeconomic justice and development.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
 
Introduction  
Twelve years after the Rome Statute was adopted, the ICC held its first „Review 
Conference,‟ in Kampala‟s luxurious lakeside Munyonyo Commonwealth Resort. The 
Conference brought together the representatives of the ICC‟s state parties and a vast 
array of other actors, including Court officials, intergovernmental organizations, a 
multitude of international, national and local NGOs, scholars, activists, and even a 
few „victims.‟ The unprecedented participation of diverse actors in the Conference 
reflects the pivotal role played by civil society in the birth of the ICC.
702
 While the 
first week of the Conference focused on review of the Rome Statute, the second week 
was devoted to the „stocktaking of international criminal justice.‟703 Stocktaking of 
the Court‟s affect on its situation countries included four key areas: the impact of the 
ICC upon victims and affected communities, peace and justice, complementarity, and 
cooperation. The primary purpose of the Conference was clear from its outset. 
Leading up to the Conference, HRW emphasized the need for the “world community” 
to advance the progress of the ICC as  “the keystone of an emerging system of 
international justice,” and “reengage the fight against impunity.”704 Essentially, the 
Conference aimed to consolidate and expand state support for a particular form of 
justice: international prosecution.     
 
Perhaps reflecting the Conference‟s Kampala setting, the Ugandan case received 
widespread attention throughout the two-week review. Northern Uganda and the LRA 
featured frequently in high-profile speeches, discussion panels on stocktaking in the 
plenary hall, and numerous side-events. The booths of the civil society „People‟s 
Space‟ were almost exclusively filled with Ugandan national and local NGOs. The 
Conference accordingly brought together the pivotal international and domestic 
players involved in transitional justice in Uganda: the ICC itself, international NGOs, 
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JLOS actors, donors and national and local civil society actors.
705
 The key tensions 
and power dynamics of the struggle for postwar justice in Uganda were displayed on 
an international stage at Munyonyo, where the influence of the dominant international 
model of „justice‟ was palpably evident. Interestingly, on the few occasions when 
criticisms were leveled against the ICC, actors that defended international justice 
often also defended the Government‟s narrative of the northern conflict.  
 
This chapter accordingly draws on the ICC Review Conference to frame the 
conclusion of this thesis. I divide this chapter into two sections, the first of which has 
three key parts. The first part explores the construction of international criminal law 
as the dominant mode of global justice, and the inadequate platform the Review 
Conference provided for meaningful critique. The second and third parts explore the 
parallel struggle over the concept of „justice‟ and divergent narratives of the Ugandan 
conflict that took place on the fringes of the Review Conference. The second 
specifically explores the unequivocal defense of international criminal justice by 
global civil society actors. In contrast, the third section highlights the efforts of a 
small minority of international, national and local actors to challenge this dominant 
discourse of justice. The five-part second section of this chapter further explores the 
theoretical implications of the case of northern Uganda for the wider field of 
transitional justice. Before providing a final conclusion, I outline critical implications 
for the field that emerged from my analysis.  
 
The ICC Review Conference  
Constructing the Hegemony of Global Justice  
 
 
The ICC is founded upon the ambitious, cosmopolitan aspiration of the realization of 
„global justice.‟ The vision that drives the Court‟s many advocates is that someday, 
international criminal justice will become embedded within all nation states through 
the rule of law, and that non state actors and state actors alike will face accountability 
for „the gravest crimes.‟ The Court‟s supporters believe it is possible for the Rome 
Statute to triumph over political power. In his opening statement to the Review 
Conference, the ICC‟s prosecutor affirmed that the Court “will force political actors 
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to adjust to new legal limits.”706 The promises of international justice extend beyond 
the provision of „justice‟ for victims, to assurances of future peace and security. 
Throughout his statement, the prosecutor emphasized that the consequence of 
impunity is the proliferation of global insecurity and violence. He concluded by 
affirming that “certainty that these crimes will be investigated and prosecuted, will 
modify the calculus of the criminals, will deter the crimes, will protect the victims.”707 
It was evident at the Review Conference that many advocates of the ICC are already 
celebrating the early successes of the „global fight against impunity.‟ In his opening 
remarks, the President of the ICC emphasized that in very little time, the Court‟s 
“effects are beginning [to] be seen around the world… a culture of impunity is slowly 
being replaced by a discourse of accountability.”708  
 
The overriding purpose of the 2010 Review Conference was to build global support 
for international criminal law. As advocates of the Court recognize, their hopes can 
only be realized if states subscribe to the project of international criminal justice. 
Political leaders must somehow be persuaded to subject their power to the framework 
of global law. The Conference itself was an exercise in cultivating a sense of 
cosmopolitanism and building adherence to the norm of criminal accountability. 
Through appeals to a common humanity and the constant repetition of mantras such 
as „join the fight against impunity‟ and „no peace without justice,‟ Conference 
participants aimed to influence the hearts and minds of the international community. 
This overriding objective left little room for serious critique of the Court‟s impact to 
date. Throughout the Conference, a widespread expectation prevailed that attendees 
unequivocally support the expansion of this form of international justice. Expressions 
of cynicism were often viewed as ultimately threatening to the key objective of 
advancing support for the Court.
709
 As one state delegate put it, the construction of 
international criminal law is like Tinkerbelle: if enough people declare their disbelief, 
no amount of clapping can revive it.
710
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Civil society actors continue to play a major role in consolidating international 
criminal law as the dominant mode of global justice. As discussed throughout this 
thesis, the concept of „justice‟ advocated and practiced by the ICC is narrow, focusing 
on individual criminal accountability for extreme physical crimes to the exclusion of 
structural violence, inequality and socioeconomic deprivation. Yet the very existence 
of the ICC as the sole arbitrator of global justice is due to the efforts of a worldwide 
constellation of civil society actors.
711
 The Court was only brought about through the 
slow convergence of ideas of many academics, activists, lawyers, international and 
national NGOs, and their long labors to construct legal consensus among states and 
press leaders to ratify the Rome Statute.
712
 Throughout the Conference, the pivotal 
task of advancing state support for international criminal justice was led by a host of 
civil society actors, the most dominant of which was the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court (CICC). Frequently, civil society organizations equated 
the term „justice‟ with international criminal law, or even more narrowly still with the 
ICC itself. 
713
 As Nouwen points out, this tendency is immediately evident in the 
mantra of the CICC: “Together for Justice: Civil society…advocating for a fair, 
effective, and independent ICC.”714 The ICC monopolizes the global discourse of 
justice only with a vast array of global support.
715
 
 
The fundamental goal of the Review Conference‟s „Stocktaking‟ exercise was 
accordingly to gather momentum for the project of international justice via 
affirmation of the Court‟s principles and achievements. The President of the ICC 
declared at the outset of the Conference, “We have come along way since Rome in a 
very short tine. Now is the time to trumpet success.”716 Despite the critical input of a 
few speakers, the official record of „Stocktaking‟ discussions in the Conference 
plenary hall lacked realistic assessment of the ICC‟s impact. Ample attention was 
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paid to the Court‟s first case, Uganda. However as I demonstrate, the exercise 
essentially failed to take „stock‟ of the highly disturbing impacts of the Court‟s 
intervention in Uganda discussed in this thesis. Assessment of the Court‟s „impact on 
victims,‟ for instance, could have grappled with Northern communities‟ dismay at the 
failure of the ICC to address the complicity of the Ugandan state in the conflict, or 
victims‟ primary interest in embedded socioeconomic justice over the criminal trial of 
indirect perpetrators.
717
 Stocktaking of „peace and justice‟ could have fully 
acknowledged that the ICC‟s untimely interventions not only obstructed peace 
processes in Uganda, but also eventually undermined the possibility that the Ugandan 
Government would implement the radical, holistic justice processes outlined in the 
Juba peace Agreement.
718
 Ironically, such key critiques were noted in the ICC‟s 
research publication “Turning the Lens: Victims and Affected Communities on the 
Court and the Rome Statute System,” but nevertheless failed to receive official 
recognition during the conference.
719
 As Nouwen puts it, the Review “took stock of 
success only.”720   
 
The „resolutions‟ drafted regarding the Court‟s „impact on victims‟ were 
overwhelmingly uncritical. Certainly, participants recognized the need for „the rights 
of victims‟ to take center stage in the Court‟s proceedings, and the need to strengthen 
the reparative aspects of the ICC‟s work. 721 Several panelists emphasized that the 
ICC provides a reparative effect to complement its „punitive function‟ through the 
Victim‟s Trust Fund (VTF). 722 The limited “visibility and resources” of the VTF were 
noted, and various actors called for member states to make further contributions to the 
fund.
723
 Simultaneously however, it was stressed that the „unrealistic expectations‟ of 
victims for reparations, material assistance or even rapid arrest of perpetrators must be 
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managed through better communication and outreach.
724
 As evident from my 
fieldwork in Northern Uganda, the VTF contributes only a „drop in the bucket‟ to the 
existing international aid work in situation countries such as Uganda.
725
 The idea that 
„justice‟ could include the need to hold the Government of Uganda accountable to 
actively address the socioeconomic devastation of the north was far beyond the scope 
of discussion.  
 
The official record of Stocktaking on peace and justice similarly validated the Court‟s 
preexisting assumptions.
726
 Throughout the Conference, the mantra was constantly 
repeated that without „justice‟ true peace is impossible. While it was recognized that 
granting amnesty or postponing criminal investigations to secure a peace deal might 
appear attractive, such „peace‟ is „false,‟ unlikely to last, and ultimately unacceptable 
without „justice.‟ „Justice,‟ is again equated with criminal prosecution. Interestingly, a 
number of experienced guest panelists in the stocktaking exercise presented views 
that contradicted this claim.
727
 The legal analyst of the Juba peace talks Barney 
Afako, highlighted the “undeniable dilemma between peace and justice” noting that 
the ICC‟s arrest warrants contributed strongly to the collapse of the promising Juba 
process.
728
 “The Ugandan people” he stressed, “would live with the consequences of 
the actions of the international community.”729 Nevertheless, the stocktaking 
moderator reiterated in his summary of the discussion that establishment of the Court 
brought about a “paradigm shift:” justice and peace are accepted as mutually 
reinforcing.
730
 He emphasized that given that victim‟s priorities shift over time, it is 
vital to consider how to “educate victims about the option of pursuing justice, without 
unduly raising their expectations.”731 The „Kampala Declaration‟ drafted in summary 
of the stocktaking exercise simply “emphasize[s] that justice is a fundamental 
building block of sustainable peace” and “Reiterate[s]…determination to put an end 
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to impunity…and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes that threaten the 
peace, security and wellbeing of the world.”732 
 
The official stocktaking sessions, served little critical function. Supported by a strong 
alliance of international and domestic civil society actors of all „levels,‟ the Review 
Conference provided a global forum to advance state support for international 
criminal justice, rather than truly reassess the Court‟s impact.  
 
Civil Society: the Defense of International Criminal Justice  
 
Reflecting the wider tensions between actors involved in postwar justice in Uganda, a 
subtle struggle took place between civil society actors in the background of the 
conference. Asides from the official plenary sessions, the Review Conference 
comprised of numerous „side events,‟ which were organized by various civil society 
groups and held onsite at Munyonyo. These events varied greatly, including book 
launches, mock court proceedings, and film screenings as well as many „discussion 
panels‟ and interactive dialogues. The content and tone of each event reflected the 
agendas of its civil society organizers. In addition to the many opportunities for more 
informal mingling, these events provided spaces of discussion between various civil 
society actors and state delegates. While there were many side events, I chose to 
attend the most prominent events, and also those that related to the Ugandan case.    
 
At such side events, informal spaces, and in the official plenary meetings themselves, 
many civil society organizations simply refrained from criticism, or defended the 
actions and inactions of the Court.
 733
 Defense of the ICC was often coupled with 
defense of dominant narratives of the Ugandan conflict that focus exclusively on the 
physical violence of the LRA. A few groups, however, offered serious challenges to 
the regime of international justice. This struggle did not simply take place between 
international groups that defend „international justice‟ and local groups that defend 
„local perspectives.‟ Rather, civil society actors at all levels took differing approaches. 
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Before noting the efforts of a minority of civil society actors to allow space for critical 
voices regarding the impact of the Court in Uganda, I explore the tendency of most 
groups to either deny or discretely ignore the failings of the ICC.  
 
It is understandable that the project of international criminal justice has attracted such 
a broad and passionate spectrum of advocates. The idea of the Court is highly 
seductive.
734
 In a world in which power prevails and complex structures of violence 
and inequity persist, the promises of international criminal justice are inspiring, 
hopeful, and deceptively simple; lock up the prime perpetrators, deter future crime.
 735
 
Participation in the project of international justice affirms the advocate‟s sense of self 
as an individual who actively responds to human suffering.
736
 As Nouwen reflects, 
when the pursuit of international criminal law produces troubling outcomes, its 
unrelenting supporters must construct validations to dissipate any feelings of 
dissonance, to feel at ease with their own complicity.
737
 Accordingly, advocates often 
zealously defend the project of international justice with a rather „mixed bag‟ of 
arguments that appear to stem purely from their unwavering faith in the ultimate 
morality of their cause. In the relatively few instances in which critical views were 
raised at the conference, this tendency was thrown into sharp relief.  
 
In response to charges that the ICC impacted negatively upon the Ugandan peace 
process, ardent advocates of the Court offered a number of justifications. At the 
Conference, these justifications were aired in numerous side events, conversations, 
and even promotional videos. A particularly common approach was to simply assert 
that the collapse of peace talks resulted from factors other than the ICC.
738
 Mirroring 
statements made by the ICC‟s Prosecutor himself, the CICC‟s Convener informed me 
that ICC was not the „determinant factor‟ in the failure of the talks, and rather 
emphasized that Kony would have refused to sign the agreement regardless of the 
arrest warrants.
739
 More subtly, other advocates appealed to the complexity of 
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causality: is it really possible to say that the ICC was a major factor?
740
 A second 
approach is to simply contend that the ICC‟s interference in the Ugandan peace 
process was desirable because it „prevented impunity.‟ As noted above, peace without 
international criminal accountability is ultimately viewed as unstable and 
insufficient.
741
 
  
A third „fallback‟ justification is to contend that the ICC is responsible solely for 
implementing the Rome Statute. Nouwen terms this approach “the institutional 
defense.”742 Proponents of this approach emphasize that ICC has a „specific mandate‟ 
to carry out its legal functions, and accordingly bares no liability for the wider 
repercussions of its actions. When I raised the question of the ICC‟s impact on the 
Juba process with one international NGO leader, she blankly posited that the ICC‟s 
role was to „implement the law” and perform its functions as a court, regardless of its 
potential impact on „political processes‟ such as peace negotiations.743 It is 
accordingly the responsibility of other actors to adjust to the „incontestable‟ borders 
of international justice.
744
 According to this view, the ICC simply need not be 
concerned with the wider implications of its intervention in Uganda discussed 
throughout this thesis. 
 
Civil society actors also evoked the „institutional defense‟ in response to wider 
criticisms of the Court. In particular, this defense supplied a simple way to dismiss 
critique of the limited scope of the ICC‟s justice. For instance, a short film was 
screened at the conference documenting the brief visit of state delegates to Northern 
Uganda produced by UCICC, NPWJ and Hurinet-U. Footage captured local 
northerners who passionately emphasized that suffering continued even after the war 
ended, and that they were yet to see the impact of the Courts „Trust Fund for 
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Victims.‟745 The film cut to a NPWJ representative who explained that certainly, the 
Trust Funds scope was limited, but emphasized that the real, long term “impact of the 
ICC is the removal from the situation of the people who did the harm in the first 
place.”746 Such statements reiterated that the ICC simply performs “ICC style justice,” 
and cannot be expected to engage deeply with the wider situations it operates in.
747
     
 
The controversial questions surrounding the absence of ICC indictments of Ugandan 
state actors unsurprisingly provoked particularly defensive responses from civil 
society advocates of the Court. For many groups, open acknowledgement of the 
ICC‟s reliance on the Ugandan state and its accordingly partial approach to 
investigating their alleged crimes would infer the illegitimacy of the Court. 
Accordingly, many NGOs avoided the issue, downplayed the culpability of Ugandan 
state actors, or parroted the ICC‟s own legal justifications for its initial focus on the 
LRA.
748
 Conveniently unfettered by a lack of institutional mandate to assume a 
„position‟ on particular ICC cases, the CICC Secretariat could comfortably refrain 
from passing judgment on the ICC‟s partiality towards the Ugandan Government. 
When I raised the topic in conversation however, individual leaders of the CICC 
simply explained the ICC‟s failure to investigate Ugandan state actors with reference 
to the Court‟s temporal jurisdiction and the gravity criteria. The CICC‟s Convener 
and coordinator furthermore emphasized that the Ugandan Government need not be 
held accountable for internal displacement in Uganda, stressing that creating camps 
for civilian protection is not a crime.
749
While some NGO actors acknowledged that 
investigation of UPDF crimes would be preferable, the notion of wider responsibility 
of the Ugandan state was rarely considered. Defense of the ICC often corresponded 
with denial of the complicity of Museveni‟s regime in the northern conflict.  
 
Ultimately, the defenses of the ICC‟s actions and inactions in Uganda offered by 
many civil society actors are highly problematic. The claim that the ICC did not 
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intrude on the Juba peace process simply does not tally with closer analysis and the 
accounts of those involved in the negotiations, as demonstrated in Chapter three.
 
The 
response that the ICC‟s intervention in the Juba process was warranted because there 
is „no peace without justice‟ simply raises the question, what kind of justice? As 
explored throughout this thesis, the Juba peace Agreements reflect the justice 
priorities of local war affected communities in Northern Uganda infinitely more than 
the narrow, partial approach to „justice‟ demonstrated by the ICC. The „institutional 
defense,‟ as Nouwen points out, is insufficient given the current international order.750 
This defense is based on a flawed comparison with a perfectly functioning domestic 
system.
751
 Unlike a domestic context in which a range of other institutions mediate 
the court system and laws and legal processes are frequently adjusted by democratic 
processes, the international arena lacks equivalent structures. As evident throughout 
the Juba process, even the UN was unable to act as a check and balance to effectively 
mitigate the ICC‟s impact on the Juba process.752 As discussed in Chapter three, 
drawing on the „gravity criteria‟ to defend the ICC‟s failure to indict state actors is 
legally unsound according to experts of international law such as Schabas.
753
 
Moreover, the structural complicity of the Ugandan state in the enduring suffering of 
Northern Ugandans simply eludes the narrow scope of the ICC‟s justice mandate.  
 
It should be emphasized, however, that many NGOs at the conference opted for 
strategic discretion regarding the Court‟s apparent failings rather than outright 
defense. Human Rights Watch (HRW) provides a good example. Certainly, HRW has 
not shied away from bringing attention to the ICC‟s failure to address the crimes of 
state actors in Uganda in various publications over the years.
754
 However, in the 
context of the Review Conference HRW refrained from heavy criticism of the Court 
or the scope of international justice. A representative carefully explained, “The focus 
of stocktaking was really on how states can increase their support to the global fight 
                                                 
750
Nouwen, Justifying Justice 
751
 Nouwen, justifying justice, p.15  
752
 See Chapter three   
753
 See Schabas, p.191 
754
 For example HRW‟s 2005 report, Human Rights Watch, Uprooted and Forgotten: Human Rights 
Watch, Courting History: the Landmark International Criminal Court‟s First Years, (Human Rights 
Watch, 2008) http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/10/courting-history-0 [Accessed 12 August 
2011]  
 
186 
 
against impunity” and “strengthening the ICC.”755She added, “It is important to judge 
the best timing and context to make [critical] comments.”756 As a former Amnesty 
International actor explained more candidly, public focus on the Court‟s failings at the 
Review Conference could lead state parties to cut funding or withdraw cooperation, 
potentially further undermining the whole project.
757
 In the interests of building state 
support, many NGOs withheld public censure of the ICC‟s partial justice. Ultimately, 
this approach contributed to the international community‟s failure to acknowledge the 
troubling impact of the ICC. As critical scholars such as Scholte highlight, “even 
contrary to their intentions and self-perceptions,” civil activists can “become co-
opted, compromising their potential to…provide space for dissent.”758  
 
Critical Spaces of Resistance  
 
In contrast to the majority of civil society organizations, however, a few domestic and 
international NGOs created spaces of resistance. A handful of groups such as RLP, 
the (international) Women‟s Initiative for Gender Justice (WIGJ), and the Ugandan 
Victims Foundation (UVF) provided platforms for critical voices to surface regarding 
the impact of the Court. The WIGJ for instance, hosted a well-attended „Women‟s 
Court,‟ which opened the floor to female activists from the DRC, Uganda and Kenya. 
Among a range of concerns, Ugandan women from the north passionately drew 
attention to the highly troubling one-sided approach of the ICC to the northern 
conflict, and noted that Uganda‟s ICD is likely to replicate the ICC‟s biased justice.759 
One woman emphasized that northern communities affected by the war have wide-
ranging „justice‟ needs, including economic opportunities and truth telling, and noted 
that the ICC had brought about little positive change to date.   
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Various side events at the Conference initiated by, or involving RLP actors provided 
rare spaces of raw, rigorous debate. In particular, an event organized by RLP entitled 
„The Politics of Peace and Justice‟ provided a platform for Conference attendees to 
critically address the reality of the power-driven landscape in which the ICC 
maneuvers and the limited scope of the ICC‟s narrow conception of „justice.‟ In the 
discussion panel, for example, Adam Branch emphasized, “The ICC…faces the 
impossible task of acting morally in a political world rent by power inequalities.”760 
Accordingly, “in its quest for efficacy, the ICC must often accommodate itself to 
political power.” In the case of Uganda, “the ICC has granted the Ugandan 
Government impunity for its violence.”761 He furthermore drew attention to the way 
in which the ICC has „monopolized‟ the discourse of justice in Uganda, ignoring the 
vast economic injustices wrought through the war. In an event titled “NGOs and the 
International Criminal Court: the State of the Union?” RLP emphasized the ways that 
the ICC obstructed peace processes that local civil society actors in Uganda had 
strived to cultivate.  
 
On the few such occasions when deeper criticisms were voiced, tensions between 
different civil society groups surfaced abruptly. While critical groups (most 
prominently RLP) tended to perceive many NGOs and the CICC as „cheer leaders‟ of 
the Court, some NGOs conversely viewed RLP as ultimately destructive of the project 
of justice.
762
 At RLP‟s “Politics of Peace and Justice” event, for instance, a guest 
scholar made a passing critique of the „World Victims Day‟ soccer match at which 
victims briefly kicked a ball with President Museveni in front of thousands of ICC 
Conference attendees. He noted that the soccer match, like the Review Conference, 
was “further testament” to the ICC‟s allegiance with the Ugandan Government which 
itself bore a degree of responsibility for the conflict.
763
The match itself was initiated 
by UCICC, Hurinet-U and NPWJ, who apparently perceived no irony in the event. In 
response, numerous actors including the organizers of the event accused the speaker 
of unnecessarily disparaging a positive occasion. In a later interview, a UCICC actor 
declared that RLP is “not only anti-Court but anti-victims,” emphasizing that the 
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football match simply gave victims “some joy in their hearts.”764 Rather than 
addressing the real issues at hand, supporters of international justice frequently turn to 
moralistic defenses. 
 
It should be finally noted that smaller local NGOs were marginalized at the Review 
Conference. Groups that might have played a highly critical role in assessing the 
impact of the ICC (for instance NUTJWG and JRP) were physically confined to the 
obscurely located „People‟s Space,‟ which was rarely frequented by state delegates. 
Limited seating in the plenary hall prevented many representatives of such groups 
from attending official events. According to civil society participants at the Review, 
securing a „slot‟ to run a side event could also prove difficult for smaller, less well-
known groups.
765
 The Conference therefore exemplified the imbalanced power 
dynamics at play within global civil society.  
 
Civil society involvement in the „governance of global spaces‟ is diverse. While the 
majority of civil society actors participating at the Conference uncritically affirmed 
the ICC as the pinnacle of global justice, only a few groups challenged this discourse, 
contesting the ICC‟s monopoly on the notion of „justice‟ and dominant narratives of 
the war in Uganda. The following section further explores the implications of this 
thesis for the field of transitional justice. 
 
Critical Implications for the Field of Transitional Justice  
As originally conceived, „transitional justice‟ was an internationally driven project 
that focused upon instituting legal measures to address violations of political and civil 
rights after a period of repressive authoritarian rule or civil war. As identified in 
Chapter One, a rigorous debate has emerged over the scope, direction and goals of the 
field of transitional justice. A new wave of critiques has questioned the top down, 
deceptively depoliticized, and narrow nature of transitional justice, leading some 
authors to cast doubt upon the future of the field. Drawing on the case study of 
Uganda, this thesis engaged with three critical overlapping areas of current debate that 
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have emerged: the exclusion of socioeconomic justice, the relationship between 
international, national and local actors, and the role and impact of transitional justice 
discourse.  
 
Socioeconomic Justice as Transitional Justice  
 
Throughout this thesis I have contended that transitional justice must embrace the 
concept of socioeconomic justice. Without a concept of socioeconomic justice, 
transitional justice may fail to address the underlying dynamics of conflict as well as 
the priorities of survivors, and fall short of activating long-term transformation. 
Exclusion of socioeconomic issues from the scope of justice simply serves to bolster 
Government driven narratives of the northern conflict.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, social and economic issues clearly factored heavily in 
the northern conflict. In many ways the war both stemmed from, and resulted in 
socioeconomic deprivation and inequality. While dominant narratives cast the LRA as 
an irrational terrorist group, the LRA movement emerged in response to historical 
patterns of economic and political exclusion. The intertwined economic and strategic 
interests of international and national actors furthermore created a system that 
perpetuated the war and the economically destructive practice of displacement. As 
contended in Chapter four, issues of „embedded‟ socioeconomic justice are 
accordingly a top priority for communities affected by the war in Northern Uganda. 
While scholars and NGOs often distinguish socioeconomic recovery and development 
from matters of „justice,‟ this distinction does not reflect the perspective of many 
communities. Given that the current livelihood struggles of Northern Ugandans 
stemmed directly from a war in which the state bears significant responsibility, it is 
arbitrary and misleading to exclude socioeconomic development from the scope of 
justice.  
 
Chapter five demonstrated that the socioeconomic „void‟ in transitional justice 
discourse ultimately threatens to undermine postwar transformation. Rather than 
marking the beginning of „transition,‟ the PRDP replicates the inadequacies of 
previous northern rehabilitation programs, and ultimately fails to address the disparity 
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between the North and the rest of the country. Framing socioeconomic issues as a 
matter of transitional justice could help create pressure for the PRDP to mark a radical 
break with the past. Casting socioeconomic justice as an aspect of transitional justice, 
furthermore, could provide a critical, transformative edge to postwar development. As 
discussed, many civil society actors in Northern Uganda often fail to politically 
challenge the Government‟s poor response to the vast socioeconomic needs of 
northern communities or the corrupt siphoning of funds. The thriving Gulu NGO 
industry risks becoming a substitute for the very economy it supposedly aims to 
develop. Framing postwar development as a „justice‟ issue however, casts attention on 
the responsibility of the state, and explicitly reclaims development as a deeply 
political issue. If socioeconomic wellbeing is understood as a pressing transitional 
justice concern, civil society groups might increasingly press the Government to 
become both capable and politically willing to invest in re-envisioning a postwar 
economy and social infrastructure for Uganda.  
 
Global Dimensions of Transitional Justice  
 
At the heart of the debate over the role of international, national and local actors in 
transitional justice lie critical questions that about international governance and the 
boundaries of state sovereignty. What role, if any, should international intervention 
play within the internal workings of the state? Who defines the goals, standards and 
parameters of transitional justice? Scholars have increasingly critiqued the top down, 
legalistic, international-driven nature of transitional justice, and have drawn attention 
to local-level „bottom-up‟ approaches. Much transitional justice scholarship has 
concentrated somewhat narrowly upon appraising the impact of mechanisms 
implemented by different „levels,‟ whether internationally imposed, or performed 
locally. This thesis expanded such critiques by focusing on the varied ways in which 
different international, national and local actors influence one another, and narrate 
different stories of conflict and its remedy. Throughout my analysis of the Ugandan 
case, I have demonstrated that actors at all levels have significant capacity to cultivate 
or restrict the opening of critical political space in which dominant discourses of the 
war and the nature of „transition‟ can be challenged.  
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As discussed in Chapter two, the war itself resulted from a complex interplay of local, 
national, and international factors. Northern communities became enmeshed between 
the structural violence of the Ugandan Government and the atrocities of the (local) 
LRA, facilitated by various international actors and systems. As demonstrated in 
Chapter four, while scholars often juxtapose local traditional justice against 
international retributive justice, a better distinction can be made between embedded 
and indirect justice. These categories evade strict definition as national, local or 
international. Most northerners appear primarily concerned with „embedded‟ justice, 
encompassing socioeconomic justice and local approaches to dealing with the social 
and spiritual dislocation of war. „Indirect‟ justice is less of a priority, but still vital. 
Although Acholi people hold divergent beliefs regarding the most suitable fate of the 
LRA leadership, many believe they must face criminal trial. Locals appear united in 
their desire for state actors to be held accountable. The role of international actors and 
domestic civil society groups must be to cultivate the development of processes that 
reflect local priorities and challenge self-interested power, whether at the local, 
national or international level.  
 
Chapter three demonstrated the starkly divergent roles that can be played by 
international actors in the search for justice. The ICC‟s intervention served to bolster 
the Government‟s narrative of the war and narrow the scope of „justice‟ to those who 
commit extreme physical violation. In contrast, a variety of international and local 
actors were instrumental in generating a highly critical political space in the Juba. 
Dominant narratives of the war were challenged, and the scope of justice was 
expanded to address socioeconomic inequality, structural injustice and the restoration 
of relationships. As discussed in Chapter five, the development of national transitional 
justice policy in Uganda continues to be characterized by ongoing struggle between 
actors at all levels. The power to define and perform postwar „justice is concentrated 
in the hands of the state. A high risk persists that Uganda‟s transitional justice policy 
will prove an empty performance of „victors justice‟ focusing narrowly on the 
criminal trial of a few LRA. International and domestic actors alike have often 
shaped, facilitated and justified the Government‟s self-interested approach. In various 
ways, the ICC, international development partners, NGO donors and domestic civil 
society actors have failed to provide sufficient challenge to State power, and 
contributed to the narrowing of the scope of Justice in Uganda. Conversely, 
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international, national and local actors have also challenged the State‟s approach to 
justice. Critical voices have stemmed from a deeper engagement with the people of 
Northern Uganda, their story and diverse views, rather than the zealous pursuit of the 
idea of international criminal justice.  
 
Actors at all „levels‟ are furthermore involved in constructing the dominant global 
discourse of justice. As highlighted by the discussion of the Review Conference 
above, the dominance of international criminal law, institutionalized in the ICC, was 
only brought about through the efforts of a vast array of worldwide civil society 
actors. As CICC actors proudly agree, the Court exists because a global collaboration 
of NGOs and activists fought, and continue to fight for it. In their eagerness to 
buttress the project of international criminal justice, many civil society actors have 
become blind to the narrow scope and disturbing consequences of its application. On 
the fringes of the 2010 Review Conference of the ICC, however, a small number of 
civil society actors also contested both the ICC‟s monopoly on the notion of „justice‟ 
and dominant narratives of the war in Uganda. Their efforts at the Conference 
mirrored the engagement of civil society actors in the struggle for transition in 
Uganda. In many ways, the struggle for a meaningful approach to postwar justice is 
global.  
Transitional Justice Discourse  
 
As discussed in Chapter One, scholars have increasingly debated the role and impact 
of transitional justice discourse, and the extent to which it is tainted by its liberal, 
imperialist, legalistic origins. This thesis demonstrated that actors in Uganda certainly 
draw upon „transitional justice‟ as a language of resistance. As explored in Chapter 
Three, the radical Agreements wrought at Juba drew strongly on the language and 
concepts of transitional justice. Chapter Five, moreover, demonstrated that in the 
Ugandan context transitional justice discourse has not provided a façade for ongoing 
injustice. Rather, civil society actors strategically utilize the language of transitional 
justice to politically challenge and confront the Ugandan Government‟s portrayal of 
the war and lack of engagement in „transition‟ after the war. Such actors use the 
framework of transitional justice as a globally recognized language to engage a 
reluctant state in the absence of meaningful change.  
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However, it is also evident that the radical capacity of transitional justice discourse is 
constrained by the globally constructed boundaries of the field. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, civil society actors believe that „transitional justice‟ is a flexible tool to 
be „wielded as desired,‟ and sometimes aim to embrace the broader concept of 
socioeconomic justice in their work. However, in practice it appears that civil society 
actors often constrict and translate local justice needs into the „conventional‟ globally 
accepted transitional justice framework. This trend reflects the marginalized status of 
socioeconomic justice in the wider field of transitional justice scholarship and 
practice. The capacity of the discourse to give political expression to the priorities of 
local communities is therefore restricted. I have argued that if the discourse of 
transitional justice is to become a truly radical tool of resistance in particular contexts, 
it must unequivocally address socioeconomic issues and structural violence.  
 
Discussion: Critical Implications for the Future of the Field 
 
The expansion of critique has brought about a growing sense of „unease‟ amongst 
critical scholars about the future direction of the field of transitional justice.
766
 Some 
critical scholars have suggested that those seeking meaningful transformation in the 
wake of war should abandon the concept entirely.
767
 Other scholars have expressed 
concern that if the notion of transitional justice is expanded to encompass structural 
violence and social and economic inequality, it may lose its normative power.
768
 
Scholars furthermore query whether anything distinctive remains about „transitional 
justice‟ as opposed to „justice.‟769  
 
Given the current contours of the transitional justice framework, it is unsurprising that 
scholars have expressed doubt that the field could maintain its „normative influence‟ 
if such an expansion is attempted.
770
 However, this approach risks becoming a self-
fulfilling prophesy. The revelation that transitional justice has become a „global 
discourse‟ is sobering, but also offers radical prospects. Potential exists for global 
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civil society actors to challenge the current confines of the transitional justice 
framework and reconstruct a new, critical approach. This potential is evident in the 
clear sense of local ownership transitional justice evident in Uganda, and the ambition 
of civil society groups to encompass socioeconomic justice to express local demands 
for justice. In effect, to reshape the scope and nature of global justice discourse, local, 
national and international civil society actors, policy makers and researchers must 
increasingly engage in critique of the current limited scope of „justice,‟ and articulate 
demands for socioeconomic justice within the transitional justice framework.  
 
Certainly, the inclusion of socioeconomic justice within the scope of transitional 
justice could deeply alter the nature of the entire enterprise. In any society, the search 
for social and economic justice and equality is an endless pursuit that extends far 
beyond the limited time span of most „transitions‟ from periods of conflict or unjust 
rule. While South Africa‟s TRC helped to ease political transition, inequality and self-
enforced, bitter racial segregation persists. Over 150 years after British colonization, 
New Zealand still grapples with widespread socioeconomic disparity between Maori 
and Pakeha and various land rights issues, while the gap between lower and upper 
classes amongst the general population continues to wax and wane. „Justice‟ is not 
something that can be decisively achieved or conclusively implemented through a 
particular policy, a specific reparations program, the imprisonment of key 
perpetrators, or even acts of institutional reform. As Derrida recognized, the divide 
between the pure, unconditional concept of „justice‟ and conditional realm of political 
realities and particular laws and policies is vast.
771
 A just societal relationship is 
something that can only be continually approximated through political struggle, and 
endlessly cultivated through constant critical questioning of particular approaches and 
hegemonic assumptions.
772
 In Derridean terms, „justice‟ opens out to the future, and is 
always “to come.”773 Embracing the concept of socioeconomic justice could 
ultimately help to re-envision transitional justice as a radical process of social and 
economic transformation. 
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The question posed by Nagy of what is distinctive about transitional justice as 
opposed to „justice‟ if the notion “reaches out to rectify social inequality and 
structural violence” is certainly valid.774 As the Ugandan case suggests however, the 
idea of „transition‟ provides a particular impetus and momentum to the concept of 
justice. The depth of economic devastation, inequity, social dislocation and broken 
relationships that abounds in the wake of war necessitates extraordinary and 
specialized response. In such circumstances, the idea of „transitional justice‟ can be 
powerful. As civil society actors in Uganda at all levels have demonstrated, the 
concept of transitional justice can provide a mobilizing rhetoric that can spur 
transformation in the absence of meaningful change. Special „transitional justice‟ 
measures, whether trials, socioeconomic reconstruction or reparations, certainly have 
the potential to initiate a process of social restoration. While certainly at some point, 
the pursuit of transitional justice may seamlessly merge into the endless search for a 
just society, the concept of „transition‟ provides a critical edge, and initial momentum.   
 
This thesis suggests a number of future research possibilities for the field of 
transitional justice. Firstly, while this thesis has drawn on the Ugandan case to 
demonstrate that socioeconomic development must be incorporated into the concept 
of transitional justice, a vast array of questions remain as to what this might involve. 
If transitional justice is expanded to encompass socioeconomic justice, the field must 
become equipped to grapple with the complex, controversial issues of economic 
recovery and development. Beyond the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, health, 
and education services, complex issues such as land repatriation, Government 
taxation and fiscal policy, privatization, (de)centralization, and state regulation will 
become increasingly relevant.  
 
Secondly, this thesis highlighted the influential role that can be played by 
international „development partners‟ in the field of transitional justice. Future 
transitional justice research must further explore the nature of the relationship 
between developing nations and their donors, examining how such actors can best 
cultivate the genuine engagement of the state, and when and how critical pressure 
should be applied. Thirdly, this thesis has illustrated the difficulties civil society 
groups face in representing, engaging and mobilizing local communities in 
                                                 
774
 Nagy, Transitional Justice From Below, p.709 
196 
 
„transitional justice‟ advocacy and bringing about change in the context of a reluctant 
state. Future research could accordingly address this challenge by drawing the field of 
transitional justice into dialogue with theories of civil society activism, social change 
in developing nations, and donor-NGO relationships.  
 
The struggle for a meaningful approach to transitional justice in Uganda that truly 
addresses the underlying dynamics of conflict has global dimensions. While the 
pursuit of international criminal law has monopolized the development for postwar 
justice in Uganda, the growth of a global „countermovement‟ is possible. The field of 
transitional justice, I have argued, must be expanded to embrace the idea of 
socioeconomic justice. Without a concept of socioeconomic justice, transitional 
justice will ultimately fall short of activating long-term social transformation, and the 
unending pursuit of a just society. In the current world order, international actors are 
often deeply embedded within the structures of the sovereign state and civil society.  
The emergence of critical, expansive approach to transitional justice is only possible 
therefore through the collective efforts of actors at all levels. 
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Appendix: List of Interviews 
 
Interviews in Villages in Gulu District 
Author‟s interview with a female Local Councilor 1 (B) (Unyama sub county, Gulu 
District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a female Local Councilor 1 (A) (Unyama Sub County, Gulu 
District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a female villager (Unyama Sub County, Gulu District, July 
2010) 
 
Author‟s interview with a male traditional leader (Unyama Sub County, Gulu District, 
July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a male traditional leader (Unyama Sub County, Gulu District, 
July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with male elder (Unyama sub county, Gulu District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with male villager (Unyama Sub County, Gulu District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a formerly abducted woman (Paicho Sub County, Gulu 
District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with female elder (Paicho sub county, Gulu District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with female villager (Paicho Sub County, Gulu District, July 
2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with male elder (Paicho sub county, Gulu District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with the Local Councilor 3 (Paicho Sub County, Gulu District, 
July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a formerly abducted young man (Patiko Sub County, Gulu 
District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a male Local Councilor 1(A) (Patiko Sub County, Gulu 
District, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a male Local Councilor 1(B) (Patiko Sub County, Gulu 
District, July 2010) 
 
Author‟s interview with a female tailor (outskirts of Gulu town, July 2010) 
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Gulu Town Civil Society Actors 
Author‟s interview with a former member of the executive of the Acholi War Debt 
Claimants (Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a local civil society representative (Gulu, August 2010) 
 
Author‟s interview with a local human rights activist (Gulu, July 2010)   
 
Author‟s interview with the director of a local NGO (Gulu, July 2010)   
 
Author‟s interview with a NGO worker employed by the ICC Victims Trust Fund 
(Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with a staff member of Caritas Gulu (Gulu, July 2010) 
 
Author‟s interview with representative of Ker Kwaro Acholi (Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with representative of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with the Director of Human Rights Focus (Gulu, August 2010) 
 
Author‟s interview with Chairperson of the Northern Ugandan Transitional Justice 
Working Group (Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with Coordinator of the Northern Ugandan Transitional Justice 
Working Group (Gulu, July 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with member of the Northern Ugandan Transitional Justice 
Working Group Secretariat (Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with representative of the Teso sub region, Northern Ugandan 
Transitional Justice Working Group (Gulu, August 2010) 
 
Author‟s interview with local lawyer (A) (Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with local lawyer (B) (Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with local lawyer (C) (Gulu, August 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with staff member of Justice and Reconciliation Project (A) (Gulu, 
June 2010) 
 
Author‟s interview with staff member of Justice and Reconciliation Project (B) (Gulu, 
June 2010)  
 
Author‟s interview with staff member of Justice and Reconciliation Project (C) (Gulu, 
June 2010)  
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Author‟s interview with staff member of Justice and Reconciliation Project (D) (Gulu, 
June 2010)  
 
Local Government Actors 
Author‟s interview with a representative of the Uganda Human Rights Commission, 
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